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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters. Chapter 1 examines the
determinants and welfare implications of the increased geographic of workers by skill
from 1980 to 2000. I estimate a structural spatial equilibrium model of local labor
demand, housing supply, labor supply, and amenity levels. The estimates indicate that
cross-city changes in rmsdemands for high and low skill labor were the underlying
forces driving the increase in geographic skill sorting. I nd that the combined e¤ects
of changes in citieswages, rents, and endogenous amenities increased well-being in-
equality between high school and college graduates by a signicantly larger amount
than would be suggested by the increase in the college wage gap alone.
Chapter 2 examines the abilities of state and local governments to extract rent
from private sector workers by charging high tax rates and paying government workers
high wages. Using a spatial equilibrium model where private sector workers are free
to migrate across government jurisdictions, I show that variation in areas housing
supply elasticities di¤erentially restrains governments abilities to extract rent from
private sector workers. Governments in less housing elastic areas can charge higher
taxes without worry of shrinking their tax bases. I test the models predictions by
using worker wage data from the CPS-MORG. I nd the public-private sector wage
gap is higher in areas with less elastic housing supplies.
Chapter 3 studies the standard practice in regression analyses to allow for clustering
in the error covariance matrix when an explanatory variable varies at a more aggregate
level than the units of observation. However, the structure of the error covariance
matrix may be more complex, with correlations not vanishing for units in di¤erent
clusters. I show that with equal-sized clusters, if the covariate of interest is randomly
assigned at the cluster level, only accounting for non-zero covariances at the cluster
iii
level, and ignoring correlations between clusters as well as di¤erences in within-cluster
correlations, leads to valid condence intervals. However, in the absence of random
assignment of the covariates, ignoring general correlation structures may lead to biases
in standard errors.
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Introduction
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters all related to local labor mar-
ket economics. Chapter 1 studies the causes and welfare consequences of the increase in
geographic sorting of workers by skill from 1980 to 2000. During this time period, the sub-
stantial rise in the U.S. college-high school graduate wage gap coincided with an increase
in geographic sorting as college graduates increasingly concentrated in high wage, high rent
metropolitan areas, relative to lower skill workers. The increase in wage inequality may
not reect a similar increase in well-being inequality because high and low skill workers
increasingly paid di¤erent housing costs and consumed di¤erent local amenities.
This chapter examines the determinants and welfare implications of the increased geo-
graphic skill sorting. I estimate a structural spatial equilibrium model of local labor de-
mand, housing supply, labor supply, and amenity levels. The model allows local amenity
and productivity levels to endogenously respond to a citys skill-mix. I identify the model
parameters using local labor demand changes driven by variation in citiesindustry mixes
and interactions of these labor demand shocks with determinants of housing supply (land
use regulations and land availability). The GMM estimates indicate that cross-city changes
in rmsdemands for high and low skill labor were the underlying forces of the increase
in geographic skill sorting. An increase in labor demand for college relative to non-college
workers increases a citys college employment share, which then endogenously raises the local
productivity of all workers and improves local amenities. Local wage and amenity growth
generates in-migration, driving up rents. My estimates show that low skill workers are less
willing to pay high housing costs to live in high-amenity cities, leading them to elect more
a¤ordable, low-amenity cities. I nd that the combined e¤ects of changes in citieswages,
rents, and endogenous amenities increased well-being inequality between high school and
college graduates by a signicantly larger amount than would be suggested by the increase
in the college wage gap alone.
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Chapter 2 examines the abilities of state and local governments to extract rent from
private sector workers by charging high tax rates and spending the revenue on non-social
desirable projects, such as excessive government worker wages. Using a spatial equilibrium
model where private sector workers are free to migrate across government jurisdictions, I
show that private sector workersmigration elasticity with respect to local taxes determines
the magnitude of rent extraction by rent seeking state and local governments. Since private
sector workers vote with their feetby migrating out of rent extractive areas, governments
trade o¤ the benets a higher tax rate with the cost of a smaller population to tax.
Variation in areashousing supply elasticities di¤erentially restrains governmentsabilities
to extract rent from private sector workers. The incidence of a tax increase falls more on
local housing prices in a less housing elastic area, leading to less out-migration. Thus,
governments in less housing elastic areas can charge higher taxes without worry of shrinking
their tax bases. I test the models predictions by using worker wage data from the CPS-
MORG. I nd the public-private sector wage gap is higher in areas with less elastic housing
supplies. This fact holds both within state across metropolitan areas for local government
workers and between states for state government workers.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Guido Imbens, Michal Kolesar, and Thomas
Barrios, we examine the standard practice in regression analyses of allowing for clustering
in the error covariance matrix when the explanatory variable of interest varies at a more
aggregate level (e.g., the state level) than the units of observation (e.g., individuals). Often,
however, the structure of the error covariance matrix is more complex, with correlations not
vanishing for units in di¤erent clusters. Here we explore the implications of such correlations
for the actual and estimated precision of least squares estimators. Our main theoretical result
is that with equal-sized clusters, if the covariate of interest is randomly assigned at the cluster
level, only accounting for non-zero covariances at the cluster level, and ignoring correlations
between clusters as well as di¤erences in within-cluster correlations, leads to valid condence
intervals. However, in the absence of random assignment of the covariates, ignoring general
2
correlation structures may lead to biases in standard errors. We illustrate our ndings using
the 5% public use census data. Based on these results we recommend that researchers as a
matter of routine explore the extent of spatial correlations in explanatory variables beyond
state level clustering.
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Chapter 1
The Determinants and Welfare Implications of US
WorkersDiverging Location Choices by Skill:
1980-2000
1.1 Introduction
The dramatic increase in the wage gap between high school and college graduates over the
past three decades has been accompanied by a substantial increase in geographic sorting of
workers by skill.1 Metropolitan areas which had a disproportionately high share of college
graduates in 1980 further increased their share of college graduates from 1980 to 2000.
Increasingly high skill cities also experienced higher wage and housing price growth than less
skilled cities (Moretti (2004b), Shapiro (2006)). Moretti (2012) coins this phenomenon "The
Great Divergence."
These facts call into question whether the increase in the college wage gap reects a sim-
ilar increase in the college well-being gap. Since college graduates increasingly live in areas
with high housing costs, local price levels might o¤set some of the consumption benets of
their high wages, making the increase in wage inequality overstate the increase in consump-
tion or well-being inequality (Moretti (2011b)). Alternatively, high housing cost cities may
o¤er workers desirable amenities, compensating them for high house prices, and possibly
increasing the well-being of workers in these cities. The welfare implications of the increased
geographic skill sorting depend on why high and low skill workers increasingly chose to live
in di¤erent cities.
This paper examines the determinants of high and low skill workerschoices to increas-
ingly segregate themselves into di¤erent cities and the welfare implications of these choices.
By estimating a structural spatial equilibrium model of local labor demand, housing supply,
1This large increase in wage inequality has led to an active area of research into the drivers of changes in
the wage distribution nationwide. See Goldin and Katz (2007) for a recent survey.
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labor supply, and amenity levels in cities, I show that changes in rmsrelative demands for
high and low skill labor across cities, due to local productivity changes, were the underlying
drivers of the di¤erential migration patterns of high and low skill workers.2 Despite local
wage changes being the initial cause of workersmigration, I nd that cities which attracted
a higher share of college graduates endogenously became more desirable places to live and
more productive for both high and low skill labor. The combination of desirable wages
and amenities made college workers willing to pay high housing costs to live in these cities.
While lower skill workers also found these areaswages and amenities desirable, they were
less willing to pay high housing costs, leading them to choose more a¤ordable cities. Overall,
I nd that the welfare e¤ects of changes in local wages, rents, and endogenous amenities led
to an increase in well-being inequality between college and high school graduates which was
signicantly larger than would be suggested by the increase in the college wage gap alone.
To build intuition for this e¤ect, consider the metropolitan areas of Detroit and Boston.
The economic downturn in Detroit has been largely attributed to decline of auto manu-
facturing (Martelle (2012)), but the decline goes beyond the loss of high paying jobs. In
2009, Detroit public schools had the lowest scores ever recorded in the 21-year history of
the national math prociency test (Winerip (2011)). Historically, the Detroit school district
had not always been in such a poor state. In the early 20th century, when manufacturing
was booming, Detroits public school system was lauded as a model for the nation in urban
education (Mirel (1999)).
By comparison, Boston has increasingly attracted high skill workers with its cluster of
biotech, medical device, and technology rms. In the mid 1970s, Boston public schools were
declining in quality, driven by racial tensions from integrating the schools (Cronin (2011)).
In 2006, however, the Boston public school district won the Broad Prize, which honors the
urban school district that demonstrates the greatest overall performance and improvement
2Work by Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Moretti (2011b) come to similar conclusions. Berry and Glaeser
(2005) consider the role of entrepreneurship in cities. Moretti (2011b) analyzes the di¤erential labor demands
for high and low skill workers across industries.
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in student achievement while reducing achievement gaps among low-income and minority
students. Similar patterns can be seen in the histories of the Detroit and Boston Symphony
Orchestras.3 The prosperity of Boston and decline of Detroit go beyond jobs and wages,
directly impacting the amenities and quality-of-life in these areas.
I illustrate these mechanisms more generally using U.S. Census data by estimating a
structural spatial equilibrium model of cities. The setup shares features of the Rosen (1979)
and Roback (1982) frameworks, but I extend the model to allow workers to have heterogenous
preferences for cities. The fully estimated model allows me to assess the importance of
changes in citieswages, rents, and amenities in di¤erentially driving high and low skill
workers to di¤erent cities.
I use a static discrete choice setup to model workerscity choices.4 The model allows
workers with di¤erent demographics to di¤erentially trade o¤ the relative values of cities
characteristics, leading them to make di¤erent location decisions.5 Workers maximize their
utility by living in the city which o¤ers them the most desirable bundle of wages, housing
rent, and amenities.
Firms in each city use capital, high skill labor, and low skill labor as inputs into produc-
tion. High and low skill labor have a constant elasticity of substitution in rmsproduction
functions. I assume capital is sold in a national market, while labor is hired locally in a per-
fectly competitive labor market. Housing markets di¤er across cities due to heterogeneity in
their elasticity of housing supply.
The key distinguishing worker characteristic is skill, as measured by graduation from a
4-year college. Citieslocal productivity levels di¤er across high and low skill workers, and
3The Detroit Symphony Orchestra was one of the top in the nation during the 1950s. More recently, it
has defaulted on loans, and is facing a labor dispute over wage cuts driven by decreased ticket sales and
corporate donations. (Bennett (2010)) The Boston Symphony Orchestra, however, continues to be one of
the best in the world.
4The model could be extended to allow for dynamics, as done by Kennan and Walker (2011) and Bishop
(2010). However, panel data is needed to estimate a model of this nature. I focus on the role of preference
heterogeneity in determining long run migration patterns, while Kennan and Walker (2011) and Bishop
(2010) focus exclusively on high-school graduates and life-cycle migration patterns.
5Estimation of spatial equilibrium models when households have heterogeneous preferences using hedonics
have been analyzed by Epple and Sieg (1999).
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the productivity levels of both high and low skill workers within a city are endogenously
impacted by the skill-mix in the city. Thus, changes in the skill-mix of a city will impact
local wages both by moving along rms labor demand curves and by directly impacting
worker productivity.
A citys skill-mix is also allowed to inuence local amenity levels, both directly, as more
educated neighbors may be desirable, and indirectly by improving a variety of city amenities
(Chapter 5 in Becker and Murphy (2000)). Indeed, observable amenities such as bars and
restaurants per capita, crime rates, and pollution levels improve in areas with larger college
populations and decline in areas with larger non-college populations. I use the ratio of
college to non-college employees in each city as a unidimensional index for all amenities that
endogenously respond to the demographics of citiesresidents.
Workerspreferences for cities are estimated using a two-step estimator, similar to the
methods used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) and the setup proposed by McFadden
(1973). In the rst step, a maximum likelihood estimator is used to identify how desirable
each city is to each type of worker, on average, in each decade, controlling for workerspref-
erences to live close to their state of birth. The utility levels for each city estimated in the
rst step are used in the second step to estimate how workers trade o¤ wages, rents, and
amenities when selecting a location to live. The second step of estimation uses a simultane-
ous equation non-linear GMM estimator. Moment restrictions on workerspreferences are
combined with moments identifying citieslabor demand and housing supply curves. These
moments are used to simultaneously estimate local labor demand, housing supply, and labor
supply to cities.
The model is identied using local labor demand shocks driven by the industry mix in each
city and their interactions with local housing supply elasticities. Variation in productivity
changes across industries di¤erentially impact cities local labor demand for high and low
skill workers based on the industrial composition of the citys workforce (Bartik (1991)). I
measure exogenous local productivity changes by interacting cross-sectional di¤erences in
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industrial employment composition with national changes in industry wage levels separately
for high and low skill workers.
I allow cities housing supply elasticities to vary based on geographic constraints on
developable land around a citys center and land-use regulations (Saiz (2010), Gyourko,
Saiz, and Summers (2008)). A citys housing supply elasticity will inuence the equilibrium
wage, rent, and population response to the labor demand shocks driven by industrial labor
demand changes.
Workersmigration responses to changes in citieswages, rents, and endogenous ameni-
ties driven by the Bartik labor demand shocks and the interactions of these labor demand
shocks with housing supply elasticity determinants identify workerspreferences for cities
characteristics. Housing supply elasticities are identied by the response of housing rents to
the Bartik shocks across cities.
The interaction of the Bartik productivity shocks with citieshousing markets identies
the labor demand elasticities. The wage di¤erences, driven by the productivity shocks, induce
workers to migrate to cities which o¤er more desirable wages. The migration drives demand
in the local housing markets, which impacts house prices, as determined by the elasticity of
housing supply. Heterogeneity in housing supply elasticity leads to di¤erences in population
changes, in response to a given Bartik shock. For a given size labor demand shock, fewer
workers will migrate to a city with a less elastic housing supply because rents increase more
than in a more elastic city. Thus, the interaction of Bartik shocks with measures of housing
supply elasticity creates variation in high and low skill local populations which is independent
of unobserved local productivity changes, which can identify labor demand elasticities.
The parameter estimates of workerspreferences show that while both college and non-
college workers nd higher wages, lower rents, and higher amenity levels desirable, high skill
workersdemand is relatively more sensitive to amenity levels and low skill workersdemand
is more sensitive to wages and rents.6 The labor demand estimates show that increases
6These results are consistent with a large body of work in empirical industrial organization which nds
substantial heterogeneity in consumersprice sensitivites. A Consumers price sensitivity is also found to be
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in the college employment ratio leads to productivity spillovers on both college and non-
college workers. Combining the estimates of rmselasticity of labor substitution with the
productivity spillovers, I nd that an increase in a citys college worker population raises
both local college and non-college wages. Similarly, an increase in a citys non-college worker
population decreases college and non-college wages.
Using the estimated model, I decompose the changes in citiescollege employment ratios
into the underlying changes in labor demand, housing supply, and labor supply to cities. I
show that when a citys productivity gap between high and low skill workers exogenously
increases, the local wage gap between these workers increases. If the migration responses to
these wage changes lead to an increase in the local share of college workers, the wages of
all workers will further increase beyond the initial e¤ect of the productivity change due to
the combination of endogenous productivity changes and shifts along rmslabor demand
curves.
In addition to raising wages, an increase in a citys college employment ratio leads to
local amenity improvements. The combination of desirable wage and amenity growth for all
workers causes large amounts of in-migration, as college workers are particularly attracted
by desirable amenities, while low skill workers are particularly attracted by desirable wages.
The increased housing demand in high college share cities leads to large rent increases. Since
low skill workers are more price sensitive, the increases in rent disproportionately discourage
low skill workers from living in these high wage, high amenity cities. Lower skill workers are
not willing to pay the priceof a lower real wage to live in high amenity cities. Thus, in
equilibrium, college workers sort into high wage, high rent, high amenity cities.
I use the model estimates to quantify the change in well-being inequality. I nd the
welfare impacts due to wage, rent, and endogenous amenity changes from 1980 to 2000 led
to an increase in well-being inequality equivalent to at least a 24 percentage point increase
in the college wage gap, which is 20% more than the actual increase in the college wage gap.
closely linked to his income. See Nevo (2010) for a review of this literature.
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In other words, the additional utility college workers gained from of being able to consume
more desirable amenities made them better o¤ relative to high school graduates, despite the
high local housing prices.
This paper is related to several literatures. Most closely related to this paper is work
studying how local wages, rents, and employment respond to local labor demand shocks
(Topel (1986), Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992), Saks (2008), Notowidigdo (2011).
See Moretti (2011a) for a review.) Traditionally, this literature has only allowed local labor
demand shocks to inuence worker migration through wage and rents changes.7 My results
suggest that endogenous local amenity changes are an important mechanism driving workers
migration responses to local labor demand shocks.
A small and growing literature has considered how amenities change in response the
composition of an areas local residents (Chapter 5 in Becker and Murphy (2000), Bayer,
Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008), Guerrieri, Hartley, and
Hurst (2011), Handbury (2012)). Work by Handbury (2012) studies the desirability and
prices of grocery products for sale across cities. Her work nds that higher quality products
(an amenity) are more available in cities with higher incomes per-capita, but these areas
also have higher prices for groceries. The paper nds higher income households are more
willing to pay for grocery quality, leading them to prefer the high price, high quality grocery
markets, relative to lower income households. I nd a similar relationship for amenities and
local real wages.
My ndings also relate to the literature studying changes in the wage structure and
inequality within and between local labor markets (Berry and Glaeser (2005), Beaudry,
Doms, and Lewis (2010), Moretti (2011b), Autor and Dorn (2012), Autor, Dorn, and Hanson
(2012)). Most related to this paper is Moretti (2011b), who is the rst to show the importance
of accounting for the diverging location choices of high and low skill workers when measuring
both real wage and well-being inequality changes. Another strand of this literature, most
7Notowidigdo (2011) allows government social insurance programs in a city to endogenously respond to
local wages, which is one of many endogenous amenity changes.
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specically related to my labor demand estimates, studies the impact of the relative supplies
of high and low skill labor on high and low skill wages (Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and
Lemieux (2001), Card (2009)). Card (2009) estimates the impact of local labor supply on
local wages in cities. My paper presents a new identication strategy to estimate city-level
labor demand and allows for endogenous productivity changes.
This paper is also related to the literature on the social returns to education (Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001), Moretti (2004c), Moretti (2004a)) and work studying the determinants
of economic growth in cities (Glaeser et al. (1992), Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995),
Shapiro (2006)). By using the interaction of local labor productivity shocks with housing
supply elasticities as instruments for education di¤erences across cities, I provide a new
identication strategy for measuring the impact of an increase in a citys education level on
the wages for all workers. Further, my ndings show that an increase in a citys education
level also spills over onto all workerswell-being through endogenous amenity changes.
The labor supply model and estimation draws on the discrete choice methods developed
in empirical industrial organization to estimate consumers demand for products (McFadden
(1973), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004)). These
methods have been applied to estimate householdspreferences for neighborhoods by Bayer,
Ferreira, and McMillan (2007). My paper adapts these methods to estimate the determinants
of workerslabor supply to cities.8
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 presents
reduced form facts. Section 4 lays out the model. Section 5 discusses the estimation tech-
niques. Section 6 presents parameter estimates. Section 7 discusses the estimates. Section
8 analyzes the determinants of citiescollege employment ratio changes. Section 9 presents
welfare implications. Section 10 concludes.
8Similar methods have been used by Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009), Bishop (2010), and Kennan
and Walker (2011) to estimate workerspreferences for cities. However, these papers do not allow local wages
and rents to be freely correlated with local amenities. Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009) focuses on the
demand for air quality, while Bishop (2010) and Kennan and Walker (2011) study the dynamics of migration
over the life-cycle exclusively for high school graduates.
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1.2 Data
The paper uses the 5 percent samples of the U.S. Censuses from the 1980, 1990, and 2000
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al. (2010)). These data provide
individual level observations on a wide range of economic and demographic information,
including wages, housing costs, and geographic location of residence. All analysis is restricted
to 25-55 year-olds who report positive wage earnings. The geographical unit of analysis is the
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) of residence, however I interchangeably refer to MSAs
as cities. The Census includes 218 MSAs consistently across all three decades of data. Rural
households are not assigned to an MSA in the Census. To incorporate the choice to live in
rural areas, all areas outside of MSAs within each state are grouped together and treated as
additional geographical units.9
The IPUMS data are also used to construct estimates of local area wages, population,
and housing rents in each metropolitan and rural area. The advantage of the Census data
is the ability to construct MSA-level measures disaggregated by education level and other
demographics. A key city characteristic I focus on is the local skill mix of workers. I dene
high skill or college workers as workers with positive wage earnings and who have completed
at least 4 years of college, while all other workers with positive wage earnings are classied
as low skill or non-college. Throughout the paper, the local college employment ratio is
measured by the ratio of college employees to non-college employees working within a given
MSA. I use a two skill group model since the college/non-college division is where the largest
divide in wages across education is seen, as found by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Goldin
and Katz (2008).
Citieshigh and low skill wages are measured by the average local hourly wage for each
skill level in each city. The sample used to measure local wages is restricted to workers
employed at least 35 hours a week and 48 weeks per year to get a standardized wage mea-
9Households living in MSAs which the census does not identify in all 3 decades are included as residents
of statesrural areas.
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sure. Local rents are measured by the average household rent in the city, where rent is
measured using both reported rents, as well as imputed from reported house price values.10
For additional city characteristics, I supplement these data with Saiz (2010)s measures of
geographic constraints and land use regulations to measure di¤erences in housing supply
elasticities. Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for these variables.
When estimating workerscity choices, I assume heads of household make city decisions
for the entire household. If a household has multiple working adults between ages 25 and
55, I assume all household members migrate with the household head and supply labor
to the labor market of the households residence.11 Thus, local labor supply and a citys
college employment ratio are calculated using all household members who have positive
wage earnings and are between ages 25 and 55, while the sample used to estimate workers
preferences for cities is restricted only to the household heads. See Appendix Table 1.1 for
summary statistics of this head-of-household sample. Appendix A contains remaining data
and measurement details.
10In Section 6 I consider dening the local wage and rents measures in a number of ways such as using
hedonic adjustments to wages and rents, dropping imputed housing rents, and allowing high and low skill
workers to face di¤erent local rents within a city. I re-estimate the model using these alternative denitions.
11While I abstract away from the role joint location decisions of dual earner households, work by Costa and
Kahn (2000) shows that couples where both partners have high powered careers are particularly attracted to
large, high skill cities. The labor markets of these cities are more likely to o¤er good jobs for both household
memberscareers. Costa and Kahn (2000) nd that the increase in womens labor supply over this period
has also contributed to increase in geographic skill sorting as large, high skill cities are increasingly attractive
to high skill couples as the number of dual career couples increases.
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Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1980
Ln College Wage 268 6.657 0.102 6.433 7.066
Ln Non-College Wage 268 6.326 0.127 5.919 6.703
Ln Rent 268 6.544 0.163 6.109 7.104
Ln College Employment Ratio 268 -1.247 0.364 -2.092 -0.236
1990
Ln College Wage 268 6.792 0.119 6.470 7.287
Ln Non-College Wage 268 6.369 0.126 5.927 6.697
Ln Rent 268 6.535 0.286 6.033 7.569
Ln College Employment Ratio 268 -1.113 0.403 -2.061 0.066
2000
Ln College Wage 268 6.847 0.131 6.536 7.585
Ln Non-College Wage 268 6.390 0.113 5.939 6.699
Ln Rent 268 6.609 0.247 6.142 7.721
Ln College Employment Ratio 268 -1.006 0.431 -1.903 0.500
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Δ Ln College Wage 536 0.095 0.077 -0.127 0.339
Δ Ln Non-College Wage 536 0.032 0.070 -0.215 0.305
Δ Ln Rent 536 0.032 0.170 -0.417 0.660
Δ Ln College Emp Ratio 536 0.142 0.133 -0.304 0.624
Δ Ln College Population 536 0.314 0.277 -0.820 1.478
Δ Ln Non-College Population 536 0.172 0.273 -1.052 1.249
College Bartik 386 -0.003 0.007 -0.027 0.013
Non-College Bartik 386 0.018 0.008 -0.001 0.058
Total Bartik 386 0.013 0.007 -0.003 0.052
Land Unavailability 193 0.254 0.215 0.005 0.860
Land Use Regulation 193 -0.032 0.733 -1.677 2.229
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Notes: Summary statistics for changes pool decadal changes in wages, rents, population from 1980-
1990 and 1990-2000. The Bartik shocks are also measured across decades. The sample reported for
MSAs' wages, rents, and population include a balanced panel of MSAs and rural areas which the
1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses cover. The sample used for statistics on the Bartik shocks and
housing supply elasticity characteristics are the balanced panel of MSAs which also contain data on
housing supply elasticity characteristics. Wages, rents, and population are measured in logs. Bartik
shocks use national changes in industry wages weighted by the share of a cities work force employed
in that industry. College Bartik uses only wages and employment shares from college workers. Non-
College Bartik uses non-college workers. Aggregate Bartik combines these. Land Unavailability
measures the share of land within a 50Km radius of a city's center which cannot be developed due to
geographical land constraints. Land use regulation is an index of Land-Use regulation policies within
an MSA. College employment ratio is defined as the ratio of number of employed workers in the city
with a 4 year college degree to the number of employed lower skill workers living in the city. See
data appendix for further details.
A. Levels
B. Changes
C. Housing Supply Elasticity Measures
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1.3 Reduced Form Facts
From 1980 to 2000, the distribution of college and non-college workers across metropolitan
areas was diverging. Specically, a MSAs share of college graduates in 1980 is positively
associated with larger growth in its share of college workers from 1980 to 2000. Figure 1.1
shows a 1% increase in a citys college employment ratio in 1980 is associated with a .22%
larger increase in the citys college employment ratio from 1980 to 2000. The diverging college
employment ratios across cities can also be seen in Figure 1.2, which shows the distribution
of college employment ratios across cities. The standard deviation was 0.116 in 1980 and
increased to 0.192 in 2000. These facts have also been documented by Moretti (2004b),
Berry and Glaeser (2005), and Moretti (2011b).
The distribution and divergence of worker skill across cities are strongly linked to cities
wages and rents. Figure 1.3 shows that a higher college employment ratio is positively asso-
ciated with higher rents across cities in both 1980 and 2000. Additionally, as the distribution
of skill-mix across cities has spread out from 1980 to 2000, Figure 1.3 shows that there has
been a similar spreading out of the distribution of rents. The third panel of Figure 1.3 plots
changes in local rents against changes in college employment ratios from 1980 to 2000. A 1%
increase in local college employment ratio is associated with a .63% increase in local rents.
Further, the relationship between rent and college employment ratio is extremely tight. In
2000, variation in citiescollege employment ratios can explain 74% of the variation of rent
across cities. Overall, these gures show that college graduates are increasingly paying higher
housing costs than lower skill workers and that local housing costs are strongly related to a
citys skill-mix.
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Figure 1.1: College Employment Ratio: 1980-2000 vs. College Employment Ratio: 1980
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of CitiesCollege Employment Ratios: 1980-2000
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Figure 1.3:Rents vs. College Employment Ratios: Levels & Changes
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Cities local wages have a similar, but less strong relationship with the local college
employment ratio. Figure 1.4 shows that local non-college wages are positively associated
with local college employment ratios in both 1980 and 2000. The third panel of Figure 1.4
plots changes in local college employment ratios against changes in local non-college wages
from 1980 to 2000. A 1% increase in college employment ratio is associated with a 0.18%
increase in non-college wages. In 2000, the variation in college employment ratios across
cities can explain 56% of the variation in local non-college wages. These gures show that
low skill workers were both initially and increasingly concentrating in low wage cities.
Similarly, Figure 1.5 shows that college wages are higher in high college employment
ratio cities in both 1980 and 2000. Looking at this relationship in changes, panel three of
Figure 1.5 shows that a 1% increase in a citys college employment ration is associated with
a 0.29% increase in college wages. Additionally, college employment ratio can explain 68% of
the variation in local college wages in 2000. College workers are increasingly concentrating
in high wage cities and high skill wages are closely linked to a citys skill-mix. Moretti
(2011b) has also documented this set of facts and refers to them as The Great Divergence
in Moretti (2012).
The polarization of skill across cities coincided with a large, nationwide increase in wage
inequality. Table 1.9, along with a large body of literature, documents that the nationwide
average college-high school graduate wage gap has increased from 42% in 1980 to 62% in
2000.12 Moretti (2011b) points out that the increase in geographic skill sorting calls into
question whether the rise in wage inequality represents a similar increase in well-being or
utility inequality between college and high school graduates. Since college workers are
increasingly living in high cost cities, the high local prices may diminish the consumption
value of their wages relative to local prices faced by lower skilled workers. Looking only at
changes in workerswages and rents, it appears the di¤erential increases in housing costs
across cities disproportionately beneted low skill workers.
12This is estimated by a standard Mincer regression using individual 25-55 year old full time full year
workershourly wages and controls for sex, race dummies, and a cubic in potential experience.
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Figure 1.4: Non-College Wages vs. College Employment Ratios: Levels & Changes
20
Figure 1.5: College Wages vs. College Employment Ratios: Levels & Changes
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However, high skill workers were free to live in more a¤ordable cities, but they chose
not too. As Moretti (2011b) notes, the welfare impacts of the changes in rents across cities
depends crucially on why high and low skill workers elected to live in high and low housing
price cities.
While wage di¤erences across cities are a possible candidate for driving high and low
skill workers to di¤erent cities, it is possible that the desirability of citieslocal amenities
di¤erentially inuenced high and low skill workerscity choices. If college workers elected to
live in high wage, high housing cost cities because they found the local amenities desirable,
then the negative welfare impact of high housing costs would be o¤set by the positive welfare
impact of being able to consume amenities.
Table 1.2 presents the relationships between changes in citiescollege employment ratios
from 1980 to 2000 and changes in a large set of local amenities.13 These results show that
increases in citiescollege employment ratios are associated with larger increases in apparel
stores per capita, eating and drinking places per capita, dry cleaners per capita, and movie
theaters per capita, as well as larger decreases in pollution levels. There are similar point
estimates for book stores per capita, museum and art galleries per capita, and property
crime rates, but the estimates are not statistically signicant. Changes in grocery stores
per capita are negatively associated with change in a citys college employment ratio and
property crime rates are positively associated, however these estimates are not statistically
signicant. While this is not an exhaustive set of amenities, it appears that the cities which
increased their skill-mix not only experienced larger increases in wages and rents, but also
had larger increases in amenities. Additionally, stores per capita, crime, and air quality
could be endogenous outcomes. Just as wages and rents, are endogenously determined in
the labor and housing markets, amenity levels could also respond to characteristics of a city.
13Appendix Table 2 presents similar regressions of observable amenity changes on changes in citiescollege
and non-college populations. These regressions show that when high and low skill population changes are
seperatedly measured, amenities tend to improve with high skill population growth and decline with low
skill population growth.
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The amenity regressions in Table 1.2 do not tell us whether the link between amenities
and skill-mix is driven by high skill workers disproportionately migrating to high amenity
cities or amenities endogenously improving when a citys college employment ratio increases.
To understand why college workers elected to live in high wage, high rent, high amenity
cities, one needs causal estimates of workersmigration elasticities with respect to each
one of these city characteristics. Further, the impact of changes in high and low skill worker
populations on wages, rents, and amenities depends on the elasticities of local housing supply,
local labor demand, and amenity supply. To understand how this set of supply and demand
elasticities interact and lead to equilibrium outcomes, it useful to view these elasticities
through the lens of a structural model. Further, using a utility microfoundation of workers
city choices allows migration elasticities to be mapped to utility functions. The estimated
parameters can then be used to quantify the welfare impacts of changes in wage, rents, and
amenities.
1.4 An Empirical Spatial Equilibrium Model of Cities
This section presents a spatial equilibrium model of local labor markets that captures how
wages, housing rents, amenities, and population are determined in equilibrium. The setup
shares many features of the Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) frameworks, but I enrich the
model to more exibly allow for heterogeneity in workerspreferences, citiesproductivity
levels, and citieshousing supplies. I also allow city productivity and amenities to be en-
dogenously determined by the types of workers that choose to live in the city.
The model admits workers of di¤erent types based on their education level, race, immi-
grant status, and state of birth. Workers of di¤erent types di¤erentially trade o¤ the relative
value of city characteristics, leading them to make di¤erent location decisions. Workers max-
imize their utility by living in the city which o¤ers them the most desirable bundle of wages,
housing rent, and amenities.
The key distinguishing worker characteristic is skill. Citieslocal productivity levels di¤er
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across high and low skill workers, and workers of di¤erent skill are imperfect substitutes into
production. Further, the productivity levels of both high and low skill workers within a city
are endogenously inuenced by the skill-mix in the city.
The skill mix of cities also partially determines citiesamenity levels. Many amenities
likely respond to the college employment ratio in the city, such as education quality, the
quality of the local goods and services markets, as well as crime. I use the college employment
ratio as an index to represent the overall level of all of these amenities.
Housing markets di¤er across cities due to heterogeneity in their elasticity of housing sup-
ply. MSAshousing supply elasticities di¤er based on geographic constraints on developable
land around a city center, such as bodies of water or wetlands (Saiz (2010)). Additionally,
land-use regulations also play an important role in housing supply elasticities by restrict-
ing new construction, leading to less new construction in response to population increases
(Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008), Saks (2008)).
The sections below describe the setup for labor demand, housing supply, worker labor
supply to cities, and how they jointly determine the spatial equilibrium across cities.
1.4.1 Labor Demand
Each city, indexed j; has many homogeneous rms, indexed by d; in year t:14 15 They produce
a homogenous tradeable good using high skill labor (Hdjt), low skill labor (Ldjt), and capital
14Autor and Dorn (2012) model local labor demand using a two sector model, where one sector produces
nationally traded goods, and the other produces local goods. My use of a single tradable sector allows me
to derive simple expressions for city-wide labor demand. I do not mean to rule out the importance of local
goods production, which is surely an signicant driver of low skill worker labor demand.
15I model rms as homogenous to derive a simple expression for the city-wide aggregate labor demand
curves. Alternatively, one could explicitly model rmsproductivities di¤erences across industries to derive
an aggregate labor demand curve.
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(Kdjt) according to the production function:
Ydjt = N

djtK
1 
djt ; (1.1)
Ndjt =
 
LjtL

djt + 
H
jtH

djt
 1

Ljt =

Hjt
Ljt
L
exp
 
"Ljt

(1.2)
Hjt =

Hjt
Ljt
H
exp
 
"Hjt

(1.3)
The production function is Cobb-Douglas in the labor aggregate Ndjt and capital, Kdjt:16
This setup implies that the share of income going to labor is constant and governed by .17
The labor aggregate hired by each rm, Ndjt; combines high skill labor, Hdjt; and low skill
labor, Ldjt; as imperfect substitutes into production with a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion, where the elasticity of labor substitution is 1
1  : The large literature on understanding
changes in wage inequality due to the relative supply of high and low skill labor uses this
functional form for labor demand, as exemplied by Katz and Murphy (1992).
Citiesproduction functions di¤er based on productivity. Each citys productivity of high
skill workers is measured by Hjt and low skill productivity is measured by 
L
jt. Equations (1:2)
and (1:3) show that local productivity is determined by exogenous and endogenous factors.
Exogenous productivity di¤erences across cities and worker skill are measured by exp
 
"Ljt

and exp
 
"Hjt

. Exogenous di¤erences in productivity across cities could be proximity to a
port or coal mine, as well as di¤erences in industry mix of rms in the area.
Additionally, productivity is endogenously determined by the skill mix in the city. Equa-
16The model could be extended to allow local housing (o¢ ce space) to be an additional input into rm
production. I leave this to future work, as it would require a more sophisticated model of how workers and
rms compete in the housing market. Under the current setup, if o¢ ce space is additively separable in the
rm production function, then the labor demand curves are unchanged.
17Ottaviano and Peri (2012) explicitly consider whether Cobb-Douglas is a good approximation to use
when estimating labor demand curves. They show that the relative cost-share of labor to income is constant
over the long run in the US. This functional form is also often used by the macro growth literature since the
labor income share is found to be constant across many countries and time. See Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
for further analysis.
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tions (1:2) and (1:3) show that the ratio of high to low skill labor working in the city, Hjt
Ljt
di¤erentially impacts high skill and low skill productivity, as measured by H and L; respec-
tively. The literature on the social returns to education has shown that areas with a higher
concentration of college workers could increase all workersproductivity through knowledge
spillovers. For example, increased physical proximity with educated workers may lead to
better sharing of ideas, faster innovation, or faster technology adoption.18 Productivity may
also be inuenced by endogenous technological changes or technology adoption, where the
development or adoption of new technologies is targeted at new technologies which o¤er the
most prot (Acemoglu (2002), Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010)).
Since there are a large number of rms and no barriers to entry, the labor market is
perfectly competitive and rms hire such that wages equal the marginal product of labor. A
frictionless capital market supplies capital perfectly elastically at price t; which is constant
across all cities. Thus, each rms demand for labor and capital is:
WHjt = N
 
djt K
1 
djt H
 1
djt

Hjt
Ljt
H
exp
 
"Hjt

;
WLjt = N
 
djt K
1 
djt L
 1
djt

Hjt
Ljt
L
exp
 
"Ljt

;
t = N

djtK
 
djt (1  ) :
Note that the productivity spillovers are governed by the city-level college employment ratio,
so the hiring decision of each individual rm takes the city-level college ratio as given when
making their hiring decisions.
Since capital is in equilibrium, it can freely adjust to changes in the labor quantities within
cities, over time.19 Firm-level labor demand translates directly to city-level aggregate labor
18See Moretti (2011a) for a literature review of these ideas.
19An alternative assumption would be to assume that capital is xed across areas, leading to downward
slopping aggregate labor demand within each city. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) explicitly consider the speed
of capital adjustment to in response to labor stock adjustment across space. They nd the annual rate of
capital adjustment to be 10%. Since my analysis of local labor markets is across decades, I assume capital
is in equilibrium.
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demand since rms face constant returns to scale production functions and share identical
production technology. Substituting for equilibrium levels of capital, the city-level log labor
demand curves are:
wHjt = lnW
H
jt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnHjt + H ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ "Hjt (1.4)
wLjt = lnW
L
jt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnLjt + L ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ "Ljt (1.5)
Njt =

exp
 
"Ljt
Hjt
Ljt
L
Ljt + exp
 
"Hjt
Hjt
Ljt
H
Hjt
 1

(1.6)
ct = ln
 


(1  )
t
 1 

!
:
1.4.2 Housing Supply
Local prices, Rjt; are set through equilibrium in the housing market. The local price level
represents both local housing costs and the price of a composite local good, which includes
goods such as groceries and local services which have their prices inuenced by local housing
prices. See Appendix A.6 for a full micro-foundation of the local goods market. Inputs
into the production of housing include construction materials and land. Developers are
price-takers and sell homogenous houses at the marginal cost of production.
P housejt =MC (CCjt; LCjt) :
The function MC (CCjt; LCjt) maps local construction costs, CCjt; and local land costs,
LCjt; to the marginal cost of constructing a home. In the asset market steady state equi-
librium, there is no uncertainty and prices equal the discounted value of rents. Local rents
are:
Rjt = t MC (CCjt; LCjt) ;
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where t is the interest rate. Housing is owned by absentee landlords who rent the housing
to local residents.
The cost of land LCjt is a function of the population size of the city. As more people
move into the city, the developable land in the city becomes more scarce, driving up the
price of land.20
I parameterize the log housing supply equation as:
rjt = ln (Rjt) = ln (t) + ln (CCjt) + j ln (Hjt + Ljt) ; (1.7)
j =  + 
geo exp
 
xgeoj

+ reg exp
 
xregj

: (1.8)
The elasticity of rent with respect to population (Hjt+Ljt), varies across cities, as measured
by j: House price elasticities are inuenced by characteristics of the city which impact
the availability of land suitable for development. Geographic characteristics, which make
land in the city undevelopable, lead to a less elastic housing supply. With less available
land around to build on, the city must expand farther away from the central business area to
accommodate a given amount of population. xgeoj measures the share of land within 50 km of
each citys center which is unavailable for development due to the presence of wetlands, lakes,
rivers, oceans, and other internal water bodies as well as share of the area corresponding to
land with slopes above 15 percent grade. This measure was developed by Saiz (2010). In
equation (1:8) ; geo measures how variation in exp
 
xgeoj

inuences the inverse elasticity of
housing supply, j:
Local land use regulation has a similar e¤ect by further restricting housing development.
Data on municipalitieslocal land use regulation was collected in the 2005 Wharton Regu-
20A full micro-foundation of this assumption can be derived from the Alonso-Muth-Mills model (Brueckner
(1987)) where housing expands around a citys central business district and workers must commute from
their house to the city center to work. Within-city house prices are set such that workers are indi¤erent
between having a shorter versus longer commute to work. Average housing prices rise as the population
grows since the houses on the edge of the city must o¤er the same utility as the houses closer in. As the
city population expands, the edge of the city becomes farther away from the center, making the commuting
costs of workers living on the edge higher than those in a smaller city. Since the edge of the city must o¤er
the same utility value as the center of the city, housing prices rise in the interior parts of the city.
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lation Survey. Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) use the survey to produce a number of
indices that capture the intensity of local growth control policies in a number of dimensions.
Lower values in the Wharton Regulation Index, can be thought of as signifying the adoption
of more laissez-faire policies toward real estate development. Metropolitan areas with high
values of the Wharton Regulation Index have zoning regulations or project approval prac-
tices that constrain new residential real estate development. I use Saiz (2010)s metropolitan
area level aggregates these data as my measure of land use regulation xregj : See Table 1.1
for summary statistics of these measures. In equation (1:8) ; reg measures how variation
in exp
 
xregj

inuences the inverse elasticity of housing supply j: measures the base
housing supply elasticity for a city which has no land use regulations and no geographic
constraints limiting housing development.
1.4.3 Amenity Supply
Cities di¤er in the amenities they o¤er to their residents. I dene amenities broadly as all
characteristics of a city which could inuence the desirability of a city beyond local wages
and prices. This includes the generosity of the local social insurance programs as well as
more traditional amenities like annual rainfall. All residents within the city have access
to these amenities simply by choosing to live there.21 Some amenity di¤erences are due to
exogenous factors such as climate or proximity to the coast. I refer to exogenous amenities
in city j in year t by the vector xAjt:
I also consider the utility value one gets from living in a city in or near ones state of
birth to be an amenity of the city. Dene xstj as a 50x1 binary vector where each element
k is equal to 1 if part of city j is contained in state k: Similarly, dene xdivj as a 9x1 binary
vector where each element k is equal to 1 if part of city j is contained within Census division
k:
21See appendix A.6 in which amenities are partially determined by the quality of the local retail market.
"Access" to the citys amenities then depends on the purchase choices of the household in the local retail
market. In this case, the amenity value represents the indirect utility function which measures the quality
of the products purchased by the worker in the local retail market.
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Additionally, city amenities endogenously respond to the types of residents who choose
to live in the city. I model the level of endogenous amenities to be determined by cities
college employment ratio, Hjt
Ljt
: Using the college employment ratio as an index for the level
of endogenous amenities is a reduced form for the impact of the distribution of residents
education levels, as well as the impact of residentsincomes on local amenities. The vector
of all amenities in the city, Ajt; is:
Ajt =

xAjt; x
st
j ; x
div
j ;
Hjt
Ljt

:
This setup is motivated by work by Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst (2011), Handbury
(2012), and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007). Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst (2011)
shows that local housing price dynamics suggest local amenities respond to the income levels
of residents. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) show that at the very local neighborhood
level, households have direct preferences for the race and education of neighboring house-
holds. Handbury (2012) shows that cities with higher income per capita o¤er wider varieties
of high quality groceries. The quality of the products available within a city are an amenity.
I approximate these forces by citiescollege employment ratios as an index for local en-
dogenous amenity levels. Regressions of changes in observable amenities over time discussed
earlier in section 1.3 suggest that amenities are positively associated with a citys college
employment, which motivates this setup. For a full microfoundation of how amenities en-
dogenously respond to the skill mix of the city through changes in the desirability of the
local retail market, see Appendix A.6.
1.4.4 Labor Supply to Cities
Each head-of-household worker, indexed by i; chooses to live in the city which o¤ers him the
most desirable bundle of wages, local good prices, and amenities. Wages in each city di¤er
between college graduates and lower educated workers. A worker of skill level edu living in
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city j in year t inelastically supplies one unit of labor and earns a wage of W edujt :
The worker consumes a local good M; which has a local price of Rjt and a national good
O; which has a national price of Pt; and gains utility from the amenities Ajt in the city: The
worker has Cobb-Douglas preferences for the local and national good, which he maximizes
subject to his budget constraint:
max
M;O
ln
 
M i

+ ln
 
O1 i

+ si (Ajt) (1.9)
s:t: PtO +RjtM  W edujt :
Workers di¤er in the relative taste for national versus local goods, which is governed by  i,
where 0   i  1: Workersrelative value of the local versus national good is a function of
their demographics, zi:22
 i = 
rzi:
zi is a vector of the workerss demographics, which includes his skill level, as well as his
skill level interacted with his race and whether the worker immigrated to the US.23 Thus,
preferences for the local and national good are heterogenous between workers with di¤erent
demographics, but homogenous within demographic group.
Workers are also heterogenous in how much they desire the local non-market amenities.
The function si (Ajt) maps the vector of city amenities, Ajt; to the workers utility value for
them.
The workers optimized utility function can be expressed as an indirect utility function
22The demographics which determine a households city preferences are those of the household head. I
abstract away from the impact of preferences of non-head-of-household workers on a households city choice.
23Since I focus on the location choices of head-of-households, I do not include gender as characteristic
inuencing preferences for city. My sample of household heads is mechanically strongly male dominated.
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for living in city j: If the worker were to live in city j in year t; his utility Vijt would be:
Vijt = ln
 
W edujt
Pt
!
  rzi ln

Rjt
Pt

+ si (Ajt) ;
= wedujt   zirjt + si (Ajt) ;
where wedujt = ln

W edujt
Pt

and rjt = ln

Rjt
Pt

: Since the workers preferences are Cobb-Douglas,
he spends rzi share of his income on the local good, and (1  rzi) share of his income on
the national good. The price of the national good is measured by the CPI-U index for all
goods excluding shelter and measured in real 2000 dollars.
Consumption of amenities is only determined by the city a worker chooses to live in
because all workers living in city j have full access to the amenities Ajt. Worker is value of
amenities Ajt is:
si (Ajt) = 
A
i x
A
jt + 
col
i
Hjt
Ljt
+ sti x
st
j + 
div
i x
div
j + i"ijt (1.10)
Ai = 
Azi
coli = 
colzi (1.11)
sti = 
stzisti
divi = 
divzi divi (1.12)
i = 
zi (1.13)
"ijt  Type I Extreme Value:
Worker i0s marginal utility of the exogenous amenities Ai , endogenous amenities 
col
i , and
birthplace amenities bi , are each a function of his demographics zi: sti and divi are a 50x1
and 9x1 binary vectors, respectively where each element is equal to 1 if the worker was born
in the state or Census division.
The endogenous amenities are a function of the college employment ratio of the overall
city, which workers take as xed when evaluating the desirability of the amenities. Each
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worker is small and cannot individually impact amenity levels.
Each worker also has an individual, idiosyncratic taste for cities amenities, which is
measured by "ijt: "ijt is drawn from a Type I Extreme Value distribution.24 The variance
of workersidiosyncratic tastes for each city di¤ers across demographic groups, as shown in
equation (1:12) : Explicitly incorporating iid error terms in the utility function is important
because households surely have idiosyncratic preferences beyond those based on their demo-
graphics, and iid errors allow a demographic groups aggregate demand elasticities for each
city with respect to citiescharacteristics to be smooth and nite.
To simplify future notation and discussion of estimation, I re-normalize the utility func-
tion by dividing each workersutility by zi: Using these units, the standard deviation
of worker idiosyncratic preferences for cities is normalized to one. The magnitudes of the
coe¢ cient on wages, rents, and amenities now represent the elasticity of workersdemand for
a small city with respect to its local wages, rents, or amenities, respectively:25 With a slight
abuse of notation, I redene the parameters of the re-normalized utility function using the
same notation of the utility function measured in wage units. The indirect utility for worker
i of city j is now represented as:
Vijt = 
wziw
edu
jt   rzirjt + AzixAjt + colzi
Hjt
Ljt
+ stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ijt:
To show how the utility function determines the population distribution of workers across
cities, I introduce some additional notation. The preferences of di¤erent workers with iden-
tical demographics z for a given city di¤er only due to workersbirth states and divisions
(sti; divi) and their idiosyncratic taste for the city, "ijt: I dene 
z
jt as utility value of the
24I also normalize "ijt such that is has a mean of zero. The standard Type I extreme value distribution
has a mean of 0.57. Thus, I make "ijt distributed by a Type I value distribution, minus .57. This simply
amounts to subtracting 0.57 from all workersutility functions.
25Due to the functional form assumption for the distribution of workersidiosyncratic tastes for cities, the
elasticity of demand of workers with demographics z for a city j with respect to local rents, for example,
is:(1  sjz)rz: sjz is the share of all workers of type z in the nation, living in city j: For a small city, where
the share of all type z workers living in city j is close to zero, the demand elasticity for rent is simply rz:
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components of city j which all workersof type z value identically:
zjt = 
wzwedujt   rzrjt + AzxAjt + colz
Hjt
Ljt
:
Economically, zjt measures workers of type z who are not born in city j
0s state or census
divisions average utility for a city. I will refer to zjt as the mean utility of city j for workers
of type z: Rewriting the utility function in terms of zjt gives:
Vijt = 
z
jt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ijt:
Since each worker elects to live in the city which gives him the highest utility level, di¤erent
city choices made by workers with identical demographics and birth states must be due to
di¤erences in their idiosyncratic tastes, "ijt:
Aggregate population di¤erences of workers of a given type z across cities represent
di¤erences in these workersmean utility values for these cities. To illustrate this, I use
a simple example of 2 cities and no demographic di¤erences in the population. Workers
utilities for cities 1 and 2 are:
Ui1 = u1 + "i1
Ui2 = u2 + "i2:
Each worker chooses which city he prefers to live in. Without loss of generality, assume city
2 is on average nicer that city 1, u2 > u1: The share of the population that live in city 1 is
the percent of people whose idiosyncratic preference for city 1 relative to city 2 ("i1   "i2) is
larger than the di¤erence in average utility of city 2 versus city 1:
("i1   "i2) > u2   u1:
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While this relationship holds for any distributional assumption on "ij; the expected popula-
tion in each city is analytic when "ij is assumed to be drawn from a Type I Extreme Value
distribution. Under this assumption, the expected population shares for each city are:
Pop1
Pop1 + Pop2
=
exp (u1)
exp (u1) + exp (u2)
Pop2
Pop1 + Pop2
=
exp (u2)
exp (u1) + exp (u2)
:
Pop1 and Pop2 are the population sizes in cities 1 and 2, respectively. Dividing these and
taking logs gives:
ln (Pop1)  ln (Pop2) = u1   u2:
The di¤erence in the citiesmean utilities equals the di¤erence in log population of the cities.
In the general case, there are many cities, and workers have heterogeneous preferences
based on demographics. The probability worker i chooses to live in city j is:
Pr(Vijt > Vi jt) =
exp(zijt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j )PJ
k exp(
zi
kt + 
stzistixstk + 
divzi divi xdivk )
:
This setup is the conditional logit model, rst formulated in this utility maximization context
by McFadden (1973). The total expected population of city j is simply the probability
each worker lives in the city, summed over all workers. Thus, the total high and low skill
populations of city j are:
Hjt =
X
i2Ht
exp(zijt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j )PJ
k exp(
zi
kt + 
stzistixstk + 
divzi divi xdivk )
Ljt =
X
i2Lt
exp(zijt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j )PJ
k exp(
zi
kt + 
stzistixstk + 
divzi divi xdivk )
:
Ht and Lt are the set of high and low skill workers in the nation, respectively.
While population reects a citys desirability, this relationship can be attenuated in the
presence of moving costs, since households will be less willing to move to nicer cities and away
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from worse cities in the presence of moving costs. I have implicitly incorporated moving
costs by allowing workers to prefer to live in or near their state of birth. This setup can be
thought of as there being a childhood period of life before ones career. During childhood,
workers are born into their birth locations, and as adults, they are allowed to move to a
new city for their career. The utility value of living in or near ones birth state represents
both the value of being near ones family and friends, as well as the psychic and nancial
costs of moving away. In a fully dynamic model, workers can elect to move every period,
and they are no longer always moving away from their birth state. Panel data is needed
to estimate a model of this nature, such as the NLSY used by Kennan and Walker (2011)
and Bishop (2010). However, this dataset is signicantly smaller and is not large enough
to consistently estimate my model.26 Further, recent work by Notowidigdo (2011) argues
that mobility costs are reasonably modest (around 17% of annual income for the marginal
migrant). He concludes that changes over 10 year horizons, as I analyze here, can be well
approximated with a model of no mobility costs.
1.4.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this model is dened by a menu of wages, rents and amenity levels,

wLt ; w
H
t ; r

t ;
Hjt
Ljt

with populations
 
Hjt; L

jt

such that:
 The high skill labor demand equals high skill labor supply:
Hjt =
X
i2Ht
exp(zijt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j )PJ
k exp(
zi
kt + 
stzistixstk + 
divzi divi xdivk )
(1.14)
wHjt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnHjt + H ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ "Hjt
26I have considered more explicitly incorporating moving costs using the censusmigration data in which
MSA workers lived 5 years ago. Unfortunately, the condentially screening makes this data o¤er little useful
information. In all decades of the public use census data, signicantly more MSAs (and a larger proportion
of each MSA) are reported in the data covering MSA of current residence than the data reporting MSA
residence 5 years earlier. As a result, implied 5 year population changes do not strongly track other o¢ cial
data on measured population changes across the 5 year periods. Further, only half of the 1980 dataset has
migration data reported. Overall, this data is not helpful in estimating moving costs.
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 The low skill labor demand equals low skill labor supply:
Ljt =
X
i2Lt
exp(zijt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j )PJ
k exp(
zi
kt + 
stzistixstk + 
divzi divi xdivk )
(1.15)
wLjt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnLjt + L ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ "Ljt
 Total labor supply equals housing supply:
rjt = ln (it) + ln (CCjt) +
 
 + geo exp
 
xgeoj

+ reg exp
 
xregj

ln
 
Ljt +H

jt

:
 Endogenous amenities supplied equal college employment ratio:

zi2Ht
jt = 
wziw
H
jt   rzirjt + AzixAjt + colzi
Hjt
Ljt

zi2Lt
jt = 
wziw
L
jt   rzirjt + AzixAjt + colzi
Hjt
Ljt
:
The model does not allow me to solve for equilibrium wages and local prices analytically,
but this setup is useful in estimation.
1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Labor Demand
As discussed in the Section 1.4.1, a citys high and low skill labor demand curves determine
the quantity of labor demanded by local rms as a function of local productivity and wages.
In rst di¤erences over decades, these are:
wHjt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnHjt + H ln

Hjt
Ljt

+"Hjt (1.16)
wLjt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnLjt + L ln

Hjt
Ljt

+"Ljt (1.17)
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Changes over a decade in citieshigh and low skill exogenous productivity levels, "Ljt
and "Hjt ; shift the local labor demand curves, directly impacting wages. Changes in the pro-
ductivity levels of the industries located within each city contribute to the citys productivity
change. Variation in productivity changes across industries will di¤erentially impact cities
local high and low skill productivity levels based on the industrial composition of the citys
workforce (Bartik (1991)). I measure exogenous local productivity changes by interacting
cross-sectional di¤erences in industrial employment composition with national changes in
industry wage levels, separately for high and low skill workers.27 I refer to these as Bartik
shocks. Formally, I dene the Bartik shock for high and low skill workers; as:
BHjt =
X
ind
 
wHind; j;t   wHind; j;t 10
 Hind;jt 10
Hjt 10
(1.18)
BLjt =
X
ind
 
wLind; j;t   wLind; j;t 10
 Lind;jt 10
Ljt 10
;
where wHind; j;t and w
L
ind; j;t represent the average log wage of high and low skill workers,
respectively, in industry ind in year t, excluding workers in city j: Hind;jt 10 and Lind;jt 10
measure the number of high and low skill workers, respectively, employed in industry ind in
city j; in year t-10:
Since I do not observe all contributors to local productivity changes, I rewrite the labor
demand equations (1:16) and (1:17) by explicitly dening ~"Hjt and ~"
L
jt; as all high and low
27Other work has measured industry productivity changes by using national changes in employment shares
of workers across industries, instead of changes in industry wages. (See Notowidigdo (2011), and Blanchard
and Katz (1992).) They use the productivity shocks as an instrument for worker migration to cities. Thus, it
makes sense to measure the shock in units of workers, instead of wages units. I focus on how these industry
productivity shocks impact wages, which is why I measure the shock in wages units. Guerrieri, Hartley, and
Hurst (2011) also constructs the instrument using industry wage changes.
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skill local productivity changes uncorrelated with the Bartik shocks BHjt ;B
L
jt:
28
wHjt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnHjt (1.19)
+H ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ HBB
H
jt +~"
H
jt
wLjt = ct + (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnLjt (1.20)
+L ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ LBB
L
jt +~"
L
jt:
The direct e¤ect of the Bartik shocks shift the local labor demand curves, directly in-
uencing local wages. To identify the labor demand curve parameters, one needs variation
in the quantities of high and low skill labor supplied to each city which is independent of
unobserved changes in local productivity levels.
The interaction of the Bartik productivity shocks with citieshousing supply elasticities
leads to variation in the migration response to the Bartik shocks, which can identify the
labor demand parameters. To see this, consider an example of 2 cities which receive the
same positive local productivity shocks. One city has a very elastic housing supply, while
the housing supply of the other is very inelastic. As workers migrate into these cities to
take advantage of the increased wages, they drive up the housing prices by increasing the
local demand for housing. The housing inelastic city exhibits much larger rent increases in
response to a given amount of migration than the elastic city. These rent increases lead to
relatively less in-migration to the housing inelastic city because the sharp rent increase driven
by a relatively small amount of in-migration o¤sets the desirability of high local wages.29
While the direct e¤ect of the Bartik shocks shifts local labor demand curves, the interaction
of the labor demand shocks with citys housing supply elasticities causes variation in labor
28The parameters

HB ; 
L
B

on the Bartik shocks in the high and low skill labor demand equations
represent the projection of exogenous changes in local productivity on the Bartik shocks: "Hjt = 
H
BB
H
jt +
~"Hjt : Thus, 
H
B and 
L
B are not structural parameters. Since this is a projection, ~"
H
jt is mechanically
uncorrelated with the Bartik shock BHjt :
29Saks (2008) has also analyzed how labor demand shocks interact is local housing supply elasticities to
inuence equilbrium local wages, rents, and populations.
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supply, which can be used as instruments for high and low skill population changes to identify
the labor demand curve parameters.
As discussed in Section 1.4.2, land unavailable for housing development due to geographic
features xgeoj and land-use regulation x
reg
j impact local housing supply elasticity. The in-
teraction of these housing supply elasticity measures with local Bartik shocks are used as
instruments for quantities of labor within the city. The exclusion restriction assumes that
land-unavailability and land-use regulation do not directly impact unobserved changes in
local productivity.
An additional measure of how Bartik shocks inuence housing price changes is the size
of the aggregate Bartik shock. I measure the aggregate Bartik shock by:
Balljt =
X
ind
0B@  wHind; j;t   wHind; j;t 10 Hind;jt 10Ljt 10+Hjt 10
+
 
wLind; j;t   wLind; j;t 10
 Lind;jt 10
Ljt 10+Hjt 10
1CA
= BHjt
Hjt 10
Ljt 10 +Hjt 10
+BLjt
Ljt 10
Ljt 10 +Hjt 10
: (1.21)
The aggregate Bartik shock adds additional information by weighting the high and low skill
Bartik shocks by the share of each cities total population made up of high and low skill
workers. Cities which have a disproportionate amount of high skill workers will have local
house prices respond relatively more to high skill Bartik shocks than cities with smaller
college population shares.
The shape of cities labor demand curves are functions of rmslabor demand curves;
which are governed by ; and the spillovers of the citys college employment ratio on the
productivity of high and low skill workers, governed by H and L: Since I only observe
changes in city-level aggregate amounts of labor, I cannot disentangle the shape of rmslabor
demand curves from changes in city productivity spillovers without parametric assumptions.
However, the combined e¤ect of productivity spillovers and rmslabor demands on local
wages can be identied. Exogenous changes in the supply of labor to a city can be used to
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measure the impact of labor supply to a city on local wages, but not how much of this e¤ect
is driven by productivity spillovers versus movement along rmslabor demand curves.
Under the assumption that rmslabor demand curves have a CES functional form, one
can disentangle the productivity spillovers from shifts along rms labor demand curves by
the asymmetric response of high and low skill labor changes on high and low skill wages.
Equations (1:16) and (1:17) show that if there were no productivity spillovers, the inverse
elasticity of high skill labor demand with respect to high skill wages should be the same
as the inverse elasticity of low skill labor demand with respect to low skill wages. Further,
the cross price inverse elasticities should also be the same for high and low skill labor. By
adding productivity spillovers, I allow the labor demand elasticities to be more exible than
the structure imposed by the CES functional form. However, separately identifying  from
H and L is due to parametric assumptions.
A technical issue with estimating the labor demand equations (1:19) and (1:20) is that
lnNjt is a non-linear, non-seperable function of local productivity "Ljt and "
H
jt ; which is not
directly observed by the econometrician, as seen in equation (1:5) : Due to the CES functional
form, I show in Appendix A.2 that Njt can be rewritten as non-linear function of data
(wHjt ; w
L
jt; Ljt; Hjt) and parameters (; L; H) :
N^jt (; L; H) =
 
wLjtH
 1+H
jt L
 L
jt + w
H
jtL
 1 L
jt H
+H
jt
wHjtL
 1+H L
jt + w
L
jtH
 1+H L
jt
!1=
: (1.22)
Equation (1:22) can be substituted in for Njt in the labor demand equations:
wHjt = ct + (1  ) ln N^jt (; L; H) + (  1) lnHjt
+H ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ HBB
H
jt +~"
H
jt
wLjt = ct + (1  ) ln N^jt (; L; H) + (  1) lnLjt
+L ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ LBB
L
jt +~"
L
jt:
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Thus, for a given guess of the parameter estimates (; L; H), Njt is known and does not
depend on
 
"Ljt; "
H
jt

: The local productivity terms
 
"Ljt; "
H
jt

are additively separable in the
labor demand equation, given Njt: See Appendix A.2 for further details on constructing the
moment functions used in estimation.
These moment restrictions will be combined with the moments identifying citieshousing
supply curves and workerslabor supply to cities. All parts of the model will be estimated
jointly using two-step GMM estimation.
1.5.2 Housing Supply
I rewrite the housing supply curve in rst di¤erences over decades:
rjt =  ln (it) +
 
 + geo exp
 
xgeoj

+ reg exp
 
xregj

 ln (Hjt + Ljt) + "
CC
jt :
"CCjt measures local changes in construction costs and other factors impacting housing prices
not driven by population change. To identify the elasticity of housing supply, one needs
variation in a citys total population which is unrelated to changes in unobserved factors
driving housing prices. I use the Bartik shocks discussed above, which shift local wages
leading to a migration response of workers, as instruments for housing demand. I combine
these moments with the labor demand and labor supply moments to jointly estimate all the
parameters of the model.
1.5.3 Labor Supply
Recall that the indirect utility of city j for worker i with demographics zi is:
Vijt = 
z
jt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ijt
zijt = 
wziw
edu
jt   zirjt + AzixAjt + colzi
Hjt
Ljt
:
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To estimate workers preferences for cities, I use a two-step estimator similar to Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004).
In the rst step, I use a maximum likelihood estimator, in which I treat the mean utility
value of each city for each demographic group in each decade zjt as a parameter to be
estimated. Recall the discussion from Section (1:4:4) that shows how di¤erences in the
mean utility value of cities leads to population di¤erences across cities for a given type of
worker. Observed population di¤erences in the data for a given type of worker are what
identify the mean utility estimates for each city. In the simple case where workers do not
gain utility from living close to their birth state, the estimated mean utility levels for each
city would exactly equal the log population of each demographic group observed living in
that city. When workerscare about living close to their state of birth, the mean utility
estimates represent what the population distribution would be across cities in the absence of
birth state preferences. The maximum likelihood estimation measures the mean utility level
for each city, for each demographic group, for each decade of data.30
The second step of estimation decomposes the mean utility estimates into how workers
value wages, rents, and amenities. First di¤erencing citiesmean utility estimates for workers
with demographics z across decades:
zjt = 
wzwedujt   rzrjt + AzxAjt + colz

Hjt
Ljt

: (1.23)
I observe changes in citieswages, rents, and college employment ratios in the data. However,
I do not observe the other amenity changes. Dene zjt as the change in utility value of city
j0s amenities unobserved to the econometrician across decades for workers with demographics
z:
zjt = 
AzxAjt:
30While one often worries about bias in estimating xed e¤ects using a non-linear objective function, such
as maximum likelihood, I have a very large sample of individual level data (over 2 million observations
for each decade), relative to about 1000 estimated xed e¤ects per decade. The asymptotics assume the
number of individuals goes to innity at a faster rate than the number of cities goes to innity.
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Plugging this into equation (1:23) gives:
zjt = 
wzwedujt   zrjt + colz

Hjt
Ljt

+zjt: (1.24)
To identify workers preferences for cities wages, rents, and endogenous amenities, I
instrument for these outcomes using the Bartik productivity shocks and their interaction
with housing supply elasticity characteristics (land-use regulation and land availability). The
Bartik shocks measure nationwide changes in industry wages and provide variation in local
labor demand unrelated to unobserved changes in local amenities. Since workers will migrate
to take advantage of desirable wages driven by the labor demand shocks, they will bid up rents
in the housing market. Heterogeneity in citieshousing supply elasticities provides variation
in the rental rate response to the induced migration. Thus, the interactions of housing
supply elasticity characteristics with the Bartik shocks impact changes in rents (and wages)
unrelated to unobserved changes in local amenities. To identify the migration elasticity
of workers within a given skill group with respect to endogenous amenities (as measured
by the college employment ratio), the Bartik shock to the other skill group is useful. For
example, the low skill Bartik shock impacts the quantity of low skill workers living in a city,
which leads to endogenous amenity changes by shifting the local college employment ratio.
This shift in endogenous amenities will impact high skill workersmigration, identifying
high skill workerspreference for endogenous amenities. While the low skill Bartik shocks
also inuence local prices and high skill workerswages, jointly instrumenting for all three
endogenous parameters simultaneously (wages, local prices, college employment ratio) allows
all instruments to impact all endogenous outcomes and simultaneously identies all three
parameters. The exclusion restrictions assume that these instruments are uncorrelated with
unobserved exogenous changes in the citys local amenities.
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1.5.4 Summary of Estimating Equations
The key structural parameters to be estimated are workersmigration elasticities with respect
to wages, local prices, and the endogenous amenity index (college employment ratio); city-
wide labor demand elasticities, including rms labor demand elasticities and endogenous
productivity spillovers; and housing supply elasticities. All moment restrictions from the
models of labor demand, housing supply, and labor supply to cities are stacked and all
parameters are jointly estimated using a 2-step simultaneous equations GMM estimator. I
summarize the estimating equations, moment restrictions, and instruments below.
Labor Demand
 Estimating Equations:
wHjt = ct + (1  ) ln N^jt (; L; H) + (  1) lnHjt
+H ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ HBB
H
jt +~"
H
jt
wLjt = ct + (1  ) ln N^jt (; L; H) + (  1) lnLjt
+L ln

Hjt
Ljt

+ LBB
L
jt +~"
L
jt:
 Moment Restrictions:
E
 
~"HjtZjt

= 0
E
 
~"LjtZjt

= 0
Instruments:Zjt 2
8>>>><>>>>:
Balljt ;B
H
jt ;B
L
jt
Balljt x
reg
j ;B
H
jtx
reg
j ;B
L
jtx
reg
j
Balljt x
geo
j ;B
H
jtx
geo
j ;B
L
jtx
geo
j
9>>>>=>>>>;
Firms labor demand elasticities and productivity spillovers due to a citys college employ-
ment ratio are identied by using the interaction of the Bartik labor demand shocks with
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local housing supply elasticity characteristics as instruments for changes in high and low
skill worker populations. The key exclusion restriction is that the housing supply elasticity
characteristics do not directly impact unobserved changes in local productivity.
Housing Supply
 Estimating Equation:
rjt =  ln (it) +
 
 + geo exp
 
xgeoj

+ reg exp
 
xregj

 ln (Hjt + Ljt) + "
CC
jt :
 Moment Restrictions:
E
 
"CCjt Zjt

= 0
Instruments:Zjt 2
8>>>><>>>>:
Balljt ;B
H
jt ;B
L
jt
Balljt x
reg
j ;B
H
jtx
reg
j ;B
L
jtx
reg
j
Balljt x
geo
j ;B
H
jtx
geo
j ;B
L
jtx
geo
j
9>>>>=>>>>;
Housing supply elasticities are identied by using the Bartik shocks as instruments for
population changes and observing the di¤erential rental rate response across cities based on
the measures of land-use regulation and land availability. The key exclusion restriction in
that Bartik shocks only impact changes in local rents through changes in citiespopulations.
Labor Supply
 Estimating Equation:
zjt = 
wzwedujt   zrjt + colz

Hjt
Ljt

+zjt:
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 Moment Restrictions:
E
 
zjtZjt

= 0
Instruments:Zjt 2
8>>>><>>>>:
Balljt ;B
H
jt ;B
L
jt
Balljt x
reg
j ;B
H
jtx
reg
j ;B
L
jtx
reg
j
Balljt x
geo
j ;B
H
jtx
geo
j ;B
L
jtx
geo
j
9>>>>=>>>>;
Changes in local wages, local prices, and college employment ratios are jointly instru-
mented for using Bartik shocks to local labor demand and their interactions with local hous-
ing supply elasticity characteristics. The key exclusion restriction assumes the Bartik shocks
and housing supply elasticity characteristics do not directly impact changes in unobserved
amenities.
See Appendix A.2 for further details on all steps of the estimation procedures.
1.6 Parameter Estimates
1.6.1 Worker Labor Supply
I estimate two specications of the model. The main specication, which I refer to as
the full model,is the model exactly described in the previous sections. As an alternative
specication, I estimate the model without endogenous amenities or endogenous productivity
changes. I refer to this specication as the no spillovermodel. Parameter estimates for
both models are reported in Table 1.3.
Panel A of Table 1.3 reports the estimates of workersdemand elasticities for cities with
respect to wages, rents,and endogenous amenities. Focusing on the estimates of the full
model, I nd that both college and non-college workers prefer cities with higher wages, lower
rent, and a higher college employment ratio. While both college and non-college workers
nd higher wages net of local prices and amenity levels desirable, the elasticity of college
workersdemand for a city with respect to amenities is much higher than non-college workers
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amenity demand elasticity. The improvement in amenities driven by a 1% increase in a cities
college employment ratio raises the college population within the city by 3.3%, while it only
increases the non-college population by 1.3%.
Similarly, non-college workersdemand is much more elastic with respect to wages and
rent than college workers. A 1% increases in local college wages increases the local college
population by 1.4%, while a similar increase in low-skill worker wages leads to a 4.2% increase
in the low-skill worker population. Similarly for rents, a 1% increase in local rent, leads to
a 2.8% decrease in low skill worker population, while it only leads to a .95% decrease in the
high skill population.
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These results are consistent with a large body of work in empirical industrial organization
which nds large amounts of heterogeneity in how sensitive consumers are to products
prices.31
The ratio of workersdemand elasticities for rents to wages measures their expenditure
share on local goods. As derived in Section 1.4, since workerspreferences are Cobb-Douglas
in the national and local good, the indirect utility value of rent measured in wage units
represents the share of expenditure spent on locally priced goods. For both college and
non-college workers, I estimate this to be 66%-68% (0.95/1.4=0.66 for college, 2.8/4.2=0.68
for non-college). Note that the estimation methods in no way mechanically restricted this to
be less than one or similar across workersskill groups. The expenditure share is inferred by
workersrevealed preference on the trade o¤ between wages and rents across cities. Albouy
(2008) measures the relative utility impact of housing rents versus local wages to equal 65%.32
While Albouy (2008) takes a very di¤erent estimation approach, it is reassuring we nd very
similar estimates.
The estimates of the no spillovermodel strongly di¤er from the full model. The no
spillover model assumes that Bartik shocks and housing supply elasticity can only impact
worker migration by inuencing local wages and rent. Under this assumption, I nd that
college workers would have to spend only 7% of their expenditure on local goods, while non-
college workers would spend 53%. To be able to rationalize the migration responses to the
Bartik shocks through only wage and rent changes, college workers would have to be almost
indi¤erent to local price levels in order to be willing to live in cities with such high housing
prices. Data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey shows that housing expenditure makes
31For an example, see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) on consumer demand for cars. See Nevo (2010)
for a review of this literature.
32He takes a di¤erent approach to estimating the relative utility value of wage earnings versus housing rent
by explicitly accounting for a variety of mechanisms which inuence how local wage earnings and housing
prices impact workersutility, such as non-labor income and tax rates. Since my methods use workers
revealed preferences on the relative utility value of local wages versus rents based on their city choices, I
do not need to explicitly model all the possible mechanisms which wages and rent inuence workersutility
levels. Workers will take into account all the ways which wages and rent impact their utility when selecting
which city to live in. Moretti (2011b) uses a similar approach to Albouy, but does not explicitly consider
taxes and non-labor income. He estimates local good expenditure to be 58%.
52
up 33% of the average college households consumption and 32% of the average non-college
households consumption. These data make it clear that college workersexpenditure shares
on local goods cannot be close to 7% and do not appear to be strongly non-homothetic.33
This result is consistent with the reduced form evidence presented earlier in Section 1.3,
which shows that in addition to local wage and rent changes, local amenity changes were
related to changes in citiescollege employment ratios.
Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that black college and non-college workers are more sensitive
to wages, rents, and amenities. As explicitly derived in the model section, higher aggregate
demand elasticities with respect to all city characteristics signies a relatively low variance of
idiosyncratic tastes across workers for each city. Since the black population is likely a more
homogenous group than the combination of all other non-immigrant races and ethnicities
lumped together in the non-black group, the variance of black workers idiosyncratic tastes
for each city is likely to be lower. Intuitively, if most workers agree on the utility value of
each city, changes in local wages, rents, or amenities that make a given worker migrate to
that city will also make many other similar workers migrate, since they all agree it o¤ers the
higher utility value.
Immigrant preferences di¤er strongly from the US non-immigrant population. I nd that
immigrants are much more sensitive to city wages. A 1% increase in local wages increases
the low skill immigrant population by 7.1% and the high skill immigrant population by
5.2%. However, immigrants are much less sensitive to local good prices. A 1% increase in
local rents lead to out migration of 0.09% of the high skill immigrant population, and 2.9%
decrease in the low skill immigrant population. This relative wage-rent trade o¤ implies that
33When looking at housing expenditure shares across households of di¤erent incomes in the CEX, one
sees that households with higher incomes have a lower expenditure share on housing. However, Chetty and
Szeidl (2007) show that housing consumption expenditure is relatively hard for a household to adjust year
to year. Household income, on the other hand, has much more year to year uctuation. High variance in
income coupled with a low variance in housing consumption over time, within a household, will lead to the
spurious cross-sectional correlation that the households with higher annual income spend a small fraction on
housing. If this were evidence of non-homotheticity in housing consumption, then we should see a similar
gradient across proxies for householdspermanent income, such as education. Given that the consumption
expenditure on housing is strikingly at across education levels, one can conclude that housing consumption
is close to homothetic.
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immigrants must spend a smaller share of their expenditure on local goods. Additionally,
high skill immigrants are less elastic to the college employment ratio driven endogenous
amenities than non-immigrant college workers. Overall, these results show that immigrants
elect their city to live in based almost exclusively on local wages. They spend much less on
housing and local goods, which makes them able to a¤ord to live in cities with high housing
prices.
Table 1.4 reports estimates for workerspreferences to live in their own state of birth or
Census Division of birth.34 Non-college workers are 4.4 times more likely to live in a given
MSA if it is located is his state of birth than if it is not, while college workers are only 3.5
times more likely. Both college and non-college workers are 2.2 times more likely to live in
an MSA located in his Census Division of birth than an MSA farther away. These estimates
are similar for blacks. Unlike the amenities inuenced by a citys college employment ratio,
the amenity of living near ones place of birth inuences the city choices of low skill workers
more than high skill. This is consistent with the migration literature that nds high skilled
workers are more likely to move away from their place of birth.35
34I estimate decade-specic parameters for workerspreferences to live close to their state of birth. This
is purely for computational convenience. Since these parameters are jointly estimated along with the mean
utility levels for each city for each demographic group for each decade, estimating each decades parameters in
a separate optimization allowed for a signcant decrease in the computational memory requirements needed
for estimation.
35See Greenwood (1997) for a review of this literature.
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Base Black Base Black Base Black
Non-College 3.413 -0.119 3.412 0.054 3.423 0.157
[0.0022] [0.0069] [0.004] [0.018] [0.005] [0.018]
College 2.537 0.225 2.525 0.252 2.629 0.206
[0.0047] [0.018] [0.003] [0.0105] [0.0032] [0.0105]
Base Black Base Black Base Black
Non-College 1.286 -0.325 1.268 -0.529 1.216 -0.540
[0.0034] [0.0059] [0.006] [0.028] [0.005] [0.014]
College 1.199 -0.484 1.192 -0.510 1.140 -0.382
[0.0047] [0.018] [0.002] [0.0101] [0.0042] [0.0105]
1980 1990 2000
Notes: Standard erorrs in brackets. Estimates from maximum likelihood of conditional logit model of city
choice. Magnitudes represent the semi-elasticity of demand for an average sized city with respect to
whether the city is located within one's birth state or division. Black estimates are relative to base
estimates. Sample is all heads of household with positive labor income.
Table 1.4: Value of Living in Own Birth State & Division
A. Birth State
1980 1990 2000
B. Birth Division
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1.6.2 Housing Supply
Panel B of Table 1.3 presents the inverse housing supply elasticity estimates. Consistent
with the work of Saiz (2010) and Saks (2008), I nd housing supply is less elastic in areas
with higher levels of land-use regulation and less land near a citys center available for real
estate development. The inverse housing supply elasticity estimates do not di¤er much
between the full model and the no spillover model. This is expected, since these two models
have identical housing supply models. I use the parameter estimates to predict the inverse
elasticity of housing supply in each city. Panel B of Table 1.3 shows that the average inverse
housing supply elasticity is 0.17, with a standard deviation of 0.16. A regression of my
inverse housing supply elasticity estimates on Saiz (2010)s estimates yields a coe¢ cient of
1.04 (0.12), suggesting we nd similar amounts of variation in housing supply elasticities
across cities. However, Saiz (2010)s inverse housing supply estimates are higher than mine
by 0.39, on average. The overall level of my estimates is governed by the "base" inverse
housing supply term, :This parameter is the least precisely estimated of the housing supply
elasticity parameters, with a point estimate of 0.021 (0.082), which could explain why I nd
lower inverse housing supply estimates overall. Further, Saizs estimates are identied using
a single, long run change in housing prices from 1970-2000, while I am looking at decadal
changes from 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000. Di¤erences in time frame could impact these
parameter estimates as well.
1.6.3 Labor Demand
Panel C of Table 1.3 presents parameter estimates for the local labor demand curves. In the
no spillovers model, I estimate  to be 0.499, which implies a elasticity of labor substitution
of 1.99. This estimate is very close to others in the literature, which tend to be between 1
and 3.36 Work by Card (2009) estimates the elasticity of labor substitution at the MSA level
and nds an elasticity of 2.5, which is not statistically distinguishable from my results.
36See Katz and Autor (1999) for a literature review of this work.
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In the full model specication, I allow for a more exible labor demand curve. The
parametric assumptions allow me to disentangle the slopes of rms labor demand curves
from productivity spillovers due to changes in citiescollege employment ratios. With this
more general model, I estimate  to be 0.558, which implies an elasticity of labor substitution
within rms of 2.26, slightly higher than the more restrictive model. Additionally, a 1%
increase in the a citys college employment ratio increases the productivity of college workers
by 0.55% and non-college workers by 0.18%.
These estimates suggest that the social returns to education are high. Combining the
estimates of the elasticity of labor substitution with the productivity spillovers, I nd that
a 1% increase in a citys college worker population raises the local college wage by 0.52%
and the local non-college wage by 0.59%. Similarly, a 1% increase in a citynon-college
worker population decreases college wages by 0.52% and non-college wages by 0.59%. The
wage increases due to local productivity spillovers, such as endogenous technology adoption
or knowledge and ideas spillovers, overwhelm the wage decreases driven by movement along
rmslabor demand curves from the increase supply of college graduate labor.
Moretti (2004a) also analyzes the impact of high and low skill worker labor supply on
workerswages within a city. He estimates a 1% increase in a citys college employment ratio
leads to a .16% increase in the wages of high school graduates and a .10% increase in the wages
of college graduates, both of which are smaller than my ndings.37 His estimates are identied
o¤ of cross-sectional variation in citys college shares, driven by the presence of a land
grant college, while my estimates are estimated o¤ of changes in skill-mix driven by housing
supply elasticity heterogeneity. Additionally, my estimates explicitly combine the impact of
37Moretti (2004a)s setup looks at the impact of a citys share of college graduates

Hjt
Hjt+Ljt

on workers
wages by education level, while my setup measures the local education mix using the log ratio of college
to non-college workers

ln
Hjt
Ljt

: To transform Morettis estimates into the same units of my own, note
that HjtHjt+Ljt =
Hjt
Ljt
1+
Hjt
Ljt
: Moretti estimates: wjt = 
Hjt
Hjt+Ljt
: Thus, @wjt
@ ln

Hjt
Ljt
 = @wjt
@
Hjt
Hjt+Ljt
@
Hjt
Hjt+Ljt
@ ln

Hjt
Ljt
 =  
Hjt
Hjt+Ljt

1  HjtHjt+Ljt

: Plugging in the average college share in 1990, 0.25 gives: @wjt
ln

Hjt
Ljt
 = (0:1875) :
Thus, I scale Morettis estimates by 0:1875 to make them in the same units as my own.
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movement along rms labor demand curves with endogenous productivity spillovers, while
Moretti controls for labor demand variation (he includes the local unemployment rate as well
as other city controls). He also uses the lagged age structure of the city as a instrument for
changes in citiesskill mix. Using this identication strategy, he nds slightly larger e¤ects
(point estimates become 0.39 for high school graduate wages and 0.16 for college wages.)
While my estimates of the social returns to education are slightly above Morettis, we both
conclude that they are large and substantial.38
In Appendix A.3, I consider whether the observed population distribution across cities
in each decade is a stable equilibrium assuming a simple dynamic adjustment process, given
the parameter estimates of the model. Using a simple dynamic adjustment process where
5% of the population can choose to migrate to a new city each period, and citieswages,
rents, and amenities instantaneously respond to population changes each period, I nd that
the equilibria observed in the data in 1980, 1990, and 2000 are stable under this assumed
adjustment dynamic. See Appendix A.3 for further details.
1.6.4 Estimation Robustness
To assess whether the parameter estimates of the model are sensitive to ways that I have
measured wages, rents, and Bartik shocks, I re-estimate the model using a variety of di¤erent
variable denitions. These results are in Table 1.5. A particularly important reason to assess
whether the parameter estimates are stable across di¤erent specications is to indirectly test
for whether my instruments are weak. I am not aware of a standard econometric test for
weak instruments when estimating a multiple equation, non-linear GMM model where there
are multiple endogenous variables.
38Ciccone and Peri (2006) also estimate the productivity spillovers of education. However, they focus
on the social return to an additional year of average education, without di¤entiating between college and
non-college years of education. They also use lagged age structure of a city as an instrument for the local
skill mix, but do not nd any evidence of spillovers. Since they do not explicitly analyze spillovers due to
college versus. non-college skill mix, it is hard to compare exactly why these estimates di¤er. Their analysis
also does not include the 2000 census.
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Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) say If identication is weak, then GMM estimates can
be sensitive to the addition of instruments or to changes in the sample. If these features are
present in an empirical application, then they can be symptomatic of weak identication.
I try to do the best I can to testfor weak identication by changing which instruments I
include and how I dene the samples variables.
I rst assess the sensitivity of including the aggregateBartik shock as an additional
instrument: The model can be identied using only the high skill and low skill Bartik shocks,
along with their interactions with housing supply elasticities. I included the aggregate Bartik
shock because it likely contains information about how each individual low and high skill
Bartik shock inuences local housing prices. Column 1 of Table 1.5 reports the parameter
estimates when all of the moments using the aggregate Bartik shocks are dropped. The para-
meter estimates are extremely similar between this specication and the main specication.
The standard errors increase slightly, which is expected when there are fewer identifying
restrictions used to estimate the model. No parameters change sign and all of the changes
in the parameter estimates are within the condence bands of my preferred specication.
As additional robustness tests, I try a variety of methods for measuring local wages and
rent. I re-estimate the model where I hedonically adjust local wage and rent changes. Wages
are adjusted for a more ne measure of education, a quadratic in experience, gender, and
race. I adjust rents by number of rooms, number of bedrooms, and apartment units in the
structure. The model estimates using these wage and rent measures are qualitatively the
same. High and low skill workers are slightly more elastic to citieswages and rents, but
high skill workers remain signicantly less price sensitive than low skill workers.
I also measure local rent changes in a variety of ways. I try using only rent data from
housing units actually rented, dropping the imputed rents. I also try using only the imputed
rents. Further, I estimate the model using only rents from college workers, as well as rents
only from non-college workers. The results are very similar across all of these specications.
This shows that the variation of housing costs between cities does not strongly di¤er across
61
home owners versus home rents or between the neighborhoods of the high skill workers or low
skill workers. Overall, the parameter estimates are stable across a variety of specications,
which alleviates some concern about whether the model is weakly identied.
I also consider an alternative measure of citiesendogenous amenities using the observable
amenity data. The main model specication uses the college employment ratio as the index
of endogenous amenities within a city. This index captures both the direct benets of
having more educated neighbors, as well as the indirect benets through amenities such as
more restaurants, lower crime, or better air quality. To assess whether these observable
amenities can capture the full extent of the increased desirability of high skill cities, I create
an alternative endogeneous amenity index. I compute changes in the observable amenity
index by measuring the average change in logs of each amenity measure in each decade.39
Specically, the amenity index is dened as:
amen_indexjt =
1
K
X
k
 ln (amenkjt) :
Column 7 of Table 1.5 shows the re-estimated model where this observable amenity index
is used in place of the college employment ratio for workerspreferences for cities. Similar
to the main model estimates, I nd that elasticity of college workers demand for a city
with a high amenity index is substantially larger than lower skill workersdemand elastcity
(2.29 (0.85) for college versus 0.413 (0.61) for non-college). However, the model estimates
using this amenity index still show that college workers appear to allocate a very small
share of their expenditure to housing and local goods, relative to non-college workers. These
estimates would imply that college workers only spend 8% of their expenditure housing and
local goods, while non-college workers spend 52%. This suggests that the college employment
39The amenity measures included are grocery stores per 1000 residents, apparel stores per 1000 residents,
eating and drinking places per 1000 residents, book stores per 1000 residents, dry cleaners per 1000 residents,
movie thearters per 1000 residents, property crimes per 1000 residents, violent crimes per 1000 residents,
and the EPA air quality index. I do not include museums and art galleries because data is missing for a
substantial number of MSAs. Since the air quality data is missing for a number of MSAs, espcially in 1980,
I impute air quality by regressing non-missing air quality on the other amenities, as well as future periods
airquality measures. I then impute the missing airquality data from this regression.
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ratio is capturing desirable amenities of the city, over and beyond these observable measures.
This is not surprising, since Table 1.2 showed that while the college employment ratio was
positively correlated with many of these desirable amenities, the college employment ratio
could explain only a very small fraction of the varition in any of these obsevable amenity
measures. A high college share city appears to be desirable for reasons over and beyond
these measures of observable amenities.
As a nal robustness test, I consider an alternative functional form for the local labor
demand curves. Using the standard constant elasticity of substitution production function
restricts wages to only depend on the the relative supply of college and non-college workers,
and not aggregate amount of labor in the city. To assess whether the models labor demand
elasticity estimates are being restricted due to the functional form assumptions, I estimate
reduced form local labor demand curves. I replace the CES labor demand curves with the
following log-linear labor demand curves:
wHjt = 
H
t + 
HH log (Hjt) + 
HL log (Ljt) + "
H
jt
wLjt = 
L
t + 
LH log (Hjt) + 
LL log (Ljt) + "
L
jt:
Column 8 of Table 1.5 reports the model estimates using these reduced-form labor demand
curves. None of the labor demand elasticity estimates change sign from the main model
estimates. The reduced form estimates show that a 1% increase in non-college labor leads
only to a 0.12% decline in college worker wages. The magnitude of this estimate is smaller
than the main model estimate of a 0.59% decline in college worker wages. The other reduced
form labor demand estimates are of similar magnitudes to those in the main model estimates.
Overall it seems the functional form restrictions of the CES production function are not
restraining the labor demand elasticities to be extremely di¤erent from those found in the
reduced form estimates.
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1.7 Amenities & Productivity Across Cities
Using the estimated parameters, one can infer the productivity of local rms and the desir-
ability local amenities in each city. Comparing the models predicted amenity and produc-
tivity levels to outside research and data on these city characteristics will assess model t
and provide a sanity check of whether these estimates appear plausible.
There is a large literature which attempts to estimate which cities o¤er the most desirable
amenities using hedonic techniques.40 The methodology used in this paper to infer which
cities o¤er the most desirable amenities di¤ers from the previous hedonic literature. Recalling
equation (1:24) ; the utility value of the amenities in a city to workers of a given demographic
group (colzHjt
Ljt
+ zjt) is measured by the component of the workerscommon utility level for
each city, zjt; which is not driven by the local wage and rent level, 
wzwedujt + 
rzrjt. The
utility workers of type z receive from the amenities in city j in year t; U zA; is thus:
U zA = 
colz
Hjt
Ljt
+ zjt = 
z
jt   wzwedujt   rzrjt:
Intuitively, amenities are inferred to be highest in cities which have higher population levels
of a given demographic group than would be expected, given the citys wage and rent levels
and workerspreferences for wages and rent. If many workers choose to live in a city that
appears relatively undesirable based on its wages and rent, as compared to other cities, it
must o¤er desirable amenities. Unlike the literature using hedonics to rank city amenities,
these methods are able to rank the desirability of cities amenities separately for di¤erent
types of workers.
A test of whether the model ts the data well is to asses whether the amenity rankings ap-
pear intuitive.Of the largest 75 cities, as measured by their population in 1980, Appendix
40The hedonic methods infer a citys amenities by directly comparing local real wages across cities. In a
model where workers have homogeneous preferences for cities, the equilibrium local real wages across cities
must be set to equate all workers utility values in all cities. In equilibrium, the di¤erence in real wages across
cities is a direct measure of the amenity value of the city. A low amenity city must o¤er a high real wage in
order to o¤er the same utility as a high amenity city. See Albouy (2008) for recent amenity estimates using
these techniques.
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Table 1.3 reports the top 10 cities with the most desirable and undesirable amenities for col-
lege and non-college workers in 1980 and 2000, as well as the cities with the largest improve-
ments and declines in amenities during this time period. In 2000, Los Angeles-Long Beach,
CA had the most desirable amenities for non-college workers, followed by Phoenix, AZ,
Denver-Boulder, CO, Seattle-Everett, WA, and Boston, MA-NH. The cities with the most
desirable amenities for college workers in 2000 were: Los Angeles-Long Beach CA, Wash-
ington, DC/MD/VA, Boston, MA-NH, Atlanta, GA, and San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo,
CA. These cities are known to have vibrant cultural scenes, desirable weather, and often
considered to have high quality-of-life.
The least desirable city amenities for college workers in 2000 are located in Youngstown-
Warren, OH-PA, which is followed by Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ, Syracuse, NY,
Harrisburg-LebanonCarlisle, PA, and Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA. Similarly, non-college
workers nd the least desirable amenities in Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA, followed by Toledo,
OH/MI, Syracuse, NY, Bu¤alo-Niagara Falls, NY, and Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ.
All of these cities are located in Americas Rust Belt, where the cities have historically had
high levels of pollution due the concentration of manufacturing jobs. They have recently
faced large declines in manufacturing jobs, population declines, and growing crime rates
since the 1980s. It is not surprising these cities o¤er the least desirable amenities. Overall,
the model seems to do well at capturing which cities are the most and least desirable.
A similar validation test can be done by analyzing which cities have the highest and
lowest productivity levels. The productivity level in each city for each skill level of worker
can be inferred from the residual of the labor demand equation:
ProdHjt = lnw
H
jt   ((1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnHjt) (1.25)
ProdLjt = lnw
L
jt   ((1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnLjt) : (1.26)
Intuitively, productivity is inferred to be the highest in areas where wages are much higher
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than what would be predicted by the amount of labor supplied to an area. Appendix
Table 1.4 reports the most and least productive cities in 1980 and 2000 for college and non-
college workers. In 2000, the most productive city for college graduates was San Jose, CA,
followed by San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA, New York-Northeastern NJ, Washington,
DC/MD/VA, and Boston, MA-NH. These cities are the hubs of many of the most productive
industries such as high tech in Silicon Valley, nance in New York, and biotech in Boston
and San Francisco.
The most productive cities for lower skill workers are very di¤erent. In 2000, the city
most productive for low skill workers was Riverside-San Bernardino,CA, followed by Detroit,
MI, Las Vegas, NV, Tacoma, WA, and Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA. Riverside-San
Bernardino, CA is where many of the largest manufacturing companies have chosen to place
their distribution centers. These centers transport nished goods and materials from the
ports surrounding Los Angeles to destinations around the US. Shipping and distribution
provide many relatively high paying jobs for low skill workers here. While Detroit, MI ranks
as the second most productive area in 2000, it is also in the top 10 for cities which have
experienced the largest productivity declines for low skill workers from 1980 to 2000. In
1980, Detroit, MI was the most productive city for low skill workers, but as American auto
manufacturing has lost market share, wages and jobs have fallen here. However, Detroit still
provides some of the most productive uses of low skill labor in 2000.
In Appendix A.4, I compare my productivity estimates with other work studying the
determinants of productivity changes across cities. My estimates are consistent with work
by Autor and Dorn (2012) who study the di¤erences in skill biased technology change across
cities driven by historical occupation di¤erences. Work by Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010)
studying di¤erences in technology adoption of rms across cities also lines up with my esti-
mated productivity changes. Additionally, the cities which I nd to have the largest declines
in low skill productivity closely overlap with the citieswhich had larger amounts of their
labor force employed in industries that faced the most competition from the increased pen-
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etration of Chinese exports (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2012)).
There are striking di¤erence in which cities have had the largest changes in their local
high and low skill productivity from 1980 to 2000. Appendix Table 1.4 shows that three cities
(San Jose, CA, Boston, MA-NH, and Chicago, IL) rank in the top 10 largest productivity
increases for high skill workers and the top 10 largest productivity decreases for low skill
workers. Table 1.6 presents a regression of the models predicted change in a citys high
skill productivity on its predicted change in low skill productivity. I nd a slight negative
relationship between local high skill productivity change, and local low skill productivity.
Note that this negative relationship between changes in local high skill productivity and low
skill productivity cannot be seen by simply comparing changes in local high skill wages with
changes in local low skill wages. Table 1.6 shows that changes in high and low skill wages
are strongly positively correlated, with an R squared of 0.50. Movement along local labor
demand curves driven by migration masks the large di¤erences local productivity changes
by skill.
The di¤erences in high and low skill workerspreferences for a citys amenities is unlikely
to di¤er by the same magnitude. The preference estimates of the model showed that both
high and low skill workers agreed that the amenity changes caused by an increase in a
citys college employment ratio were desirable. Thus, one would expect that college workers
overall utility value for a citys amenities to be positively associated with non-college workers
utility value for the same citys amenities. Table 1.6 shows that the utility value of college
and non-college amenity changes across cities are strongly positively correlated. Changes in
non-college workersutility due to changes in citiesamenities explains 58% of the variation
in changes in college workersutility for the same citiesamenities.
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Table 1.6 shows that changes in college productivity are positively associated with changes
in college amenities. However, changes in non-college productivity are negatively associated
with non-college amenity changes. Industries which are the most productive for low skill
workers may negatively impact the amenities of the city. For example, Kahn (1999) nds
the decline of manufacturing in Rust Belt cities led to increases in local air-quality. The
model allows for this e¤ect through the college employment ratio. However, the industries
most productive for college workers tend to be driven by research, ideas and innovation.
Even though high skill production might not directly spillover onto a citys amenities, cities
which attract high skill workers by o¤ering high wages benet from the endogenous amenity
increases, driven by the presence of high skill workers living in the city.
The inferred local productivity and amenity changes across cities appear consistent with
outside knowledge on these measures, and the relationships between productivity and ameni-
ties changes also appear intuitive. These tests of the model provide evidence that the model
setup and parameter estimates capture the key underlying drivers of the determinants of
local wages, rents, and amenities across cities.
1.7.1 The Determinants of CitiesCollege Employment Ratio Changes
To understand what drove the changes in cities college employment ratios from 1980 to
2000, I use the estimated model to assess the contributions of productivity, amenities, and
housing supply elasticities to the changes in citiescollege employment ratios.
1.7.2 College Employment Ratio Changes and Productivity
I rst consider how much of the observed changes in citiescollege employment ratios can be
explained by changes in citiesexogenous productivity levels. Changes in local productivity
directly impact wages, but also inuence local prices and endogenous amenities through
migration. Before considering how local productivity changes are capitalized into equilibrium
wages, rents, and endogenous amenities, I consider the direct e¤ect of productivity changes
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on local wages. Using the exogenous productivity changes predicted by the model, I compute
the direct e¤ect of exogenous changes in productivity from 1980 to 2000 in each city on local
high and low skill wages. These counterfactual college and non-college wages in 2000, w^Hj2000
w^Lj2000 are dened as:
w^Hj2000 = c1980 + (1  ) ln N^j2000 + (  1) lnHj1980 + H ln

Hj1980
Lj1980

| {z }
Labor Supply in 1980
+ "Hj2000| {z }
Exog. Productivity in 2000
w^Lj2000 = c1980 + (1  ) ln N^j2000 + (  1) lnLj1980 + L ln

Hj1980
Lj1980

| {z }
Labor Supply in 1980
+ "Lj2000| {z }
Exog. Productivity in 2000
N^j2000 =

exp
 
"Lj2000
Hj1980
Lj1980
L
Lj1980 + exp
 
"Hj2000
Hj1980
Lj1980
H
Hj1980
 1

:
The counterfactual wages only reect the shifts in local labor demand curves driven by the
exogenous changes in local productivity from 1980 to 2000, but not the movement along
citieslabor demand curves or endogenous productivity changes due to migration.
Using these counterfactual year 2000 wages, while holding rents and amenity levels xed
at their 1980 levels, I use the model to predict where workers would have chosen to live if
they had to choose among this set of hypothetical cities. Specically, worker is utility for
hypothetical city j is:
Vijt = 
wziw^
edu
j2000   rzirj1980 + zj1980 + colzi
Hj1980
Lj1980
+ stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ij80:
The predicted citiescollege employment ratios from this hypothetical world are then com-
pared to those observed in the data. This counterfactual scenario assesses whether the cities
which became disproportionately productive for college, relative to non-college workers, were
also the cities which experienced disproportionate growth in their college versus non-college
populations. Figure 1.6 panel A plots the observed college employment ratio changes against
these predicted counterfactual changes.
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Figure 6.A Predicted change in college ratio
due to local wage changes from productivity
changes
Figure 6.B Predicted change in ln college
ratio due to observed changes in local wages
& rent
Figure 6.C Predicted change in ln college
ratio due to changes in observed changes in
wages, rent, and endogenous amenities
Figure 1.6: Predicted Changes in Ln College Employment Ratio: 1980-2000
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The predicted and actual changes are strongly correlated with a correlation coe¢ cient of
0.70. This shows local productivity changes explain a large share of the changes in cities
local college employment ratios from 1980 to 2000.
While simple shifts in citieswages due to productivity changes explain a large amount
of the variation in college employment ratio changes, workers actual migration decisions
depended on how local productivity changes inuenced the overall desirability of citiess
wages, rents, and amenities. For example, productivity growth in a city with very inelastic
housing supply would attract many fewer workers than a similar city with elastic housing
supply. Additionally, the amenities of the city will respond to the mix of college and non-
college workers living in the city.
In a model where amenities are assumed to be exogenous, the only ways which productiv-
ity changes can inuence workerslocation decisions is by inuencing local wages and rents.
To measures the importance of endogenous amenity changes in inuencing cities college
employment ratio changes, I use the model to predict workerscity choices in 2000, using
only the observed changes in wages and rent. Holding amenities xed at the 1980 levels, I
set local wages and rents to the levels observed in 2000. Specically, worker is utility for
hypothetical city j is:
Vijt = 
wziw
edu
j2000   rzirj2000 + zj1980 + colzi
Hj1980
Lj1980
+ stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ij80:
I predict where workers would have chosen to live if they had to choose from this set of
counterfactual cities. If endogenous amenity changes were not an important factor in how
productivity changes inuenced citiescollege employment ratio changes, then local wage and
rent changes should be at least as strong of a predictor of college employment ratio changes as
simply shifting wages by productivity changes. Figure 1.6 panel B plots the observed college
employment ratio changes against these counterfactual predicted college employment ratio
changes. The correlation of the predicted versus actual college employment ratio changes
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falls by 14% to 0.60. Local wage and rent changes have less predictive power in explaining
citiescollege employment ratio changes than the direct impact of productivity changes. This
suggests endogenous amenity changes are an important component in changing citiescollege
employment ratios.
To test how much predictive power the endogenous amenity changes have in explaining
college employment ratio changes, beyond wages and rent, I create a third set of counter-
factual cities. These cities hold the exogenous amenities xed at their 1980 levels, but allow
wages, rents, and endogenous amenities to shift to the level observed in 2000. Specically,
worker is utility for hypothetical city j is:
Vijt = 
wziw
edu
j2000   rzirj2000 + zj1980 + colzi
Hj2000
Lj2000
+ stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ij80:
I use the model to predict where workers would have chosen to live within this set of counter-
factual cities. Figure 1.6 panel C plots actual college employment ratio changes against these
predicted changes due to wages, rents, and endogenous amenities. The correlation coe¢ cient
is now 0.80, a 30% increase relative to the predictive power of wage and rent changes alone.
The combination of wage, rent, and endogenous amenity changes have more predictive power
than the productivity shifts alone, which shows that the endogenous amenity response was
a key mechanism in how local productivity changes led to migration changes.
1.7.3 Corroborating Reduced Form Evidence
As an alternative method to assess the role of local productivity changes in driving local
migration patterns, I analyze the reduced form relationship between the observable Bartik
local labor demand shocks and changes in cities college employment ratios. To measure
the labor demand impacts of the Bartik shocks directly on migration, I measure the Bartik
shocks using changes in nationwide industry employment.41 I regress changes in citiescollege
41Since the Bartik shocks were used as instruments for wages in estimation, they o¤er the most power
when measured in wage units. However, when measuring the reduced form impact of Bartik labor demand
shocks on migration, it is useful to measure the industry shock in the same units as migration: counts of
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employment ratios on the college and non-college Bartik local labor demand shocks. The
results are in Table 1.7. Consistent with the ndings of Moretti (2011b), I nd that high
skill labor demand shocks strongly predict increases in cities college employment ratios,
while low skill labor demand shocks are negatively predictive. Further, the R-squared of this
regression shows that over 40% of the variation in changes in citiescollege employment ratios
can be explained by changes in industrial labor demand for high and low skill workers. Both
these observable local productivity changes, as well as the model estimated local productivity
changes, show that the local productivity changes were the underlying drivers of changes in
citiescollege employment ratios.
As an additional test for the importance of endogenous amenity changes, I analyze the
relationship between the observed Bartik labor demand shocks and changes in local real
wages. The model estimates showed that both college and non-college workers spent 67% of
their expenditure on locally priced goods. Thus, I measure local real wages as:
local real wageedujt = w
edu
jt   0:67  rjt:
A regression of changes in college workerslocal real wages on Bartik labor demand shocks in
Table 1.7 show that an increase in the college Bartik labor demand decreases college work-
erslocal real wages. As previously discussed, the college Bartik shocks strongly predicted
increases in the local college employment ratio. It is hard to rationalize why college workers
would disproportionately migrate to areas with decreases in local real wages, unless the Bar-
tik shocks caused increases in local amenities. In contrast, Table 1.7 shows that increases in
non-college Bartik shocks lead to increases in non-college workerslocal real wages, which
workers. Additionally, Bartik measured in wage changes for each skill group should impact wages, and thus
migration of both skill groups, due to imperfect labor substitution within rms. Bartik measured in quanti-
ties, thus, should give a more precise measure of the increase in quantities of labor demanded for high and
low skill workers. Bartik shocks measured in quantities are dened as: BH;quantjt =
P
ind s
H;ind
jt 1  lnH
ind
( j)t;
BL;quantjt =
P
ind s
L;ind
jt 1  lnL
ind
( j)t; where s
H;ind
jt 1 and s
L;ind
jt 1 are the share of college and non-college workers
employed in industry ind in city j in 1980, respectively.  lnHind( j)t measures the change between 1980 and
2000 in the log of number of jobs for college graduates in industry ind nationwide, excluding city j:  lnLind( j)t
is a similar measure for non-college workers.
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shows the in-migration of low skill workers did not endogenously increase local amenities.
Additionally, Table 1.7 shows the OLS relationship between changes in local college employ-
ment ratios and cities local real wages for high and low skill workers. Increases in local
college employment ratios are associated with decreases in local real wages for both college
and non-college workers. Earlier reduced form facts presented in Section 3 showed changes
in citiescollege employment ratios are positively associated with increases in both wages
and rents. However, the rent increases are so large, that they overwhelm the wage increases,
leading to local real wage decreases. This further shows that local amenities changes played
an important role in the observed migration patterns.
As a direct test of the impact of local Bartik labor demand shocks on endogenous amenity
changes, Table 1.8 reports regressions of a set of observable amenity changes on high and low
skill Bartik labor demand shocks. I nd apparel stores per capita and eating and drinking
places per capita positively respond to increases in labor demand for college workers. I also
nd property crime rates and pollution levels fall in response to increase in labor demand
for college workers. Similarly, increase in non-college labor demand causes decreases in
grocery stores per capita, apparel stores per capita, eating and drinking places per capita,
and movie theaters per capita. These results show that in-migration of college workers leads
to increases in a large set of amenities, while in-migration of low skill workers, leads to
decreases of amenities. This further conrms the structural model estimates which showed
workersmigration responses to Bartik shocks could not be rationalized without the college
employment ratio directly inuencing local amenities.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ College
Employment
Ratio
Δ College
Employment
Ratio
Δ College
Local Real
Wage
Δ Non-
College Local
Real Wage
Δ College Local Real
Wage -0.500***
[0.183]
Δ Non-College Local
Real Wage -0.783***
[0.147]
College Bartik
Employment Shock 2.375*** -0.651*** -0.780***
[0.176] [0.0745] [0.0912]
Non-College Bartik
Employment Shock -1.588*** 0.283*** 0.240**
[0.179] [0.0757] [0.0927]
Constant 0.405*** -0.632*** 0.442*** 0.398***
[0.0259] [0.0766] [0.0324] [0.0397]
Observations 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.257 0.409 0.256 0.276
Table 1.7: Reduced Form Relationships between  College Employment Ratios,
Local Real Wages & Local Employment Shocks
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Changes measured between 1980-2000. Weighted by
MSA population in 1980. College employment ratio is defined as the ratio of number of
employed college workers to the number of employed lower skill workers living in the city.
Δ Real Wage = Δ ln(Wage)-.67*ΔLn(Rent). Bartik employment shock measure uses
national industry changes in log employment quantities, weighted by the share of a city's
employees employed in the industry. See text for futher details. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Overall, the underlying cause of the increase in sorting of workers by skill levels across
cities was due to an increases in sorting of productivity by skill across cities. As presented
earlier, Figure 1.2 shows the widening of the distribution of college employment ratios across
cities from 1980 to 2000. Figure 1.7 provides a similar histogram of the ratio of college
productivity to non-college productivity across cities for each decade. The productivity
ratio in each city is dened as:
Productivity Ratio=
exp
 
ProdHjt

exp
 
ProdLjt
 ;
where ProdHjt ; Prod
L
jt are the local productivities of high and low skill workers, as dened in
equations (1:25) ; (1:26).42 As seen in Figure 1.7, the productivity ratio distribution across
cities exhibits the same widening over decades as seen in the college share distribution across
cities in Figure 1.2.
In Appendix A.5, I analyze the role of housing supply elasticity heterogeneity in explain-
ing the increase in geographic skill sorting. As the nations population grows, the cities with
less elastic housing supply experience relatively higher increases in housing rents. Since low
skill workers are more price sensitive, the rent increases in inelastic cities lead to more out
migration of low skill than high skill workers. This, in turn, leads to larger increases in the
college employment ratios of housing inelastic cities. Increases in a citys college employment
ratio raise all workerswages, as well as increase the citys amenities. These e¤ects will mit-
igate the out-migration driven by the initial increase in the citys rent, keeping the rent high
in these housing inelastic cities. Thus, nationwide population growth over time should lead
to larger increases in wages, rents, and college employment ratios in housing inelastic cities.
While I nd evidence for these e¤ects, they only explain a small amount of the changes in
citiescollege employment ratios. The dominant cause is local productivity change.
42The productivities are exponentiated since they are measured in log wage units. This makes the ratio of
high and low skill productivity comparable to the college employment ratio because both now are measured
in levels, not logs.
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of College Productivity Gap Across MSAs: 1980-2000
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1.7.4 Summary of Skill Sorting Mechanisms
To summarize, I nd the underlying cause of the relative migration choices of high and low
skill workers to be changes in high and low skill workersrelative productivity across cities.
The structural model estimates show that a migration response to local productivity changes
which increases a citys college employment ratio further increases the wages of all workers in
the city and increases the local amenities. Wages rise due the combined e¤ect of endogenous
productivity changes and movement along rms labor demand curves. Amenities such as
pollutions levels, crime rates, and the quality of the local goods market improve in response
to increases in the college employment ratio.
The combination of desirable wage and amenity growth for all workers led to large
amounts of in-migration of both high and low skill workers. College workers were par-
ticularly attracted by desirable amenities, while low skill workers were particularly attracted
by desirable wages. The increase in population in high college share cities led to large rent
increases. Since low skill workers are more price sensitive, the increases in rent dispropor-
tionately discouraged low skill workers from living in these high wage, high amenity cities.
Thus, in equilibrium, college workers sort into high wage, high rent, high amenity cities.
Lower skill workers are not willing to pay the priceof a lower local real wage to live in
high amenity cities, leading them to chose more a¤ordable, low amenity cities.
1.8 Welfare Implications & Well-Being Inequality
It is well documented that the nationwide wage gap between college workers and high school
graduates has increased signicantly from 1980 to 2000. Table 1.9 shows that the nationwide
college wage gap has increased by 0.20 log points.43 However, increases in wage inequality do
not necessarily reect increases in well-being inequality. College workers increasingly chose
43I focus on the college graduate-high school graduate wage gap because most of the literature has used this
as a key wage inequality statistic. My model assumes all non-college workers face the same wage di¤entials
across cities. To make the welfare analysis comparable to the college-high school wage gap, I adjust the non-
college workerswages nationwide to represent the wages of a high school graduate, instead of the typical
non-college worker. This does not impact the relative wages across cities.
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to live in cities with higher wages, high rents, and more desirable amenities than non-college
workers. The additional welfare e¤ects of local rents and amenities could either add to or
o¤set the welfare e¤ects of wage changes.
First, I look only at wage and rent changes. I measure changes in the college local
real wage gap, where I dene a workers local real wage as his utility from wages and rent,
measured in log wage units:
Local Real Wageijt = w
edu
jt  
rzi
wzi
rjt:
rzi
wzi
measure worker i0s expenditure share on locally priced goods. Table 1.9 reports changes
in the college local real wage gap from 1980-2000. Similar to the ndings of Moretti (2011b),
I nd the local real wage gap has increased 0.15 log points, 24% less than the increase in the
college wage gap. However, this is not a full welfare metric.
Part of the reason college workers chose to pay such high housing rents was because they
gained utility from the areasamenities. To measure how changes in citieswages, rents,
and amenities each contributed to well-being inequality, I conduct a welfare decomposition.
First, I measure each workers expected utility change from 1980 to 2000 if the only cities
wages had changed, but local rents and amenities had stayed xed. A worker {0s expected
utility in 1980 is measured by the expected utility he would receive from living in his rst
choice city:
E (Ui1980) = E

max
j
Vij1980

Vij1980 = 
wziw
edu
j1980   rzirj1980 + zj1980 + colzi
Hj1980
Lj1980
+stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ij1980:
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Since I do not observe each workers idiosyncratic taste for each city, I must integrate out
over the error distribution to calculate his expected utility from the city he chooses to live
in. Since the error terms are distributed Type I extreme value, a workers expected utility
from his top choice city is:
E (Ui1980) = ln
0B@X
j
exp
0B@ wziweduj1980   rzirj1980 + zj1980 + colzi Hj1980Lj1980
+stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j
1CA
1CA :
Similarly, worker i0s expected utility if wages adjust to the levels observed in 2000,E

U^wi2000

;
is measured by:
E

U^wi2000

= ln
0B@X
j
exp
0B@ wziweduj2000   rzirj1980 + zj1980 + colzi Hj1980Lj1980
+stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j
1CA
1CA :
E

U^wi2000

measures the utility worker i receives from living in the city he nds most desir-
able. Combining these, the expected utility impact due to citieswage changes from 1980 to
2000 is:
E

U^wi2000

  E

U^wi1980

wzi
:
The change in utility is divided by worker is marginal utility of wages, so that utility is
measured in log wage units. Intuitively, the expected utility change measures each workers
willingness to pay (in log wages) to live in his rst choice counterfactual city instead of his
rst choice city from the set available in 1980. I compute this for each worker in 2000 and
compare the average utility impact for college workers to the that of non-college workers.
Table 1.9 reports these estimates. From 1980-2000 changes in citieswages led to an
increase in the college well-being gap equivalent to a nationwide increase of 0.193 log points
in the college wage gap, which is very close to observed increase of 0.199 in the college
wage gap. Even if local amenities and rents had not changed, there still would have been a
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substantial increase in well-being inequality between college and non-college workers due to
local wage changes.
To account for the additional e¤ect of local rent changes, I perform a similar calculation
that allows local wages and rents to adjust to the level observed in 2000. The expected
utility of worker i if wages and rent adjust to the level observed in 2000 E

U^wri2000

is:
E

U^wri2000

= ln
0B@X
j
exp
0B@ wziweduj2000   rzirj2000 + zj1980 + colzi Hj1980Lj1980
+stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j
1CA
1CA :
The change in well-being inequality between college and and high school graduates due to
wage and rent changes from 1980 to 2000 is equivalent to a nationwide increase of 0.175 log
points in the college wage gap. The welfare impacts of wages and rents lead to a smaller
increase in well-being inequality because the cities which o¤ered the most desirable wages
for college workers also had the highest rents, o¤setting some of the wage benets.
To measure the additional contribution of amenity changes to well-being inequality, I can
only quantify the welfare impacts of endogenous amenity changes due to changes in cities
college employment ratios. Since the model infers unobserved exogenous amenity changes by
measuring which cities have larger population growth than would be expected from the local
wage and rent changes, the model only identies relative amenity changes between cities
across years.
The model cannot identify the overall magnitude of amenity changes across decades. To
see this consider a simple example of 2 cities: New York and Chicago. Assume New York
and Chicago are equally appealing in year 1, and have equal populations. In year 2, there
is large migration from New York to Chicago, which cannot be explained by wage and rent
changes. One can conclude that the amenities of Chicago must have improved, relative to
the amenities of New York. If the amenities of New York stayed xed, while the amenities
of Chicago improved, workers were able increase their utility, since New York is equally
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desirable in years 1 and 2, but Chicago improved. In contrast, if the amenities of New York
declined, but Chicagos amenities stayed xed, workers would be worse o¤ in year 2 than
year 1, because both cities are weakly less desirable in year 2 than year 1. Yet these two
scenarios produced identical migration patterns, which makes inferring the welfare e¤ects of
unobserved amenity changes over time impossible.
The welfare e¤ects of endogenous amenity changes over time, however, can be measured.
Since a citys college employment ratio represents an index of the citys endogenous amenity
level, an increase in a citys college employment ratio over time means that the endogenous
amenities must have improved from one year to the next. This welfare e¤ect can be measured
directly.
There are two main reasons the endogenous amenities of cities have changed over time.
First, there has been a nationwide increase in the share of the population with a college
degree. This led to increases in the college shares of almost all cities from 1980 to 2000.
Second, there has been a re-sorting of college and non-college workers across cities, which,
coupled with the nationwide college share increase, led to increases in some citiescollege
shares more than others.
First, I measure the impact of amenity changes on well-being inequality driven only by
the re-sorting of college and non-college workers across cities. I hold the nationwide college
share xed at the 1980 level. The expected utility of worker i if wages, rents, and endogenous
amenities due to resorting adjust to the level observed in 2000 E

U^wri2000

; is measured by:
E

U^wri2000

= ln
0B@X
j
exp
0B@ wziweduj2000   rzirj2000 + zj1980 + colzi H^j2000L^j2000
+stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j
1CA
1CA
H^j2000 =
Hj2000
H2000
H1980; L^j2000 =
Lj2000
L2000
L1980:
H^j2000 measures the share of all high skill workers living in city j in year 2000, scaled by the
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national population size of high skill workers in 1980:H1980: L^j2000 is similarly dened, for
low skill workers.
The change in well-being inequality between college and high school graduates due to
wage, rent, and endogenous amenity changes due to workers re-sorting across cities from
1980 to 2000 is equivalent to a nationwide increase of 0.238 log points in the college wage
gap. This change in well-being inequality is 20% larger than the observed increase in the
actual college wage gap from 1980 to 2000. AWald test of whether this increase in well-being
inequality is statistically indistinguishable from the well-being increases due only to wage
changes is rejected.
The additional nationwide growth in the countrys college share led to large amenity
changes across almost all US cities. Adding on the additional e¤ect of the change in en-
dogenous amenities due to the nationwide increase in all citiescollege shares leads to an
overall increase in well-being inequality equivalent to 0.461 log point increase in the college
wage gap. This gure, however, should be interpreted with caution. There are surely many
other nationwide changes in the US which di¤erentially e¤ected the well-being of college and
non-college workers. For example, nationwide improvements in health care, life expectancy,
air-conditioning, television, and the internet likely inuenced the well-being of all workers
nationwide. Since the model can only capture the welfare e¤ects of college share changes
and not the many other nationwide change, one should not interpret the welfare e¤ects of
the nationwide increase in college graduates as an accurate measure of changes in overall
well-being inequality. It is di¢ cult to gauge what aspects of well-being inequality changes
are measured in the nationwide increase in citiesendogenous amenities.
For these reasons, I place more condence in the estimated changes in well-being inequal-
ity due to wage, rent, and endogenous amenity changes driven by workers re-sorting across
cities. The combined welfare e¤ects of changes in wages, rents, and endogenous amenities
driven only by the re-sorting of workers across locations have led to at least a 20% larger
increase in well-being inequality than is apparent in the changes in the college wage gap
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alone.
1.9 Conclusion
The divergence in the location choices of high and low skill workers from 1980 to 2000 was
fundamentally caused by a divergence in high and low skill productivity across space. By
estimating a structural spatial equilibrium model of local labor demand, housing supply,
and labor supply to cities, I quantify the ways through which local productivity changes
led to a re-sorting of workers across cities. The estimates show that cities which became
disproportionately productive for high skill workers attracted a larger share of skilled workers.
The rise in these cities college shares caused increases in local productivity, boosting all
workerswages, and improved the local amenities. The combination of desirable wage and
amenity growth caused large amounts of in-migration, driving up local rents. However, low
skill workers were less willing to pay the priceof a lower real wage to live in high amenity
cities, leading them to prefer more a¤ordable, low amenity locations.
The net welfare impacts of the changes in citieswages, rents, and endogenous amenities
led to an increase in well-being inequality between college and high school graduates of at
least 20% more than the increase in the college wage gap alone. The additional utility college
workers gained from of being able to enjoy more desirable amenities, despite the high housing
local prices, increased college workerswell-being, relative to high school graduates.
While the model quanties high and low skill productivity levels across cities, it does not
fully analyze the underlying determinants of these productivity di¤erences across locations.
A point of future work is to study the causes of the geographic decoupling of high skill
productivity from low skill productivity and the resulting re-sorting of rms across US cities.
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Chapter 2:
Housing Supply Elasticity and Rent Extraction by
State and Local Governments
2.1 Introduction
Can government workers extract rent from private sector workers by charging high tax rates
and paying themselves high wages? The determinants and justication of government work-
erscompensation levels has taken on considerable heat in the past few years, as many states
and localities face budgetary stress. Since state and local governments set taxes and govern-
ment employee wages, government employees could earn rents by charging high taxes and
receiving high wages. There has long been debate over whether the government acts as a
benevolent social planner for its citizens or uses its market power to benet its workers and
political interest groups. (See Gregory and Borland (1999) for a review of this literature.)
In particular, the high unionization rate in the public sector may allow union bargaining
to inuence the political process and the decisions of elected o¢ cials (Freeman (1986)). In
this paper, I analyze whether government workers receive higher wages than similar private
sector workers in areas where state and local governments have stronger abilities to exercise
market power.
This paper develops a model where state and local governments set taxes and the level of
government services to maximize government "prots", which can then be paid to employees
as excessive wages. I use a Rosen (1979) Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium model where
workers maximize their utility by living in the city which o¤ers them the most utility based
on the citys wage, rental rate of housing, tax rate, government services, and other amenities.
Thus, governments must compete for residents to tax, and workers can "vote with their feet"
by migrating away from excessively rent extractive governments.
I show that if state and local governments are using their market power to over pay their
employees, their abilities to extract rents from their citizens is determined by the equilibrium
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migration elasticity of private sector residents with respect to local tax rates. Governments
must trade o¤ the benets of a higher tax with the cost that a higher tax will cause workers
to migrate away, leaving the government with a smaller population to tax. This is analogous
to the standard result found in analysis of imperfect competition between product producers
where a rms optimal price markup over cost is equal to the inverse elasticity of consumer
demand with respect to price for the rms product.
Unlike rm competition for consumer demand, I show that a governments market power
to charge wasteful taxes remains even when there are a large number of governments com-
peting for residents and every government is small.44 The spatial equilibrium model shows
that when a government raises taxes, workers will migrate away to other jurisdictions. How-
ever, this out-migration decreases the level of labor supply and housing demand in the area.
Assuming labor demand curves slope down and housing supply curves slope up, this decrease
in population raises wages and decreases housing rents. Thus, some of the disutility of a tax
increase will be o¤set by an increase in the desirability of local wages and rents, which limits
the amount of out-migration caused by the tax increase. Since the local housing and labor
markets will respond to government imposed taxes through migration, the government will
always have market power.
An areas elasticity of housing supply will determine how local housing rents respond
to population changes in an area. Governments presiding over areas with inelastic housing
supplies will have more market power than governments in housing elastic areas. A tax
hike by a government in an area with inelastic housing supply leads to a small amount of
out-migration because housing prices sharply fall due to the decrease in housing demand
driven by the tax hike. The housing cost decline o¤sets the negative utility impact of a
tax increase with a only small amount of out-migration in the housing inelastic area. Thus,
governments in housing inelastic areas can charge higher taxes without shrinking their tax
base since housing price changes limit the migration response.
44This result is closely related to Epple and Zelenitz (1981), which shows that worker migration between
government juristidictions is not enough to entirely compete away a governments market power.
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If state and local governments exercise more market power in areas with inelastic housing
supplies, the wage gap between public and private sectors workers should be larger in these
areas. I test the models prediction by measuring variation in public-private sector wage
gaps across areas with di¤erent housing supply elasticities. I measure workerswages using
data from the 1995-2011 Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups
(CPS-MORG). I proxy for a metropolitan areass housing supply elasticity using data from
Saiz (2010) on the share of land within 50km of a citys center unavailable for real-estate
development due to geographic constraints, such as the presence of swamps, steep grades,
or bodies of water. With less available land around to build on, the city must expand
farther away from the central business area to accommodate a given amount of population,
driving up average housing costs.45 I also use the Wharton Land Use Regulation Index
from Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) as component of housing supply elasticity. Since
the decision to regulate real-estate development is endogenous and possibly correlated with
unobserved characteristics which could impact government workers wages, I focus on the
Saiz (2010) measure of geographic constraints on real-estate development as an exogenous
source of variation in housing supply elasticity. These data are the metropolitan area level.
To measure stateshousing supply elasticities I use an average of these measures across each
states MSAs, weighted by the MSAspopulations.
I nd that the public-private sector wage gap is higher in states and metropolitan ar-
eas with less elastic housing supplies. This result holds when analyzing variation in state
government-private sector wage gaps across states and in local government-private sector
wage gaps across MSAs. This nding is robust to including a host of controls for workers
demographics and characteristics, including dummies for three digit occupation codes. Ad-
45A full micro-foundation of this mechanism can be derived from the Alonso-Muth-Mills model (Brueckner
(1987)) where housing expands around a citys central business district and workers must commute from
their house to the city center to work. Within-city house prices are set such that workers are indi¤erent
between having a shorter versus longer commute to work. Average housing prices rise as the population
grows since the houses on the edge of the city must o¤er the same utility as the houses closer in. As the
city population expands, the edge of the city becomes farther away from the center, making the commuting
costs of workers living on the edge higher than those in a smaller city. Since the edge of the city must o¤er
the same utility value as the center of the city, housing prices rise in the interior parts of the city.
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ditionally, the local government-private sector wage gap is found to be higher in housing
inelastic MSAs, even when only comparing MSAs within the same state.
As falsication tests, I show that housing supply elasticity has no impact on the federal
government worker-private sector wage gap. Since federal workers compensation is not
derived from government revenues of their place of residence, the market power of the state
and local government should have no impact on their wages. Additionally, I show that
variation in the state government worker-private sector wage gap does not vary across MSAs,
within a state. The public-private wage gaps only vary with housing supply elasticities when
the housing supply elasticity variation impacts the governments market power. I also show
that the e¤ect is larger for government workers who are union members, suggesting unions
allow government workers to bargain for a larger share of government rents.
The CPS-MORG only reports data on workersearnings, and does not include data on
the value of workersbenefts. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that goverment employees
receive more generous benets than similar private sector workers, on average. I use data
from on average government pension payouts per beneciary across states from the Census
2007-2010 Annual Surveys of Public Employee Retirement Systems as a measure of state
government workersbenets. While I do not have a data source for similar private sector
workersretirement benets, I show that average annual state government pension payouts
per beneciary are higher in states with less elastic housing supplies. This suggests that the
wage gap estimates from the CPS understate the full impact of housing supply elasticity on
government worker compensation.
Previous work has also found evidence suggesting government jobs are more desirable
than similar private sector jobs. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that public sector em-
ployees are more generously compensated than similarly qualied private sector employees.
In particular, they nd that government worker wages tend to be slightly lower than similar
private sector workers. However, the value of government workersbenets strongly outweigh
those of the private sector, leading to public sector employees to be better compensated over-
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all. Krueger (1988) nds that there are more job applications for each government job than
for each private sector job, suggesting that government jobs are more desirable to workers,
on average. Additionally, average job quit rates reported from the 2002-2006 Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Surveys show that average annual quit rate is 28% for private sector
workers, but only 8% for public sector employees. These fact taken together suggest that
government jobs are better compensated than private sector jobs, and that there appears to
be excess labor supply for these jobs, which is consistent with government workers receiving
rents. While this evidence shows that government jobs appear desirable to workers, it is not
clear that this desirability is due to rent-seeking behavior of governments exercising market
power. My paper shows that an increase in governmentsabilities to extract rent directly
leads to better paid government employees.
The public sector workforce is also highly unionized, enabling government employees to
bargain for government rents. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) use a spatial equilibrium model to
show that if the cost of government taxes to citizens are not completely o¤set by benets
of government services, they will be capitalized into housing prices. Similarly, if high levels
of public sector unionization lead to more government rent extraction, the public sector
unionization rate will proxy for government waste and also be capitalized into housing prices.
While Gyourko and Tracy (1991) nd evidence for both of these e¤ects, it is unclear what
drives the variation in taxes and unionization rates across localities. This paper uses housing
supply elasticity as a source of exogenous variation in government market power to assess
whether government take advantage of their power to over pay employees.
Brueckner and Neumark (2011) considers whether government can extract more rent from
local residents if the government presides over an area with more desirable amenities. They
use a similar setup to this paper where prot maximizing governments compete for residents
by setting local tax rates. They allow local governments to play a game in tax-competition
where the number of competing governments is small. My model di¤ers from theirs by
allowing each government to be small when deriving tax rates chosen by governments. They
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nd evidence that amenity di¤erences are positively associated with public-private wage
gaps. However, it is possible that some of the amenity measures, such as coastal proximity
and population density, are correlated with housing supply elasticity di¤erences.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 layouts of the model. Section 3 presents
empirical evidence, and Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model detailed below uses a Rosen (1979) Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium to analyzes
how local governments set taxes and compete for residents. In the model, I assume that
governments use a head tax to collect revenue, however in reality, most state and local
governments use property and income tax instruments. In Appendix B I derive results for
the case of a government income or property tax and show the same results. I also abstract
away from the political election process in each area. While politics could surely inuence
the extent of government rent seeking, my goal is to analyze contributors to governments
abilities to excercise market power if they had a rent seeking motivation.
The nationwide economy is made up of many cities. There are N cities, where N is large.
Cities are di¤erentiated by their endowed amenity levels Aj;which impact how desirable
workers nd the city, and their endowed productivity levels j; which impact how productive
rms are in the city. Workers are free to migrate to any city within the country. Each city
has a local labor and housing market, which determine local wages and rents. The local
government provides government services and collects taxes.
2.2.1 Government
The local government of city j charges a head tax  j to workers who choose to reside within
the city. The local government also produces government services, which cost sj for each
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worker in the city. The government revenue and cost are
Revenuej =  jNj
Costj = sjNj:
Nj measure the population of city j: The local government is not benevolent and maximizes
prots. These prots could be spent on ine¢ cient production of sj (thus, making the
government benevolent, but naive). They could also be directly pocketed by government
workers, such as through union negotiations. The local government maximizes:
max
j ;sj
 jNj   sjNj
2.2.2 Workers
All workers are homogeneous. Workers living in city j inelastically supply one unit of labor,
and earn wage wj: Each worker must rent a house to live in the city at rental rate rj and
pay the local tax  j:Workers value the local amenities as measure by Aj:The desirability of
government services sj is represented by g (sj) : Thus, workersutility from living in city j
is:
Uj = wj   rj + Aj + g (sj)   j:
Workers maximize their utility by living in the city which they nd the most desirable.
2.2.3 Firms
All rms are homogenous and produce a tradeable output Y:Cities exogenously di¤er in
their productivity as measured by j. Local government services impact rms productivity,
as measured by b(sj): The production function is:
Yj = jNj + b(sj)Nj + F (Nj) ;
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where F 0 (Nj) > 0 and F 00 (Nj) < 0 in labor:
The labor market is perfectly competitive, so wages equal the marginal product of labor:
wj = j + b(sj) + F
0 (Nj) :
2.2.4 Housing
Housing is produced using construction materials and land. All houses are identical. Houses
are sold at the marginal cost of production to absentee landlords, who rents housing to
the residents. The asset market is in long-run steady state equilibrium, making housing
price equal the present discounted value of rents. Housing supply elasticities di¤er across
cities. Di¤erences in housing supply elasticity are due to topography and land use regulation,
which makes the marginal cost of building an additional house more responsive to population
changes (Saiz (2010)). The housing supply curve is:
rj = aj + j log (Nj) ;
j = x
house
j
where xhousej is a vector of city characteristics which impact the elasticity of housing supply.
2.2.5 Equilibrium in Labor and Housing
Since all workers are identical, all cities with positive population must o¤er equal utility to
workers. In equilibrium, all workers must be indi¤erent between all cities. Thus:
Uj = wj   rj + Aj + g (sj)   j = U:
Plugging in labor demand and housing supply gives:
j + b(sj) + F
0 (Nj)  aj   j logNj + Aj + g (sj)   j = U: (2.1)
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Equation (2:1) determines the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities.
2.2.6 Government Tax Competition
Local governments set city tax rates and the level of government services to maximize prots,
taking into account the endogenous response of workers and rms in equilibrium, equation
(2:1). Each city is assumed to be small, meaning out-migration of workers to other cities does
not impact other citiesequilibrium wages and rents. If there were a small number of cities,
each city would have even more market power than in this limiting case. The results below
can be thought of as a lower bound on the market power of local governments competing for
residents. They maximize:
max
sj ;j
 jNj   sjNj:
The rst order conditions are:
0 =  j
@Nj
@sj
 Nj   sj @Nj
@sj
(2.2)
0 =  j
@Nj
@ j
+Nj   sj @Nj
@ j
:
Di¤erentiating equation (2:1) to solve for @Nj
@sj
and @Nj
@j
gives:
@Nj
@sj
=
b0 (sj) + g0 (sj)
j
Nj
  F 00 (Nj)
 > 0
@Nj
@ j
=
 1
j
Nj
  F 00 (Nj)
 < 0: (2.3)
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Population increases with government services and decreases in taxes. Plugging these into
(2:2) gives:
0 = ( j   sj)
0@ b0 (sj) + g0 (sj)
j
Nj
  F 00 (Nj)

1A Nj
 j = Nj

j
Nj
  F 00 (Nj)

+ sj:
Combining the rst order conditions shows that government services are provided such that
the marginal benet (b0 (sj) + g0 (sj)) equals marginal cost (1) :
b0
 
sj

+ g0
 
sj

= 1:
This is the socially optimal level of government service.
The equilibrium tax rate is:
 j = j  NjF 00 (Nj) + sj : (2.4)
The elasticity of city population with respect to the tax rate
 
"migratej

can be written as:
"migratej =
@Nj
@ j
 j
Nj
:
Plugging in equation (2:3) for @Nj
@j
and rearranging gives:

j
Nj
  F 0 (Nj)

Nj =
  j
"migratej
:
Substituting this expression into the equation (2:4) shows that the tax markup can be written
as:
 j   sj
 j
=
 1
"migratej
:
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The tax markup above cost is equal to the inverse elasticity of city population with respect
to the tax rate: While workers are perfectly mobile between cities, worker migration causes
shifts along the local labor demand and housing supply curves. An increase in local taxes
would cause workers to migrate to other cities. A decrease in population will increase local
wages, since I have assumed a downward sloping labor demand curve. The decrease in
population will also cause rents to fall, by moving along the housing supply curve. This
increase in wages and decrease in rents will increase the desirability of the city to workers,
limiting the migration response to the tax increase. The government takes into account the
equilibrium wage and rent response to a tax hike when setting taxes to prot maximize.
Thus, if migration leads to large changes in local wages and rent, a tax increase will not lead
to large amounts of out-migration, since workers will be compensated for the tax with more
desirable wages and rents.
To analyze the e¤ect of housing supply elasticity on governmentsability to extract rent
from taxes, I di¤erentiate the tax markup with respect to the slope of the inverse housing
supply curve, j:
@
@j
 
 j   sj

= 1  @
@Nj
(NjF
00 (Nj))
@Nj
@j
: (2.5)
The rst term (1) in equation (2:5) represents the increased rent response to migration
induced by a tax hike in a city with an inelastic housing supply. The equilibrium condition,
equation (2:1) ; shows that out-migration will continue until the negative utility impact of
the tak hike has been completely o¤set by changes in the citys wage and rent. In a city
with a less elastic housing supply, a smaller amount of migration is needed to push housing
rents down to o¤set the negative utility impact of the tax hike. The second term in equation
(2:5) represents the change in the elasticity of labor demand due to being at a di¤erent
point on the labor demand curve

@
@Nj
(NjF
00 (Nj))

. Since a city with a less elastic housing
supply has a smaller equilibrium population, the slope of the labor demand curve in a smaller
city could di¤er from the slope of the labor demand curve in a larger city. I will assume
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@
@Nj
(NjF
00 (Nj)) = 0; which is equivalent to assuming exp (F 0 (Nj)) has a constant elasticity
with respect to Nj. Under this assumption, the derivative of the tax markup with respect
to the slope of the inverse housing curve is:
@
@j
 
 j   sj

= 1 > 0:
The government can extract more rent through higher taxes in a city with a less elastic
housing supply.
Note that this result assumes there are a large number of cities. When there are a small
number of cities, the incentives for rent extraction will be even higher. Outward migration
from a city in response to a tax increase will lead to increases in other cities rents and
decreases in their wages, leading to less outward migration in response to tax increases. I
have assumed this e¤ect away by not allowing the equilibrium utility level across all cities to
fall in response to a given citys tax increase. Cities can extract rent even in an environment
where there are a large number of competitors because household demand for city residence
can never be innite in equilibrium.
Additionally, this model assumes cities charge a head tax, while in reality most cities and
states tax their population through income taxes and property taxes. The amount of rent
extraction depends on the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate. Thus, an
income tax will depend both on the wage response to the tax rate, as well as the migration
response. Appendix B shows that when using an income tax, governments can still excercise
more market power in housing inelastic areas.
In the case of a property tax, government revenue will depend on local the rental rate
and the size of the tax base. An increase in the property tax rate can decrease government
revenue both by incentivizing workers to migrate away, shrinking the tax base, and decreasing
housing rents, lowering tax revenue from each household. However, I show in appendix B
that if local labor demand is perfectly elastic, the housing supply elasticity will not impact
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the size of the rental rate decrease in response to a given tax hike. To see this, recall the
equilibrium condition, equation (2:1) : For workers to derive utility U from a local area, the
utility impact of a tax increase must be perfectly o¤set by a rent decrease, if labor demand
is perfectly elastic. Thus, the equilibrium rental rate response to a given tax increase does
not depend on the local housing supply elasticity. Indeed, the housing supply elasticity
determines the migration response required to change housing rents in order to o¤set the
utility impact of the tax increase. Thus, a less elastic housing supply decreases the elasticity
of government revenue with respect to the tax rate, giving the government more market
power when using a property tax instrument. See Appendix B for the full derivation of this
result.
Regardless of the tax instrument, governments of cities with less elastic housing supplies
are able to extract more rent from their residents. In the next section, I empirically test this
prediction.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
The model predicts that local governments in areas with less elastic housing supplies will be
able to extract more rent from their residents. While this extra money could be spent in a
number of ways, it is likely that some of it gets absorbed into public sector workerswages.
Since most public sector workers are unionized, they will be able to bargain to gain some
of these rents as wages. Thus, the wage gap between government employees and similarly
qualied private sector workers should be higher in areas with less elastic housing supplies.
The e¤ect should hold across metropolitan areas for local government-private sector wage
gaps and across states for state government-private sector wage gaps.
To test this, I estimate how statesand MSAspublic/private sector wage gaps vary with
characteristics which impact local housing supply elasticities. Saiz (2010) shows that the
topological characteristics of land around an MSAs center impact whether the land can
used for real-estate development. Cities located next to wetlands, bodies of waters, swamps,
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or extreme hilliness have limits on how many building can be built close to the city center,
which impacts the elasticity of housing supply to the area. Saiz (2010) uses satellite data to
measure the share of land within 50km of an MSAs center which cannot be developed due
to these topological constraints. A rent-seeking government is able to charge higher taxes
in areas with less land available for development. Thus, the public-private sector wage gap
should be higher in these areas.
A citys housing supply elasticity is also inuenced by the amount of land-use regulation
in the area. The 2005 Wharton Land Use Regulation Survey Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers
(2008) collected survey data on a number of land-use regulations and practices, which were
aggregated into the Wharton Land Use Regulation Index (WLURI). Saiz (2010) aggregates
this municipality measure into a MSA-level index.
I z-score the MSA level data from the WLURI and the land unavailability measure and
will use both as measures of citieshousing supply elasticities. I also aggregate these measures
to a state-level index, where I weight each MSA measure by the state population in each
MSA. The state-level housing supply elasticity measure is a noisy measure of the overall
housing supply elasticity for the state, since the data is only based o¤ of the MSAs covered
by Saizs sample. Table 2.1 reports summary statistics on these measures. The data covers
48 states (there is no data for Hawaii or Alaska) and 228 MSAs.
101
Mean
Standard
Dev. Min Max N
Local Government Worker Ln Weekly
Earnings 6.723 0.519 4.854 8.695 112639
State Government Worker Ln Weekly
Earnings 6.725 0.509 4.857 8.695 62994
Federal Government Worker Ln
Weekly Earnings 6.964 0.496 4.855 8.695 37008
Private Sector Worker Ln Weekly
Earnings 6.686 0.613 4.852 8.695 968349
Mean
Standard
Dev. Min Max N
State Aggregated Land Unavailability: Z-
Score 0.000 1.000 -1.427 2.982 48
State Aggregated Wharton Land Use
Regulation Index: Z-Score 0.000 1.000 -1.640 2.348 48
MSA Land Unavailability: Z-Score 0.000 1.000 -1.205 2.824 228
MSA Wharton Land Use Regulation
Index: Z-Score 0.000 1.000 -1.746 3.938 228
Mean
Standard
Dev. Min Max N
Log Thousand Dollars of Annual Payout
per beneficiary from State Pension 2.9897 0.24996 2.5289 3.629 192
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
A. CPS Data 1995-2011
B. Housing Supply Elasticity Measures
C. State Government Pension Payouts: 2007-2010
Notes: Wages are measured as weekly wages deflated by the CPI-U and reported in constant 2011 dollars
for 25-55 year old workers working at least 35 hours per week. Workers with imputed weekly earnings
are dropped from the analysis. Top coded weekly earnings as set to 1.5 times the top coded value and
weekly earnings below $128 (in real 2011 dollars) are dropped from the analysis. Sector of worker
(local/state/federal/private) is measured by reported class of worker. MSA land unavailability measures
the share of land within 50km of an MSA's center which cannot be developed due to these topological
constraints from Saiz (2010). This measure is then Z-scored. The Wharton Land Use Regulation index
aggregates survey data on a large set of local land use practices by local municipalities. This is aggregated
to the MSA level and then Z-scored. State aggregated housing supply elasticity meaures use a population
weighted average of MSA level data. State and MSA level housing supply elasticity measures are z-scored.
Government pension data come from 2007-2010 Annual Surveys of Public-Employee Retirement
Systems.
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2.3.1 Wage Gap Regressions
To measure public-private sector wage gaps across MSAs and states, I use data from the
Current Population Survey Merged Outing Rotation groups from 1995-2011.46 The CPS-
MORG is a household survey which collects data on a large number of outcomes including
workersweekly earnings, hours worked, public/private sector of employment, union status,
and a host of demographics. I restrict the sample to 25 to 55 year old workers with positive
labor income, working at least 35 hours per week, to have a standardized measure of weekly
earnings. The CPSs usual weekly earnings question does not include the self-employment
income so all analysis excludes the self-employed. I also restrict analysis to workers whose
wages are not imputed to avoid any bias due to the CPSs wage imputation algorithm
(Bollinger and Hirsch (2006)). I measure earnings using workerslog usual weekly earnings,
deated by the CPI-U and measured in real 2011 dollars. Top coded weekly earnings are
multiplied by 1.5 and weekly earnings below $128 are dropped from the analysis.47 All
analysis is weighted by the CPS earnings weights.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of workerslog weekly earnings each for workers em-
ployed in the private sector, local government, state government, and federal government.48
Consistent with previous works, such as Gittleman and Pierce (2012), the raw earnings are
higher for all three classes of government workers than for private sector workers. However,
these raw earnings di¤erences do not account for di¤erences in the characteristics of work-
ers between the public and private sector. To test the models predictions, I will control
for worker characteristics when evaluating di¤erences in the public private sector wage gap.
46Since there was a signicant change in the CPSs earnings questions in 1994, I restrict analysis to 1994-
2011. I also focus my analysis on workers whose wages are not imputed in the CPS. Since sector, occupation,
and union status and not used in the CPSs imputation algorithm, analyzing government wage gaps and
union wage gaps using imputed wages can be problematic (Bollinger and Hirsch (2006)). Thus, I focus only
on the non-imputed wage sample. The data agging which wages were imputed are missing in the 1994 data,
so I drop this year, leaving me with a 1995-2011 sample.
47I follow Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008)s top and bottom coding procedures. Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2008) drops all reported hourly wages below $2.80 in real 2000 dollars. This translates to $128 per
week in real 2011 dollars, assuming a 35 hour work week. They also scale top coded wages by 1.5.
48A workers sector is measured by the CPS variable reporting a workers class.
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Additionally, the CPS only collects data on workersearnings, but not compensation paid to
workers in the form of benets. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show using the BLSrestricted-
use Employer Cost of Employee Compensation microdata that government employees receive
signicantly more generous benets than similar workers in the private sector. I will return
to the question of benets compensation, but rst focus on public-private sector wage gaps.
To test the models predictions, I estimate the following regression:
lnwijt = j + t + 
govgovit + 
elastzelastj  govit + Xit + "ijt: (2.6)
As controls, I include location xed-e¤ects j; year xed e¤ects, t; and a set of worker
demographics which include 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race, Hispanic
origin, a quartic in age, and a rural dummy. govi is a dummy for whether the worker is
government worker, zelastj measures land use regulation and topography. Standard errors are
clustered by state when using state-level measures of housing supply elasticity and clustered
by MSA when using MSA variation in housing supply elasticity.
The nationwide average public-private wage gap is measured by gov:The model predicts
that public-private wage gap should be higher in areas with less elastic housing supplies:
elast > 0:
The prediction should hold both for areas with less land available for development and for
areas with stricter land-use regulations. Since land-use regulations are chosen by local mu-
nicipalities, it is possible that the decision to regulate land-use could be correlated with other
characteristics of the area which could impact workerswages. Since the topological con-
straints around a city are pre-determined, they are likely a measure of exogenous di¤erences
in housing supply elasticities across areas. I perform all analysis using both measures, but I
also drop the regulation index to focus directly on the impact of land availability, which is
likely a cleaner estimate of the impact of housing supply elasticity on public-private sector
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wage gaps.
I test this prediction rst using a sample including private sector workers and state
government workers. Column 1 of Table 2.2 shows that the nationwide average wage gap be-
tween state government employees and private sector workers is -0.112 log points. Consistent
with Gittleman and Pierce (2012), after controlling for worker demographics, government
workersearnings are lower than similar private sector workers, on average. However, the
state worker-private sector wage gap increases by 0.017 log points in states with a 1 stan-
dard deviation increase in land unavailability. This e¤ect is signicant at the 10% level. The
wage gap is 0.026 log points higher in states with a 1 standard deviation increase land-use
regulation. This e¤ect is signicant at the 5% level. In a regression which drops the land-use
index, a 1 standard deviation increase in a states land availability increases the wage gap
by 0.026 log points. This e¤ect is signicant at the 1% level. Figure 2.1 plots statesland
unavailability against statesstate government worker-private sector wage gaps, after wages
have been residualized against the set of controls included in equation (2:6) : Figure 1 shows
the state government-private sector wage gaps are higher in states including California, Ver-
mont, Florida, and Connecticut, but must lower in states such as Iowa, Texas, Montana,
and Kentucky which lines up with these statesland unavailability. Note that states such as
Utah are signicant outliers. However, Utahs land availability was measured only based on
Salt Lake City, which has a large share of land unavailable for development due proximity
to the Great Salt Lake. This is likely a poor measure of the overall state housing supply
elasticity. Despite the short comings of the state-level data, I nd that states with less elastic
housing supplies have signicantly better paid state government employees, as compared to
the private sector employees residing in the state.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Government Worker -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.0798***-0.0707***
[0.00909] [0.00931] [0.00721] [0.00758]
Gov* Land Unavailability 0.0170* 0.0262*** 0.0287*** 0.0366*** 0.00856 0.0108*
[0.0101] [0.00976] [0.00781] [0.00855] [0.00637] [0.00657]
Gov* Land Use Regulation 0.0263** 0.0348*** 0.0220**
[0.0125] [0.00803] [0.00920]
Constant 2.493*** 2.487*** 2.382*** 2.378*** 2.396*** 2.399***
[0.289] [0.290] [0.397] [0.396] [0.397] [0.397]
State x Gov Worker FE: X X
State Elasticity Measures: X X
MSA Elasticity Measures: X X X X
State Gov Workers Sample: X X
Local Gov Workers Sample: X X X X
Observations 973,792 973,792 586,696 586,696 586,696 586,696
R-squared 0.384 0.384 0.389 0.389 0.39 0.39
Table 2.2: Ln Wage vs. State & Local Public Sector-Housing Supply Elasticity Interactions
Note: Standard errors clustered by state for state worker regressions. Standard errors clustered by MSA for local
government worker regressions. Weekly wage data from 1995-2011 CPS MORG. Wage data is restricted to 25-55
year old workers working at least 35 hours per week. State government worker sample includes private sector
and state government workers. Local government worker sample includes private sector and local government
workers living in MSAs. Land unavailability measures a z-score of the share of land within 50km of an MSA's
center which cannot be developed due to topological constraints. Land use regulation is an index of aggregated
survey data on a large set of local land use practices by local municipalities. This is aggregated to the MSA level
and then Z-scored. State level measures are z-scores of average MSA-level measures within the state, weighted
by MSA population. Controls include 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race and hispanic origin, a
quartic in age, a rural dummy, and year dummies. All regressions weighted using CPS MORG earnings weights.
State Gov-Private
Sector Wage Gaps Local Gov-Private Sector Wage Gaps
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Figure 2.1: State Goverment-Private Sector Wages Gaps vs. State Land
Unavailability Z-Score. State wage gaps calculated after residualizing wages
against 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race, hispanic origin, a
quartic in age, a rural dummy, and year dummies. Regression weighted using
CPS earnings weights.
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Performing the same analysis on local government employees, I compare the wage gaps
between local government workers and private sector workers across 229 MSAs. The controls
in this setup now include MSA xed e¤ects and the housing supply measures are now at the
MSA level. Column 3 of Table 2.2 shows that the nationwide local government worker-private
sector wage gap is -0.080 log points. A 1 standard deviation increase in land unavailability
increases the wage gap by 0.029 log points and a 1 standard deviation increase in land-use
regulation increases the wage gap by 0.0348 log points. Both of these e¤ects are signicant at
the 1% level. Dropping the land-use regulation, I nd the coe¢ cient on land unavailability
increases to 0.037 log points, and is signicant at the 1% level. Figure 2.2 plots MSAsland
unavailability against MSAslocal government worker-private sector wage gaps, after wages
have been residualized against the set of controls included in equation (2:6) : The plot shows
high local government wages gaps in land unavailable cities including Los Angeles, New York,
Cleveland, Chicago, and Portland and low government wage gaps in cities with lots of land
to develop including Atlanta, Houston, Minneapolis, and Phoenix. Housing supply elasticity
explains a signicant amount of the cross-section variation in public-private wage gaps.
To test whether the local housing supply elasticity measures impact local government
worker-private sector wage gaps within states, across MSAs, I add controls for state di¤er-
ences in the local government worker-private sector wage gaps. I now estimate:
lnwijkt = j + t + 
govgovit + 
gov
k govit + 
elastzelastj  govit + Xit + "ijt;
where j represents an MSA and k represents a state. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.2 show
that the impact of land unavailability on the local government-private sector wage gap falls
slightly, but remains statistically sigincant when land-use regulations are not included in
the regression. Land unavailability consistently has a positive impact the public-private
sector wage gap both for local and state government workers, as predicted by the model.
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Figure 2.2: Local Goverment-Private Sector Wages Gaps vs. MSA Land
Unavailability Z-Score. MSA wage gaps calculated after residualizing wages
against 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race, Hispanic origin, a
quartic in age, a rural dummy, and year dummies. Regression weighted using
CPS earnings weights.
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Table 2.3 repeats the analysis adding in dummies for each three-digit occupation code to
attempt to further control for di¤erences in workersskills in the public and private sectors.
The point estimate measuring the impact of land unavailability of the state government-
private sector wage gap remains positive, but the standard errors increase, making the e¤ect
only statistically signicant when land-use regulations are dropped from the regression. How-
ever, the large standard errors shows that one cannot rule out a point estimate equal to the
magnitude found when 3-digit occupation code dummies were not included in the regression.
The estimates for local-government worker wage gaps are positive and statistically sig-
nicant at the 1% level. Column 4 of Table 2.3 shows that even when including the full
set of 3 digit occupation dummies, a 1 standard deviation increase in land unavailability
increases the local public-private wage gap by 0.028 log points. Note that with the inclusion
of occupation dummies, the nationwide local government worker-private sector wage gap is
now positive at 0.028 log points.
One possible way government workers can raise their wages is through union wage bar-
gaining. I repeat the analysis adding in additional housing supply elasticity interactions
terms for whether the government worker is part of a labor union. I control for the direct ef-
fect of being in a union, and its interaction with the housing supply elasticity characteristics.
This controls for di¤erences in union bargaining power across states and MSAs for all unions,
public and private. Table 2.4 shows that a standard deviation increase in land unavailability
raises state government-private sector wage gaps by 0.0127 log points for non-union mem-
bers and an addition 0.0214 log points for unionized government workers. State government
worker unions appear to be able to bargain for better wages in inelastic areas, relative to
non-unionized government workers. The point estimates in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4
are similar for local government-private sector wage gaps. However, the additional impact
of goverment labor unions is positive, but not statistically signicant. These point estimates
suggest government workers part of a labor union might be able to use their market power
to negotiate for larger rents beyond the o¤erings of the private sector.
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1 2 3 4
Government Worker -0.0320***-0.0331*** 0.0181*** 0.0275***
[0.00830] [0.00837] [0.00538] [0.00545]
Gov* Land Unavailability 0.0107 0.0188* 0.0197*** 0.0275***
[0.0111] [0.0109] [0.00675] [0.00743]
Gov* Land Use Regulation 0.0234** 0.0350***
[0.0112] [0.00716]
Constant 4.263*** 4.258*** 4.211*** 4.208***
[0.274] [0.274] [0.386] [0.386]
State Elasticity Measures: X X
MSA Elasticity Measures: X X
State Gov Workers Sample: X X
Local Gov Workers Sample: X X
Observations 973,792 973,792 586,696 586,696
R-squared 0.524 0.524 0.526 0.526
Table 2.3: Ln Wage vs. State & Local Public Sector-Housing Supply Elasticity
Interactions with 3 Digit Occupation Dummy controls
Note: Standard errors clustered by state for state worker regressions. Standard errors
clustered by MSA for local government worker regressions. Weekly wage data from
1995-2011 CPS MORG. Wage data is restricted to 25-55 year old workers working at
least 35 hours per week. State government worker sample includes private sector and
state government workers. Local government work sampe includes private sector and
local government workers living in MSAs. Land unavailability measures a z-score of the
share of land within 50km of an MSA's center which cannot be developed due to
topological constraints. Land use regulation is an index of aggregated survey data on a
large set of local land use practices by local municipalities. This is aggregated to the
MSA level and then Z-scored. State level measures are z-scores of average MSA-level
measures within the state, weighted by MSA population. Controls include 1057
occupation dummies, 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race, hispanic
origin, a quartic in age, a rural dummy, and year dummies. Three digit occupation code
definitions change in 2000, so I include the full set of combined 3 digit occupation
dummies. I treat occupation codes used in years 2000-2011 as distinct occupations
from those in previous years, giving a total of 1057 occupation codes. All regressions
weighted using CPS earnings weights.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
State Gov-Private
Sector Wage Gaps
Local Gov-Private
Sector Wage Gaps
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1 2 3 4
Government Worker -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.123*** -0.119***
[0.00613] [0.00575] [0.00695] [0.00718]
Gov* Land Unavailability 0.0101 0.0127** 0.0269*** 0.0316***
[0.00705] [0.00624] [0.00739] [0.00801]
Gov* Land Use Regulation 0.00782 0.0238***
[0.00889] [0.00801]
Gov* Land Unavailability*Union 0.00372 0.0214* -0.00373 0.00753
[0.0120] [0.0128] [0.00845] [0.00934]
Gov* Land Use Regulation*Union 0.0492** 0.0356***
[0.0191] [0.0106]
Constant 2.532*** 2.540*** 2.456*** 2.442***
[0.289] [0.288] [0.395] [0.396]
State Elasticity Measures: X X
MSA Elasticity Measures: X X
State Gov Workers Sample: X X
Local Gov Workers Sample: X X
973,792 973,792 586,696 586,696
0.39 0.389 0.395 0.394
Table 2.4: Ln Wage vs. State & Local Public Sector-Housing Supply Elasticity
Interactions: Union Government Workers
Note:Standard errors clustered by state for state worker regressions. Standard errors
clustered by MSA for local government worker regressions. Weekly wage data from 1995-
2011 CPS MORG. Wage data is restricted to 25-55 year old workers working at least 35 hours
per week. State government worker sample includes private sector and state government
workers. Local government work sampe includes private sector and local government
workers living in MSAs. Land unavailability measures a z-score of the share of land within
50km of an MSA's center which cannot be developed due to topological constraints. Land
use regulation is an index of aggregated survey data on a large set of local land use practices
by local municipalities. This is aggregated to the MSA level and then Z-scored. State level
measures are z-scores of average MSA-level measures within the state, weighted by MSA
population. Controls include 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race and
hispanic origin, a quartic in age, a rural dummy, and year dummies. Controls also include a
labor union dummy, labor union dummy interacted with government dummy, and the labor
union dummy interacted with the housing supply elasticity measures. Union is defined as a
member of a labor union. All regressions weighted using CPS earnings weights. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
State Gov-Private
Sector Wage Gaps
Local Gov-Private
Sector Wage Gaps
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Table 2.5 repeats the analysis separately for workers with and without a 4 year college
education. I nd a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect both for college and non-college
educated workers. The impact of land unavailability is stronger for low skill workers than
for those with a college education. Overall, housing supply elasticity appears to impact the
public-private wage gap.
2.3.2 Falsication Tests
The evidence presented thus far suggests that governments are exercising their market power
by extracting rents and paying government employees higher wages than are paid by local
private sector employers. Variation in housing supply elasticities across areas impacts the
extent to which governments can exercise market power. A falsication test of these pre-
dictions is to analyze whether the federal government-private sector wage gaps across cities
and states exhibit similar properties. Since federal workers are not paid by the state or local
government which presides over their location of residence, housing supply elasticity should
have no impact on federal workerswages.
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 2.6 estimate the same state and local wage gap regressions,
but use federal workers instead of state and local workers. The point estimate of the impact
of land unavailability of the federal worker-private sector wage gap is consistently negative.
As predicted by the model, the federal worker-private sector wage gaps are not inated by
the housing supply elasticity of these workerscities or states of residence.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Government Worker 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.154***
[0.0130] [0.0130] [0.00701] [0.00748]
Gov* Land Unavailability -0.0172 -0.0216** -0.00698 -0.00972 -0.0122 -0.0117
[0.0112] [0.0103] [0.00805] [0.00776] [0.00786] [0.00793]
Gov* Land Use Regulation -0.0151 -0.0158 0.00625
[0.0122] [0.0114] [0.0100]
Constant 2.338*** 2.337*** 2.422*** 2.418*** 2.701*** 2.701***
[0.291] [0.291] [0.413] [0.412] [0.413] [0.413]
State FE X X
MSA FE X X X X
State x Gov Worker FE: X X
State Elasticity Measures: X X
MSA Elasticity Measures: X X X X
Federal Gov Worker Sample: X X X X
State Gov Workers Sample: X X
948,785 948,785 549,857 549,857 560,367 560,367
0.383 0.383 0.394 0.394 0.39 0.39
Table 2.6: State & Federal Government Workers Falsification Tests
Note:Standard errors clustered by state for state worker regressions. Standard errors clustered by MSA for local
government worker regressions. Weekly wage data from 1995-2011 CPS MORG. Wage data is restricted to 25-55
year old workers working at least 35 hours per week. State government worker sample includes private sector
and state government workers. Federal government work sampe includes private sector and federal government
workers. Land unavailability measures a z-score of the share of land within 50km of an MSA's center which
cannot be developed due to topological constraints. Land use regulation is an index of aggregated survey data
on a large set of local land use practices by local municipalities. This is aggregated to the MSA level and then Z-
scored. State level measures are z-scores of average MSA-level measures within the state, weighted by MSA
population. Controls include 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race, hispanic origin, a quartic in
age, a rural dummy, and year dummies. All regressions weighted using CPS earnings weights. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
State Gov-Private
Sector Wage GapsFederal Gov-Private Sector Wage Gaps
115
As an additional falsication test, I compare the wage gaps between state government
and private sector workers across MSAs within states. Since the revenues used to pay state
government workers are collected from all areas within a state, the MSA of residence of a
state governments should not impact their pay, relative to private sector workers living in
the same MSA. I add state xed e¤ects interacted with whether the worker is employed by
the state government as controls:
lnwijkt = j + t + 
govgovit + 
gov
k govit + 
elastzelastj  govit + Xit + "ijt:
This setup estimates the relation between state government-private sector wage gaps and
local housing supply elasticities within states, across MSAs. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.6
show that the impact of land unavailability on state government-private sector wages gaps
is not statically signicant and that the point estimates are negative.
While state level variation in housing supply elasticity impacts state worker-private sector
wage gaps, variation across MSAs within a state have no impact on the state worker-private
sector wage gap, exactly as predicted by the model. Further, federal worker-private sector
wages gaps are una¤ected by state level or MSA level variation in housing supply elasticities,
as also predicted by the model. However, local government worker-private sector wage gaps
vary across MSAs both within and across states. Additionally, the impact of housing supply
elasticities of these the public-private sector wage gaps is larger for unionized government
workers. This evidence suggests that governments are exercising market power and over
paying their employees, relative to the private sector.
The empirical evidence shows that housing supply elasticity impacts the average wage gap
between public and private sector workers. A possible alternative explanation for this result
other than rent-seeking and market power is that housing supply elasticity inuences the type
of workers state and local governments choose to employ. The wage gap between public and
private sector workers could represent unobserved skill di¤erences between workers employed
116
in the public and private sectors. If this were true, the regressions previously presented which
controlled for 3-digit occupation codes should have had much smaller point estimates than
those which did not control for occupation, since there is likely less variation in worker skill
within occupation than between.
As an additional test of this alternative hypothesis, I assess whether public-private sector
workers years of education gaps vary with state and local housing supply elasticities. Table
2.7 preforms the standard analysis used to analyze state and local wage gaps, but replaces
the left hand side variable with a workers years of education. If government workers are
higher skilled that private sector workers in housing inelastic areas, then this should hold
both for observed skills (education) and unobserved skills (which cannot be tested). Ta-
ble 2.7 shows that impact of land unavailability on public-private sector education gaps is
not statistically signicant. This holds in the state government workers sample and local
government workers sample. This result is also robust to dropping worker demographics as
controls in the regressions. Overall, di¤erences in public and private sector workersyears
of schooling to not appear to relate to state and local housing supply elasticities. Columns
5 through 8 of Table 2.7 reports additional robustness by re-doing the same analysis with
the left-hand side variable equal to a dummy of whether the worker has a four year col-
lege degree. These results further show housing supply elasticity does not positively impact
public-private sector worker skill di¤erences. Government workerswages appear to reect
the market power of state and local governments.
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2.3.3 Benets
Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that government workersbenets are more generous than
private sector workersbenets. If the market power of state and local governments allows
government workers to earn more desirable wages than similar private sector workers, this
should also be true for public-private di¤erences in the generosity of benets.
As a measure of government workerspension benets, I use data from the Census2007-
2010 Annual Surveys of Public Employee Retirement Systems. This data is collected annually
from states governmentspension plans on the aggregate amount of retirement benets paid
out during the year, as well as the total number of beneciaries who received a transfer that
year. Taking the ratio of these, gives the average pension payout per beneciary. Table 2.1
reports summary statistics on this data. Unfortunately, there is not a similar data set for
retirement payouts to private sector workers.
An indirect test of whether benets augment or o¤set wage gap di¤erences is to assess
whether the state worker-private sector wage gap negatively varies with pension payouts
per retiree. If the public-private wage gap is high when public pension benets are low,
than changes in wage gaps across states might be o¤set by changes in benets across states.
However, Table 2.8 shows a regression of state government pensions payouts per retiree
is strongly positively correlated with the public-private sector wage gap. This suggests
that increases in the public-private wage gap are positively associated with increases in the
public-private benets gap. The wage gap estimates are likely a lower bound of impact of
government market power of government employees compensation since they do not account
for the impacts on benets.
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1 2 3
Land Unavailability 0.0317 0.0674**
[0.0311] [0.0329]
Land Use Regulation 0.0925**
[0.0366]
Public-Private State Wage Gap 2.830***
[0.651]
Constant 2.932*** 2.931*** 3.130***
[0.0318] [0.0342] [0.0534]
Observations 192 192 192
R-squared 0.219 0.099 0.287
Standard errors clustered by state. Data from 2007-2010 Annual Surveys of Public-
Employee Retirement Systems. Annual payout per beneficiary is measured in log
thousands of dollars.
Table 2.8: State Housing Supply Elasticity, State Pension Payout per State
beneficiary & State Public-Private Government Wage Gaps
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If private sector benets do not vary with states housing supply elasticities, than a
regression of state pension payouts per beneciary on states housing supply elasticities
measures the impact of housing supply elasticity on government retirement benets. Table
2.9 reports these regressions. I nd a 1 standard deviation increases in a statesland unavail-
ability increases annual retirement payouts per retired state government employee by 0.0674
log points. Government workers appear to receive better compensation in both wages and
retirement benets in areas where the government can exercise more market power.
2.4 Conclusion
By using housing supply elasticity as exogenous variation in governmentsabilities to exercise
market power, I show that the public-private sector wage gap is higher in areas where the
government can extract more rent from residents. Further, this e¤ect is stronger for unionized
government workers, suggesting that public sector unions might inuence governments to
engage in rent seeking behavior. While I cannot gauge to what extent government workers
are overcompensated overall, government market power appears to play a role in government
worker compensation.
The spatial equilibrium model shows that the scope of governmentsmarket power does
not disappear when there is competition between a large number of governments or when
each government is small. The local labor and housing market will respond to the tax policy
choices of the state and local government, mitigating the disciplining e¤ects of workers
voting with their feet through migration.
It is possible that the unmodeled political system where multiple candidates run for
election and campaign for less wasteful government policies could compete away some of this
government market power. However, the empirical evidence of this paper suggests that these
rents have not been fully competed away.
These results also speak to the welfare e¤ects of land-use regulation policy. While the
decision to regulate real-estate development and population expansion has many costs and
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benets not studied in this paper, my results show that decreasing a citys housing supply
elasticity through regulation gives the local government more market power. Thus, the rise in
land-use regulations since the 1970s may have had an unintended consequence of increasing
rent seeking by governments and leading to overpaid government workers. State and local
governments appear to take advantage of their market power and some of these rents are
shared with government employees.
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Chapter 3
Clustering, Spatial Correlations and Randomization
Inference
3.1 Introduction
Many economic studies that analyze the causal e¤ects of interventions on economic behavior
study interventions or treatments that are constant within clusters whereas the outcomes
vary at a more disaggregate level. In a typical example, and the one we focus on in this paper,
outcomes are measured at the individual level, whereas interventions vary only at the state
(cluster) level. Often, the e¤ect of interventions is estimated using least squares regression.
Since the mid-eighties Liang and Zeger (1986), Moulton (1986) empirical researchers in
social sciences have generally been aware of the implications of within-cluster correlations in
outcomes for the precision of such estimates. The typical approach is to allow for correlation
between outcomes in the same state in the specication of the error covariance matrix.
However, there may well be more complex correlation patterns in the data. Correlation in
outcomes between individuals may extend beyond state boundaries, it may vary in magnitude
between states, and it may be stronger in more narrowly dened geographical areas.
In this paper we investigate the implications, for the repeated sampling variation of least
squares estimators based on individual-level data, of the presence of correlation structures
beyond those that are constant within and identical across states, and vanish between states.
First, we address the empirical question whether in census data on earnings with states as
clusters such correlation patterns are present. We estimate general spatial correlations for
the logarithm of earnings, and nd that, indeed, such correlations are present, with substan-
tial correlations within groups of nearby states, and correlations within smaller geographic
units (specically pumas, public use microdata areas) considerably larger than within states.
Second, we address whether accounting for such correlations is important for the properties
of condence intervals for the e¤ects of state-level regulations or interventions. We report
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theoretical results, and demonstrate their relevance using illustrations based on earnings
data and state regulations, as well as Monte Carlo evidence. The theoretical results show
that if covariate values are as good as randomly assigned to clusters, implying there is no
spatial correlation in the covariates beyond the clusters, variance estimators that incorpo-
rate only cluster-level outcome correlations remain valid despite the misspecication of the
error-covariance matrix. Whether this theoretical result is useful in practice depends on the
magnitude of the spatial correlations in the covariates. We provide some illustrations that
show that, given the spatial correlation patterns we nd in the individual-level variables,
spatial correlations in state level regulations can have a substantial impact on the precision
of estimates of the e¤ects of interventions.
The paper draws on three strands of literature that have largely evolved separately. First,
it is related to the literature on clustering, where a primary focus is on adjustments to stan-
dard errors to take into account clustering of explanatory variables. See, e.g., Liang and
Zeger (1986), Moulton (1986), Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004), Hansen (2007)
and the textbook discussions in Angrist and Pischke (2009), Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, and
Zeger (2002), and Wooldridge (2002). Second, the current paper draws on the literature on
spatial statistics. Here a major focus is on the specication and estimation of the covariance
structure of spatially linked data. For textbook discussions see Schabenberger and Gotway
(2004) and and Gelfand, Diggle, Guttorp, and Fuentes (2010). In interesting recent work
Bester, Conley, and Hansen (2011) and Ibragimov and Muller (2010) link some of the inferen-
tial issues in the spatial and clustering literatures. Finally, we use results from the literature
on randomization inference going back to Fisher (1925) and Neyman (1990). For a recent
textbook discussion see Rosenbaum (2002). Although the calculation of Fisher exact p-values
based on randomization inference is frequently used in the spatial statistics literature Sch-
abenberger and Gotway (2004), and sometimes in the clustering literature Bertrand, Duo,
and Mullainathan (2004), Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), Neymans approach to
constructing condence intervals using the randomization distribution is rarely used in these
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settings. We will argue that the randomization perspective provides useful insights into the
interpretation and properties of condence intervals in the context of spatially linked data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce the basic set-up. Next,
in Section 3.3, using census data on earnings, we establish the presence of spatial correla-
tion patterns beyond the constant-within-state correlations typically allowed for in empirical
work. In Section 3.4 we discuss randomization-based methods for inference, rst focusing
on the case with randomization at the individual level. Section 3.5 extends the results to
cluster-level randomization. In Section 3.6, we present the main theoretical results. We show
that if cluster-level covariates are randomly assigned to the clusters, the standard variance
estimator based on within-cluster correlations can be robust to misspecication of the error-
covariance matrix. Next, in Section 3.7 we show, using Mantel-type tests, that a number
of regulations exhibit substantial regional correlations, suggesting that ignoring the error
correlation structure may lead to invalid condence intervals. Section 3.8 reports the results
of a small simulation study. Section 3.9 concludes. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
3.2 Framework
Consider a setting where we have information on N units, say individuals in the United
States, indexed by i = 1; : : : ; N . Associated with each unit is a location Zi, measuring
latitude and longitude for individual i. Associated with a location z are a unique puma P (z)
(public use microdata area, a census bureau dened area with at least 100,000 individuals),
a state S(z), and a division D(z) (also a census bureau dened concept, with nine divisions
in the United States). In our application the sample is divided into 9 divisions, which are
then divided into a total of 49 states (we leave out individuals from Hawaii and Alaska,
and include the District of Columbia as a separate state), which are then divided into 2,057
pumas. For individual i, with location Zi, let Pi, Si, and Di, denote the puma, state, and
division associated with the location Zi. The distance d(z; z0) between two locations z and
z0 is dened as the shortest distance, in miles, on the earths surface connecting the two
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points. To be precise, let z = (zlat; zlong) be the latitude and longitude of a location. Then
the formula for the distance in miles between two locations z and z0 we use is
d(z; z0) = 3; 959 arccos(cos(zlong   z0long)  cos(zlat)  cos(z0lat) + sin(zlat)  sin(z0lat)):
In this paper, we focus primarily on estimating the slope coe¢ cient  in a linear regression
of some outcome Yi (e.g., the logarithm of individual level earnings for working men) on a
binary intervention or treatment Wi (e.g., a state-level regulation), of the form
Yi = +  Wi + "i: (3.1)
A key issue is that the explanatory variable Wi may be constant withing clusters of individ-
uals. In our application Wi varies at the state level.
Let " denote the N -vector with typical element "i, and let Y,W, P, S, and D, denote
the N -vectors with typical elements Yi, Wi, Pi, Si, and Di. Let N denote the N -vector of
ones, let Xi = (1;Wi), and let X and Z denote the N  2 matrices with ith rows equal to
Xi and Zi, respectively, so that we can write in matrix notation
Y = N  +W   + " = X

 
0
+ ": (3.2)
Let N1 =
PN
i=1Wi, N0 = N   N1, W = N1=N , and Y =
PN
i=1 Yi=N . We are interested in
the distribution of the ordinary least squares estimators:
^ols =
PN
i=1(Yi   Y )  (Wi  W )PN
i=1(Wi  W )2
; and ^ols = Y   ^ols W:
The starting point is the following model for the conditional distribution of Y given the
location Z and the covariateW:
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Assumption 1. (Model)
Y
W = w;Z = z  N (N  + w  ;
(z)):
Under this assumption we can infer the exact (nite sample) distribution of the least
squares estimator, conditional on the covariates X, and the locations Z.
Lemma 2. (Distribution of Least Squares Estimator) Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
Then ^ols is unbiased and Normally distributed,
E
h
^ols jW;Z
i
= ; and ^ols
W;Z  N (;VM(W;Z)) ; (3.3)
where
VM(W;Z) =
1
N2 W 2  (1 W )2

W  1

N W
0

(Z)

N W
0B@W
 1
1CA : (3.4)
We write the model-based variance VM(W;Z) as a function of W and Z to make ex-
plicit that this variance is conditional on both the treatment indicators W and the loca-
tions Z. This lemma follows directly from the standard results on least squares estima-
tion and is given without proof. Given Assumption 1, the exact distribution for the least
squares coe¢ cients (^ols; ^ols)
0 is Normal, centered at (; )0 and with covariance matrix
(X0X) 1 (X0
(Z)X) (X0X) 1. We then obtain the variance for ^ols in (3.4) by writing out
the component matrices of the joint variance of (^ols; ^ols)
0.
It is also useful for the subsequent discussion to consider the variance of ^ols, conditional
on the locations Z, and conditional on N1 =
PN
i=1Wi, without conditioning on the entire
vectorW. With some abuse of language, we refer to this as the unconditional variance VU(Z)
(although it is still conditional on Z and N1). Because the conditional and unconditional
expectation of ^ols are both equal to , it follows that the unconditional variance is simply
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the expected value of the model-based variance:
VU(Z) = E[VM(W;Z) j Z]
=
N2
N20 N21
 E [(W  N1=N  N)0
(Z)(W  N1=N  N) j Z] :
(3.5)
3.3 Spatial Correlation Patterns in Earnings
In this section we provide some evidence for the presence and structure of spatial correlations,
that is, how 
 varies with Z. Specically we show in our application, rst, that the structure
is more general than the state-level correlations that are typically allowed for, and second,
that this matters for inference.
We use data from the 5% public use sample from the 2000 census. Our sample consists
of 2,590,190 men at least 20 and at most 50 years old, with positive earnings. We exclude
individuals from Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico (these states share no boundaries with
other states, and as a result spatial correlations may be very di¤erent than those for other
states), and treat DC as a separate state, for a total of 49 states. Table 3.1 presents
some summary statistics for the sample. Our primary outcome variable is the logarithm of
yearly earnings, in deviations from the overall mean, denoted by Yi. The overall mean of
log earnings is 10.17, the overall standard deviation is 0.97. We do not have individual level
locations. Instead we know for each individual only the puma (public use microdata area)
of residence, and so we take Zi to be the latitude and longitude of the center of the puma of
residence.
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Let Y be the variable of interest, in our case log earnings in deviations from the overall
mean. Suppose we model the vector Y as
Y j Z  N (0;
(Z; )):
If researchers have covariates that vary at the state level, the conventional strategy is to
allow for correlation at the same level of aggregation (clustering by state), and model the
covariance matrix as

ij(Z; ) = 
2
"  1i=j + 2S  1Si=Sj =
8>>>><>>>>:
2S + 
2
" if i = j
2S if i 6= j; Si = Sj
0 otherwise;
(3.6)
where 
ij(Z; ) is the (i; j)th element of 
(Z; ). The rst variance component, 2", captures
the variance of idiosyncratic errors, uncorrelated across di¤erent individuals. The second
variance component, 2S, captures correlations between individuals in the same state. Esti-
mating 2" and 
2
S on our sample of 2,590,190 individuals by maximum likelihood leads to
^2" = 0:929 and ^
2
S = 0:016. The question addressed in this section is whether the covariance
structure in (3.6) provides an accurate approximation to the true covariance matrix 
(Z).
We provide two pieces of evidence that it is not.
The rst piece of evidence against the simple covariance matrix structure is based on
simple descriptive measures of the correlation patterns as a function of distance between
individuals. For a distance d (in miles), dene the overall, within-state, and out-of-state
covariances as
C(d) = E [Yi  Yjj d(Zi; Zj) = d] ;
CS(d) = E [Yi  YjjSi = Sj; d(Zi; Zj) = d] ;
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and
CS(d) = E [Yi  YjjSi 6= Sj; d(Zi; Zj) = d] :
If the model in (3.6) was correct, then CS(d) should be constant (but possibly non-zero) as
a function of the distance d, and CS(d) should be equal to zero for all d.
We estimate these covariances using averages of the products of individual level outcomes
for pairs of individuals whose distance is within some bandwidth h of the distance d:
[C(d) =
X
i<j
1jd(Zi;Zj) djh  Yi  Yj
X
i<j
1jd(Zi;Zj) djh;
\CS(d) =
X
i<j;Si=Sj
1jd(Zi;Zj) djh  Yi  Yj
 X
i<j;Si=Sj
1jd(Zi;Zj) djh;
and
\CS(d) =
X
i<j
1Si 6=Sj  1jd(Zi;Zj) djh  Yi  Yj
 X
i<j;Si 6=Sj
1jd(Zi;Zj) djh:
Figure 3.1 shows the covariance functions for \CS(d) and \CS(d) for the bandwidth h = 50
miles for the within-state and out-of-state covariances. (Results based on a bandwidth
h = 20 are similar.) The main conclusion from Figure 3.1a is that within-state correlations
decrease with distance. Figure 3.1b suggests that correlations for individuals in di¤erent
states are non-zero, also decrease with distance, and are of a magnitude similar to within-
state correlations. Thus, these gures suggest that the simple covariance model in (3.6) is
not an accurate representation of the true covariance structure.
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As a second piece of evidence we consider various parametric structures for the covariance
matrix 
(Z) that generalize (3.6). At the most general level, we specify the following form
for 
ij(Z; ):

ij(Z; ) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2dist  exp(   d(Zi; Zj)) + 2D + 2S + 2P + 2" if i = j,
2dist  exp(   d(Zi; Zj)) + 2D + 2S + 2P if i 6= j; Pi = Pj,
2dist  exp(   d(Zi; Zj)) + 2D + 2S if Pi 6= Pj; Si = Sj,
2dist  exp(   d(Zi; Zj)) + 2D if Si 6= Sj; Di = Dj,
2dist  exp(   d(Zi; Zj)) if Di 6= Dj.
(3.7)
Beyond state level correlations the most general specication allows for correlations at the
puma level (captured by 2P ) and at the division level (captured by 
2
D). In addition we
allow for spatial correlation as a smooth function geographical distance, declining at an
exponential rate, captured by 2dist exp( d(z; z0)). Although more general than the typical
covariance structure allowed for, this model still embodies important restrictions, notably
that correlations do not vary by location. A more general model might allow variances or
covariances to vary directly by the location z, e.g., with correlations stronger or weaker in
the Western versus the Eastern United States, or in more densely or sparsely populated parts
of the country.
Table 3.2 gives maximum likelihood estimates for the covariance parameters  given
various restrictions, based on the log earnings data, with standard errors based on the
second derivatives of the log likelihood function. To put these numbers in perspective,
the estimated value for  in the most general model, ^ = 0:0293, implies that the pure
spatial component, 2dist  exp(   d(z; z0)), dies out fairly quickly: at a distance of about
twenty-ve miles the spatial covariance due to the 2dist  exp(   d(z; z0)) component is half
what it is at zero miles. The covariance of log earnings for two individuals in the same puma
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is 0:080=0:948 = 0:084. For these data, the covariance between log earnings and years of
education is approximately 0.3, so the within-puma covariance is substantively important,
equal to about 30% of the log earnings and education covariance. For two individuals in the
same state, but in di¤erent pumas and ignoring the spatial component, the total covariance
is 0.013. The estimates suggest that much of what shows up as within-state correlations in
a model such as (3.6) that incorporates only within-state correlations, in fact captures much
more local, within-puma, correlations.
To show that these results are typical for the type of correlations found in individual
level economic data, we calculated results for the same models as in Table 3.2 for two other
variables collected in the census, years of education and hours worked. Results for those
variables are reported in an earlier version of the paper Barrios, Imbens, Diamond, and
Kolesár (2010). In all cases puma-level correlations are an order of magnitude larger than
within-state out-of-puma level correlations, and within-division correlations are of the same
order of magnitude as within-state correlations.
The two sets of results, the covariances by distance and the model-based estimates of clus-
ter contributions to the variance, both suggest that the simple model in (3.6) that assumes
zero covariances for individuals in di¤erent states, and constant covariances for individu-
als in the same state irrespective of distance, is at odds with the data. Covariances vary
substantially within states, and do not vanish at state boundaries.
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Now we turn to the second question of this section, whether the magnitude of the corre-
lations we reported matters for inference. In order to assess this, we look at the implications
of the models for the correlation structure for the precision of least squares estimates. To
make this specic, we focus on the model in (3.1), with log earnings as the outcome Yi,
and Wi equal to an indicator that individual i lives in a state with a minimum wage that is
higher than the federal minimum wage in the year 2000. This indicator takes on the value
one for individuals living in nine states in our sample, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and DC, and zero for all other
states in our sample (see Figure 3.2 for a visual impression).49 In the second to last column
in Table 3.2, under the label MW,we report in each row the standard error for ^ols based
on the specication for 
(Z; ) in that row. To be precise, if 
^ = 
(Z; ^) is the estimate for

(Z; ) in a particular specication, the standard error is
s:e:(^ols) =
0B@ 1
N2W
2
(1 W )2
0B@ W
 1
1CA
0
N W
0

(Z; ^)

N W
0B@ W
 1
1CA
1CA
1=2
:
With no correlation between units at all, the estimated standard error is 0.002. If we allow
only for state level correlations, Model (3.6), the estimated standard error goes up to 0.080,
demonstrating the well known importance of allowing for correlation at the level that the
covariate varies. There are two general points to take away from the column with standard
errors. First, the biggest impact on the standard errors comes from incorporating state-
level correlations (allowing 2S to di¤er from zero), even though according to the variance
component estimates other variance components are substantially more important. Second,
among the specications that allow for 2S 6= 0, however, there is still a substantial amount
of variation in the implied standard errors. Incorporating only 2S leads to a standard
error around 0.080, whereas also including division-level correlations (2D 6= 0) increase that
49The data come from the website http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm. To be con-
sistent with the 2000 census, we use the information from 2000, not the current state of the law.
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to approximately 0.091, an increase of 15%. We repeat this exercise for a second binary
covariate, with the results reported in the last column of Table 3.2. In this case the covariate
takes on the value one only for the New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and East-North-Central states (Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin), collectively referred to as the NE/ENC states from here on.
This set of states corresponds to more geographical concentration than the set of minimum
wage states (see Figure 3.2). In this case, the impact on the standard errors of mis-specifying
the covariance structure 
(Z) is even larger, with the most general specication leading to
standard errors that are almost 50% larger than those based on the state-level correlations
specication (3.6). In the next three sections we explore theoretical results that provide
some insight into these empirical ndings.
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3.4 Randomization Inference
In this section we consider a di¤erent approach to analyzing the distribution of the least
squares estimator, based on randomization inference Rosenbaum (2002). Recall the linear
model (3.1),
Yi = +  Wi + "i; with "jW;Z  N (0;
(Z)):
In Section 3.2 we analyzed the properties of the least squares estimator ^ols under repeated
sampling. To be precise, the sampling distribution for ^ols was dened by repeated sampling
in which we keep both the vector of treatments W and the location Z xed on all draws,
and redraw only the vector of residuals " for each sample. Under this repeated sampling
thought-experiment, the exact variance of ^ols is VM(W;Z) as given in Lemma 2.
It is possible to construct condence intervals in a di¤erent way, based on a di¤erent
repeated sampling thought-experiment. Instead of conditioning on the vectorW and Z, and
resampling the ", we can condition on " and Z, and resample the vectorW. To be precise,
let Yi(0) and Yi(1) denote the potential outcomes under the two levels of the treatment Wi,
and let Y(0) and Y(1) denote the corresponding N -vectors. Then let Yi = Yi(Wi) be the
realized outcome. We assume that the e¤ect of the treatment is constant, Yi(1)  Yi(0) = .
Dening  = E[Yi(0)], the residual is "i = Yi       Wi. In this section we focus on the
simplest case, where the covariate of interestWi is completely randomly assigned, conditional
on
PN
i=1Wi = N1.
Assumption 3. Randomization
pr(W = w j Y(0);Y(1);Z) = 1
0B@ N
N1
1CA ; for all w s.t. NX
i=1
wi = N1:
Under this assumption we can infer the exact (nite sample) variance for the least squares
estimator for ^ols conditional on Z and (Y(0);Y(1)):
139
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and that the treatment e¤ect Yi(1) Yi(0) = 
is constant for all individuals. Then (i), ^ols conditional on (Y(0);Y(1)) and Z is unbiased
for ,
E
h
^ols
Y(0);Y(1);Zi = ; (3.8)
and, (ii), its exact conditional (randomization-based) variance is
VR(Y(0);Y(1);Z) = V

^ols
Y(0);Y(1);Z = N
N0 N1  (N   2)
NX
i=1
("i   ")2 ; (3.9)
where " =
PN
i=1 "i=N .
Because this result direct follows from results by Neyman (1990) on randomization infer-
ence for average treatment e¤ects, specialized to the case with a constant treatment e¤ect,
the proof is omitted. Note that although the variance is exact, we do not have exact Nor-
mality, unlike the result in Lemma 2.
In the remainder of this section we explore two implications of the randomization per-
spective. First of all, although the model and randomization variances VM and VR are exact
if both Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, they di¤er because they refer to di¤erent repeated sam-
pling thought experiments, or, alternatively, to di¤erent conditioning sets. To illustrate this,
let us consider the bias and variance under a third repeated sampling thought experiment,
without conditioning on either W or ", just conditioning on the locations Z and (N0; N1),
maintaining both the model and the randomization assumption.
Lemma 5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then (i), ^ols is unbiased for ,
E
h
^ols
Z; N0; N1i = ; (3.10)
(ii), its exact unconditional variance is:
VU(Z) =

1
N   2 trace(
(Z)) 
1
N  (N   2)
0
N
(Z)N

 N
N0 N1 ; (3.11)
140
and (iii),
VU(Z) = E [VR(Y(0);Y(1);Z)jZ; N0; N1] = E [VM(W;Z)jZ; N0; N1] :
Thus, in expectation, VR(Y(0);Y(1);Z), is equal to the expectation of VM(W;Z).
For the second point, suppose we had focused on the repeated sampling variance for
^ols conditional on W and Z, but possibly erroneously modeled the covariance matrix as
constant times the identify matrix, 
(Z) = 2  IN . Using such a (possibly incorrect) model
a researcher would have concluded that the exact sampling distribution for ^ols conditional
on the covariates would be
^ols
W;Z  N (;VINC) ; where VINC = 2  N
N0 N1 : (3.12)
If 
(Z) di¤ers from 2  IN , then VINC is not in general the correct (conditional) distribution
for ^ols. However, in some cases the misspecication need not lead to invalid inferences
in large samples. To make that precise, we rst need to dene precisely how inference is
performed. Implicitly the maximum likelihood estimator for the misspecied variance denes
2 as the probability limit of the estimator:
^2 = argmax
(
N
2
ln(2)  1
22
NX
i=1

Yi   ^ols   ^olsWi
2)
=
1
N
NX
i=1

Yi   ^ols   ^olsWi
2
:
The probability limit for this estimator ^2, under Assumptions given in the Lemma below, is
plim( trace(
(Z))=N). Then the probability limit of the normalized variance based on the
possibly incorrect model is
N  VINC = plim(trace(
(Z))=N) plim

N2
N0 N1

:
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The following result claries the properties of this probability limit.
Lemma 6. Suppose Assumption 1 holds with 
(Z) satisfying trace(
(Z))=N ! c for some
0 < c < 1, and 0N
(Z)N=N2 ! 0, and Assumption 3 holds with N1=N ! p for some
0 < p < 1. Then
N  (VINC   VU(Z)) p ! 0; and N  VINC p ! c
p  (1  p) :
Hence, and this is a key insight of this section, if the assignmentW is completely random,
and the treatment e¤ect is constant, one can, at least in large samples, ignore the o¤-diagonal
elements of 
(Z), and (mis-)specify 
(Z) as 2IN . Although the resulting variance estimator
will not be estimating the variance under the repeated sampling thought experiment that
one may have in mind, (namely VM(W;Z)), it leads to valid condence intervals under the
randomization distribution. The result that the mis-specication of the covariance matrix
need not lead to inconsistent standard errors if the covariate of interest is randomly assigned
has been noted previously. Greenwald (1983) writes: when the correlation patterns of the
independent variables are unrelated to those across the errors, then the least squares variance
estimates are consistent.Angrist and Pischke (2009) write, in the context of clustering, that:
if the [covariate] values are uncorrelated within the groups, the grouped error structure does
not matter for standard errors.The preceding discussion interprets this result formally from
a randomization perspective.
3.5 Randomization Inference with Cluster-level Randomization
Now let us return to the setting that is the main focus of the paper. The covariate of
interest, Wi, varies only between clusters (states), and is constant within clusters. Instead
of assuming that Wi is randomly assigned at the individual level, we now assume that it is
randomly assigned at the cluster level. Let M be the number of clusters, M1 the number
of clusters with all individuals assigned Wi = 1, and M0 the number of clusters with all
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individuals assigned to Wi = 0. The cluster indicator is
Cim = 1Si=m =
8><>: 1 if individual i is in cluster=state m;0 otherwise;
withC theNM matrix with typical element Cim. For randomization inference we condition
on Z, ", and M1. Let Nm be the number of individuals in cluster m. We now look at the
properties of ^ols over the randomization distribution induced by this assignment mechanism.
To keep the notation precise, let ~W be the M -vector of assignments at the cluster level,
with typical element ~Wm. Let ~Y(0) and ~Y(1) be M -vectors, with m-th element equal to
~Ym(0) =
P
i:Cim=1
Yi(0)=Nm, and ~Ym(1) =
P
i:Cim=1
Yi(1)=Nm respectively. Similarly, let ~"
be an M -vector with m-th element equal to ~"m =
P
i:Cim=1
"i=Nm, and let ~" =
PM
m=1 ~"m=M .
Formally the assumption on the assignment mechanism is now:
Assumption 7. (Cluster Randomization)
pr( ~W = ~w j Z = z) = 1
0B@ M
M1
1CA ; for all w s.t. MX
m=1
~wm =M1, and 0 otherwise.
We also make the assumption that all clusters are the same size:
Assumption 8. (Equal Cluster Size) Nm = N=M for all m = 1; : : : ;M .
Lemma 9. Suppose Assumptions 7 and 8 hold, and the treatment e¤ect Yi(1) Yi(0) =  is
constant. Then (i), the exact sampling variance of ols, conditional on Z and ", under the
cluster randomization distribution is
VCR(Y(0);Y(1);Z) =
M
M0 M1  (M   2)
MX
m=1
 
~"m   ~"
2
; (3.13)
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(ii) if also Assumption 1 holds, then the unconditional variance is
VU(Z) = E [VCR(Y(0);Y(1);Z)jZ;M1] =
M2
M0 M1  (M   2) N2  (M  trace (C
0
(Z)C)  0
(Z)) : (3.14)
The unconditional variance is a special case of the expected value of the unconditional
variance in (3.5), with the expectation taken overW given the cluster-level randomization.
3.6 Variance Estimation Under Misspecication
In this section we present the main theoretical result in the paper. It extends the result in
Section 3.4 on the robustness of model-based variance estimators under complete random-
ization to the case where the model-based variance estimator accounts for clustering, but
not necessarily for all spatial correlations, and that treatment is randomized at cluster level.
Suppose the model generating the data is the linear model in (3.1), with a general covari-
ance matrix 
(Z), and Assumption 1 holds. The researcher estimates a parametric model
that imposes a potentially incorrect structure on the covariance matrix. Let 
(Z; ) be the
parametric model for the error covariance matrix. The model is misspecied in the sense
that there need not be a value  such that 
(Z) = 
(Z; ). The researcher then proceeds to
calculate the variance of ^ols as if the postulated model is correct. The question is whether
this implied variance based on a misspecied covariance structure leads to correct inference.
The example we are most interested in is characterized by a clustering structure by state.
In that case 
(Z; ) is the N N matrix with  = (2"; 2S)0, where

ij(Z; 
2
"; 
2
S) =
8>>>><>>>>:
2" + 
2
S if i = j
2S if i 6= j; Si = Sj;
0 otherwise:
(3.15)
Initially, however, we allow for any parametric structure 
(Z; ). The true covariance matrix
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(Z) may include correlations that extend beyond state boundaries, and that may involve
division-level correlations or spatial correlations that decline smoothly with distance as in
the specication (3.7).
Under the (misspecied) parametric model 
(Z; ), let ~ be the pseudo true value, dened
as the value of  that maximizes the expectation of the logarithm of the likelihood function,
~ = argmax

E

 1
2
 ln (det (
(Z; )))  1
2
 "0
(Z; ) 1"
Z :
Given the pseudo true error covariance matrix 
(~), the corresponding pseudo-true
model-based variance of the least squares estimator, conditional onW and Z, is
VINC;CR =
1
N2W
2
(1 W )2
0B@W
 1
1CA
0
N W
0

(Z; ~)

N W
0B@W
 1
1CA :
Because for some Z the true covariance matrix 
(Z) di¤ers from the misspecied one,

(Z; ~), it follows that in general this pseudo-true conditional variance VM(
(Z; ~);W;Z)
will di¤er from the true variance VM(
(Z);W;Z). Here we focus on the expected value
of VM(
(Z; ~);W;Z), conditional on Z, under assumptions on the distribution of W. Let
us denote this expectation by VU(
(Z; ~);Z) = E[VM(
(Z; ~);W;Z)jZ]. The question is
under what conditions on the specication of the error-covariance matrix 
(Z; ), in combi-
nation with assumptions on the assignment process, this unconditional variance is equal to
the expected variance with the expectation of the variance under the correct error-covariance
matrix, VU(
(Z);Z) = E[VM(
(Z);W;Z)jZ].
The following theorem shows that if the randomization ofW is at the cluster level, then
solely accounting for cluster level correlations is su¢ cient to get valid condence intervals.
Theorem 10. (Clustering with Misspecified Error-Covariance Matrix)
Suppose Assumption 1 holds with 
(Z) satisfying trace(C0
(Z)C)=N ! c for some 0 < c <
1, and 0N
(Z)N=N2 ! 0, Assumption 7 holds with M1=M ! p for some 0 < p < 1, and
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Assumption 8 holds. Suppose also that that 
(Z; ) is specied as in (3.15). Then
N  (VINC;CR   VU(Z)) p ! 0; and N  VINC;CR p ! c
N2m  p  (1  p)
:
This is the main theoretical result in the paper. It implies that if cluster level explanatory
variables are randomly allocated to clusters, there is no need to consider covariance structures
beyond those that allow for cluster level correlations. In our application, if the covariate
(state minimum wage exceeding federal minimum wage) were as good as randomly allocated
to states, then there is no need to incorporate division or puma level correlations in the
specication of the covariance matrix. It is in that case su¢ cient to allow for correlations
between outcomes for individuals in the same state. Formally the result is limited to the case
with equal sized clusters. There are few exact results for the case with variation in cluster
size, although if the variation is modest, one might expect the current results to provide
useful guidance.
In many econometric analyses researchers specify the conditional distribution of the out-
come given some explanatory variables, and ignore the joint distribution of the explanatory
variables. The result in Theorem 10 shows that it may be useful to pay attention to this
distribution. Depending on the joint distribution of the explanatory variables, the analyses
may be robust to mis-specication of particular aspects of the conditional distribution. In
the next section we discuss some methods for assessing the relevance of this result.
3.7 Spatial Correlation in State Averages
The results in the previous sections imply that inference is substantially simpler if the ex-
planatory variable of interest is randomly assigned, either at the unit or cluster level. Here
we discuss tests originally introduced by Mantel (1967) Schabenberger and Gotway (2004)
to analyze whether random assignment is consistent with the data, against the alternative
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hypothesis of some spatial correlation. These tests allow for the calculation of exact, nite
sample, p-values. To implement these tests we use the location of the units. To make the
discussion more specic, we test the random assignment of state-level variables against the
alternative of spatial correlation.
Let Ys be the variable of interest for state s, for s = 1; : : : ; S, where state s has location
Zs (the centroid of the state). In the illustrations of the tests we use an indicator for a state-
level regulation, and the state-average of an individual-level outcome. The null hypothesis of
no spatial correlation in the Ys can be formalized as stating that conditional on the locations
Z, each permutation of the values (Y1; : : : ; YS) is equally likely. With S states, there are S!
permutations. We assess the null hypothesis by comparing, for a given statistic M(Y;Z),
the value of the statistic given the actual Y and Z, with the distribution of the statistic
generated by randomly permuting the Y vector.
The tests we focus on in the current paper are based on Mantel statistics Mantel (1967),
Schabenberger and Gotway (2004). These general form of the statistics we use is Gearys c
(also known as a Black-White or BW statistic in the case of binary outcomes), a proximity-
weighted average of squared pairwise di¤erences:
G(Y;Z) =
S 1X
s=1
SX
t=s+1
(Ys   Yt)2  dst; (3.16)
where dst = d(Zs; Zt) is a non-negative weight monotonically related to the proximity of the
states s and t. Given a statistic, we test the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation by
comparing the value of the statistic in the actual data set, Gobs, to the distribution of the
statistic under random permutations of the Ys. The latter distribution is dened as follows.
Taking the S units, with values for the variable Y1; : : : ; YS, we randomly permute the values
Y1; : : : ; YS over the S units. For each of the S! permutations g we re-calculate the Mantel
statistic, say Gg. This denes a discrete distribution with S! di¤erent values, one for each
allocation. The one-sided exact p-value is dened as the fraction of allocations g (out of the
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set of S! allocations) such that the associated Mantel statistic Gg is less than or equal to the
observed Mantel statistic Gobs:
p =
1
S!
S!X
g=1
1GobsGg : (3.17)
A low value of the p-value suggests rejecting the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation in
the variable of interest. In practice the number of allocations is often too large to calculate the
exact p-value and so we approximate the p-value by drawing a large number of allocations,
and calculating the proportion of statistics less than or equal to the observed Mantel statistic.
In the calculations below we use 10; 000; 000 draws from the randomization distribution.
We use six di¤erent measures of proximity. First, we dene the proximity dst as states s
and t sharing a border:
dBst =
8><>: 1 if s; t share a border;0 otherwise: (3.18)
Second, we dene dst as an indicator for states s and t belonging to the same census division
of states (recall that the US is divided into 9 divisions):
dDst =
8><>: 1 if Ds = Dt;0 otherwise: (3.19)
The last four proximity measures are functions of the geographical distance between states
s and t:
dGDst =  d (Zs; Zt) ; and dst = exp (   d (Zs; Zt)) (3.20)
where d(z; z0) is the distance in miles between two locations z and z0, and Zs is the latitude
and longitude of state s, measured as the latitude and longitude of the centroid for each
state. We use  = 0:00138,  = 0:00276, and  = 0:00693. For these values the proximity
index declines by 50% at distances of 500, 250, and 100 miles.
We calculate the p-values for the Mantel test statistic based on three variables. First,
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an indicator for having a state minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage. This
indicator takes on the value 1 in nine out of the forty nine states in our sample, with
these nine states mainly concentrated in the North East and the West Coast. Second, we
calculate the p-values for the average of the logarithm of yearly earnings. Third, we calculate
the p-values for the indicator for NE/ENC states. The results for the three variables and
six statistics are presented in Table 3.3. All three variables exhibit considerable spatial
correlation. Interestingly the results are fairly sensitive to the measure of proximity. From
these limited calculations, it appears that sharing a border is a measure of proximity that is
sensitive to the type of spatial correlations in the data.
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3.8 A Small Simulation Study
We carried out a small simulation study to investigate the relevance of the theoretical results
from Section 3.6. In all cases the model was
Yi = +  Wi + "i;
with N = 2; 590; 190 observations to mimic our actual data. In our simulations every state
has the same number of individuals, and every puma within a given state has the same
number of individuals. We considered three distributions for Wi. In all cases Wi varies only
at the state level. In the rst case Wi = 1 for individuals in nine randomly chosen states.
In the second case Wi = 1 for the the nine minimum wage states. In the third case Wi = 1
for the eleven NE/ENC states. The distribution for " is in all cases Normal with mean zero
and covariance matrix 
. The general specication we consider for 
 is

ij(Z; ) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
2D + 
2
S + 
2
P + 
2
" if i = j,
2D + 
2
S + 
2
P if i 6= j; Pi = Pj,
2D + 
2
S if Pi 6= Pj; Si = Sj,
2D if Si 6= Sj; Di = Dj,
We look at two di¤erent sets of values for (2"; 
2
P ; 
2
S; 
2
D), (0:929; 0; 0:016; 0) (only state level
correlations, corresponding to the second pair of rows in Table 3.4) and (0:868; 0:005; 0:005; 0:066)
(puma, state and division level correlations, corresponding to the fth pair of rows in Table
3.4).
Given the data, we consider ve methods for estimating the variance of the least squares
estimator ^ols, and thus for constructing condence intervals. The rst is based on the
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randomization distribution:
V^CR(Y(0);Y(1);Z) =
M
M0 M1  (M   2)
MX
m=1
~^"2m;
where ~^"m is the average value of the residual "^i = Yi   ^ols   ^ols Wi over cluster m. The
second, third and fourth variances are model-based:
V^M(
^(Z);W;Z) =
1
N2 W 2  (1 W )2
(W   1)

N W
0

^(Z)

N W
0B@ W
 1
1CA ;
using di¤erent estimates for 
^(Z). First we use an infeasible estimator, namely the true
value for 
(Z). Second, we specify

ij(Z; ) =
8>><>>:
2S + 
2
" if i = j,
2S if i 6= j; Si = Sj.
We estimate 2P and 
2
S using moment-based estimators, and plug that into the expression
for the covariance matrix. For the third variance estimator in this set of three variance
estimators we specify

ij(Z; ) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
2D + 
2
S + 
2
P + 
2
" if i = j,
2D + 
2
S + 
2
P if i 6= j; Pi = Pj,
2D + 
2
S if Pi 6= Pj; Si = Sj,
2D if Si 6= Sj; Di = Dj,
and again use moment-based estimators.
The fth and last variance estimator allows for more general variance structures within
states, but restricts the correlations between individuals in di¤erent states to zero. This
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estimator assumes 
 is block diagonal, with the blocks dened by states, but does not
impose constant correlations within the blocks. The estimator for 
 takes the form

^STATA;ij(Z) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
"^2i if i = j,
"^i  "^j if i 6= j; Si = Sj,
0 otherwise,
leading to
V^STATA =
1
N2 W 2(1 W )2
 (W   1)

N W
0

STATA(Z)

N W
0B@ W
 1
1CA :
This is the variance estimator implemented in STATA and widely used in empirical work.
In Table 3.4 we report the actual level of tests of the null hypothesis that  = 0 with a
nominal level of 5%. First consider the two columns with random assignment of states to the
treatment. In that case all variance estimators lead to tests that perform well, with actual
levels between 5.0 and 7.6%. Excluding the STATA variance estimator the actual levels are
below 6.5%. The key nding is that even if the correlation pattern involves pumas as well
as divisions, variance estimators that ignore the division level correlations do very well.
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When we do use the minimum wage states as the treatment group the assignment is
no longer completely random. If the correlations are within state, all variance estimators
still perform well. However, if there are correlations at the division level, now only the
variance estimator using the true variance matrix does well. The estimator that estimates
the division level correlations does best among the feasible estimators, but, because the
data are not informative enough about these correlations to precisely estimate the variance
components, even this estimator exhibits substantial size distortions. The same pattern, but
even stronger, emerges with the NE/ENC states as the treatment group.
3.9 Conclusion
In empirical studies with individual level outcomes and state level explanatory variables,
researchers often calculate standard errors allowing for within-state correlations between
individual-level outcomes. In many cases, however, the correlations may extend beyond
state boundaries. Here we explore the presence of such correlations, and investigate the im-
plications of their presence for the calculation of standard errors. In theoretical calculations
we show that under some conditions, in particular random assignment of regulations, corre-
lations in outcomes between individuals in di¤erent states can be ignored. However, state
level variables often exhibit considerable spatial correlation, and ignoring out-of-state corre-
lations of the magnitude found in our application may lead to substantial underestimation
of standard errors.
In practice we recommend that researchers explicitly explore the spatial correlation struc-
ture of both the outcomes as well as the explanatory variables. Statistical tests based on
Mantel statistics, with the proximity based on shared borders, or belonging to a common
division, are straightforward to calculate and lead to exact p-values. If these test suggest
that both outcomes and explanatory variables exhibit substantial spatial correlation, we rec-
ommend that one should explicitly account for the spatial correlation by allowing for a more
exible specication than one that only accounts for state level clustering.
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A Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1   Data Appendix
Variable Source Sample Notes
Metropolitain
Statistical
Area
US Census
1980, 1990,
2000
All MSAs identified across all 3
censuses. Rural areas of each
state are included as additional
geopgraphic units.
MSAs identified in some, but not
all of the censuses are included in
rural areas of each state.
Local High
Skill and Low
Skill Wages
US Census
1980, 1990,
2000
All individuals ages 25-55
working at least 35 hours per
week and 48 weeks per year.
Local wages in each MSA are
averages of workers for each skill
level living in each city. High skill
worker is defined as a worker with
at least a 4 year college degree.
All other workers are considered
low skill.
Local Housing
Rent
US Census
1980, 1990,
2000
All households where the head-of-
household is between the ages of
25 and 55 and works at least 35
hours per week and 48 weeks per
year.
Rental rates are measured as the
gross rent, which includes both the
housing rent and the cost of
utilities.  Rents are imputed for
households which own their home.
Imputed rents are converted from
housing values using a discount
rate of 7.85 percent (Peiser and
Smith 1985), to which electricity
and gas utility costs are added.
Local College
Employment
Ratio
US Census
1980, 1990,
2000
All employed workers between
the ages of 25 and 55.
College employment ratio is
defined as the ratio of number of
employed workers in the city with
a 4 year college degree to the
number of employed lower skill
workers living in the city.
Worker's Race
US Census
1980, 1990,
2000
All households where the head-of-
household is between the ages of
25 and 55 with positive wage
earnings.
A household is classifed as black
if the head of household reports
his race as black.
Worker's
Immigrant
Status
US Census
1980, 1990,
2000
All households where the head-of-
household is between the ages of
25 and 55 with positive wage
earnings.
A household is classifed as an
immigrant if the head-of-
household was born outside of the
United States.
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Variable Source Sample Notes
Property
Crimes and
Violent
Crimes per
1000
Residents
FBI
Uniform
Crime
Reports
1980, 2000
All non-rural MSAs which the
FBI data covers.
EPA Air
Quality Index
Envionment
al
Protection
Agency
All non-rural MSAs which the
EPA reports data on.
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A.2 Estimation Appendix
A.2.1 Labor Demand
The parameters to be estimated in cities labor demand curves are (; H ; L) :  governs
the slope of rmslabor demand curves and H and L measure endogenous productivity
spillovers driven by citiescollege employment ratios.
Throughout the appendix, I use a change of variables dening the high and low skill
exogenous productivities:
ln


1=
jt (1  jt)

= "Hjt
ln


1=
jt jt

= "Ljt:
These variable denitions are useful for showing how Njt is computed for estimation, but
have no economic impact on the model. City j0s inverse labor demand is:
wHjt = ct + ln


1=
jt (1  jt)

+ (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnHjt + H ln

Hjt
Ljt

wLjt = ct + ln


1=
jt jt

+ (1  ) lnNjt + (  1) lnLjt + L ln

Hjt
Ljt

Njt =

jt

Hjt
Ljt
L
Ljt + (1  jt)

Hjt
Ljt
H
Hjt
 1

: (A.1)
A contributor to local productivity change is changes in the productivity levels of the
industries located within each city. I measure these observable local productivity shocks by
interacting cross-sectional di¤erences in industrial employment composition with national
changes in industry wage levels, separately for high and low skill workers. I refer to these as
Bartik shocks, as represented byBHjt and B
L
jt. The aggregate Bartik shock, which weights
the two skill group specic Bartik shock by the share of a citys employment made up of
each skill group is represented by Balljt : Industry classications are those used in the 1980,
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1990 and 2000 Census, which is very close to 3 digit SIC code classications. See equations
(1:18) and (1:21) in the main text for the exact denition.
Since I do not observe all other contributors to local productivity changes, I rewrite the
labor demand equations by explicitly dening~"Hjt and~"
L
jt; which represent all productivity
changes of high and low skill workers, respectively, unaccounted for by the Bartik shocks
BHjt ;B
L
jt:
~"Hjt = w
H
jt  
0B@ ct + HBBHjt + (1  ) lnNjt
+(  1) lnHjt + H ln

Hjt
Ljt

1CA (A.2)
~"Ljt = w
L
jt  
0B@ ct + LBBLjt + (1  ) lnNjt
+(  1) lnLjt + L ln

Hjt
Ljt

1CA : (A.3)
While the direct impact of Bartik shocks lead to shifts in local labor demand curves,
the interaction of the Bartik shocks with citieshousing markets creates variation that can
identify the labor demand parameters. Heterogeneity in housing supply elasticity will lead to
di¤erences in population changes in response to a given Bartik shock. Land unavailable for
housing development due to geographic features, xgeoj ; as well as land-use regulation, x
reg
j ;
impact local housing supply elasticity. The interaction of these housing supply elasticity
measures with local Bartik shocks can be used as instruments for quantities of labor within
the city.
This leads to the following moments:
 Bartik Shocks uncorrelated with unobserved productivity changes:50
50These moments only identify the coe¢ cients which measure the Bartik shocks direct impact on wages.
They do not directly identify any of the structural labor demand parameters.
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E
 
~"HjtB
H
jt

= 0
E
 
~"LjtB
L
jt

= 0
 Bartik shocks interacted with housing supply elasticity measures are uncorrelated with
unobserved productivity changes:
E
 
~"HjtB
H
jtx
geo
j

= 0
E
 
~"HjtB
H
jtx
reg
j

= 0
E
 
~"LjtB
L
jtx
geo
j

= 0
E
 
~"LjtB
L
jtx
reg
j

= 0
 The aggregate Bartik shock and interactions with housing supply elasticity are uncor-
related with high and low skill unobserved productivity changes:
E
 
~"LjtB
all
jt

= 0
E
 
~"HjtB
all
jt

= 0
E
 
~"LjtB
all
jt x
geo
j

= 0
E
 
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jt x
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
= 0
E
 
~"HjtB
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jt x
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j

= 0
E
 
~"HjtB
all
jt x
reg
j

= 0:
 High skill Bartik shock and interactions with housing supply elasticity are uncorrelated
with low skill unobserved productivity changes, and vice versa:
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I also include decade xed e¤ects.
To compute the moments, I need to be able to compute the unobserved changes in cities
productivities
 
~"Hjt ;~"
L
jt

, given a guess of the labor demand parameters (; H ; L), and
the data
 
wcoljt ; w
hs
jt ; Hjt; Ljt

, as seen in equations (1:19) and (1:20) :~"Hjt and ~"
L
jt depend
on the CES aggregate labor quantity in the city, Njt: Njt is a function of jt; which measures
the relative productivity of high and low skill workers, and it is not directly observable.
However, the CES functional form allows one to solve for jt in terms of observable data.
Taking the ratio of high skill wages to low skill wages in city j gives:
wHjt
wLjt
=
jtN
1 
jt

jt(1 )
r
 1 

(1  jt)H 1jt

Hjt
Ljt
H
jtN
1 
jt

jt(1 )
r
 1 

jtL
 1
jt

Hjt
Ljt
L :
Solving for jt :
jt =
wLjtH
 1+H L
jt
wHjtL
 1+H L
jt + w
L
jtH
 1+H L
jt
:
Plugging in this expression for jt into equation (A:1) ;the CES aggregate labor quantity in
the city, and rearranging gives:
Njt =
 
wLjtH
 1+H
jt L
 L
jt + w
H
jtL
 1 L
jt H
+H
jt
wHjtL
 1+H L
jt + w
L
jtH
 1+H L
jt
!1=
: (A.4)
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Thus, given a guess of the parameter values (; H ; L) and data
 
wHjt ; w
L
jt; Hjt; Ljt

from
each decade 1980, 1990, and 2000, one can compute ~"Hjt and ~"
L
jt using equations (A:2),
(A:3) ; and (A:4) : These residuals can the be used to form the labor demand moments:
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L) =
1
JT
X
jt
 
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
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jt
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9>>>>=>>>>; :
A.2.2 Housing Supply
To identify the elasticity of housing supply, one needs variation in a citys total popula-
tion which is unrelated to changes in unobserved construction costs. Dening changes in
unobserved construction costs as "CCjt ; I rewrite the housing supply curve as:
"CCjt =  ln (CCjt)
= rjt  
 
 ln (t) +
 
 + geo exp
 
xgeoj

+ reg exp
 
xregj

 ln (Hjt + Ljt)

:
I instrument for housing demand changes using the Bartik shocks discussed above. This
leads to moments:
E
 
"CCjt Zjt

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Zjt 2
8>>>><>>>>:
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The sample analog for each of these moments is measured by:
mhousing (; geo; reg) =
1
JT
X
jt
 
"CCjt Zjt

:
A.2.3 Labor Supply
Recall that the utility of worker i in city j at time t is a function of the citys wage, rent,
amenities o¤ered, the workers demographic characteristics, zi; and his state and Census
division of birth, sti; divi:
Vijt = 
zi
jt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j + "ijt
zijt = 
wziw
edu
jt   rzirjt + AzixAjt + colzi
Hjt
Ljt
:
The utility a worker with demographics z gains from any city can be written as the sum of the
common utility value of that city for all workers with demographics z,zjt; the utility value
of whether the city is located close to the workersstate of birth, stzistixstj +
divzi divi x
div
j ;
and a worker specic idiosyncratic taste for the city "ijt:
To estimate workers preferences for cities, I use a two-step estimator similar to the
methods used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) to estimate householdsdemand for
automobiles. In the rst step, I use a maximum likelihood estimator, where I treat the
common utility value of each city for each demographic group, zjt; as a parameter to be
estimated. The distributional assumption on the iid taste preferences for cities ("ijt) allow
me to form a likelihood function to maximize.51 Since "ijt is distributed Type I extreme
51While one often worries about bias in estimating xed e¤ects using a non-linear objective function, such
as maximum likelihood, I have a very large sample of individual level data (over 2 million observations for
each decade), relative to about 1000 estimated xed e¤ects per decade. The asymptotics assumes the
number of individuals goes to innity, either holding the number of cities xed or at a faster rate than the
number of cities goes to innity.
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value, the likelihood function is:
LLH(zjt; 
st; div) =
nX
i=1
log(
exp(zijt + 
stzistix
st
j + 
divzi divi x
div
j )  1(ji = j)PJ
k exp(
zi
kt + 
stzistixstk + 
divzi divi xdivk )
);
where 1(ji = j) is an indicator function of whether worker i did, in fact, choose to live in city
j and n is the total number of workers in the data. This setup allows the econometrician
to only need to observe the location choices of workers and the workersdemographics, but
not citiescharacteristics, to estimate how di¤erent types of workers value di¤erent cities.52
The maximum likelihood estimation identies a mean utility level for each city, for each
demographic group, for each decade of data. This amounts to estimating 1608 mean utility
parameters (268 cities x 6 demographic groups) in each decade. A desirable property of the
conditional logit model is that the likelihood function is globally concave. Optimizing the
likelihood function to nd the global maximum is relatively simple, since there are no local
minima.
A.2.4 Estimation of wage, local price, and amenity preferences
The second step of estimation decomposes the mean utility estimates into how workers value
wages, rents and amenities. For each demographic group, the maximum likelihood estimation
produced mean utility estimates in 1980, 1990, and 2000 for each city. I rst di¤erence the
mean utility estimates for a given city, for each demographic group across decades. The
change in a citys mean utility across a decade for workers with demographics z is driven by
changes in wages, rents, and amenities:
52An issue I do not explicitly consider is the presence of unobserved household characteristics which impact
preferences over cities. Many discrete choice models incorporate this by adding random coe¢ cients on some
product characteristics in the utility function. These can be useful for estimating realistic substitution
elasticities across products. The random coe¢ cients would allow the characteristics of the city a worker
chose to live in to inform what types of city characteristics that worker is likely to prefer. This break the
undesirable independence of irrelevent alternatives (IIA) property of conditional logit models. However,
since I do not observe any information about workerspreferences over cities beyond their rst choice cities,
any identication of the variance of random coe¢ cient parameters would be solely due to functional form
restrictions.
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zjt = 
wzwedujt   rzrjt + AzxAjt + colz

Hjt
Ljt

: (A.5)
Changes in citieswages, rents, and college employment ratios are observed in the data.
However, other amenity changes are unobserved by the econometrician. Dene zjt as the
change in utility value of city j0s amenities unobserved to the econometrician across decades
for workers with demographics z:Formally, zjt is dened by:
zjt = 
AzxAjt:
Plugging this into equation (A:5) :
zjt = 
wzwedujt   rzrjt + colz

Hjt
Ljt

+zjt:
If the changes in unobserved amenities across decades were uncorrelated with the changes in
local wages, rents, and endogenous amenities, then the equation above could be estimated
by regressing the changes in mean utilities on the changes in local wages, rents, and college
concentration. However, since wages, rents, and the college employment ratios are simulta-
neously determined with workerscity choices, exogenous changes in local amenities will be
correlated wages, rent, and college employment ratio changes.
To identify workerspreferences for citieswages, rents, and endogenous amenities, Bartik
productivity shocks and their interaction with housing supply characteristics are used as
instruments for these endogenous outcomes. Since Bartik productivity shocks are driven by
national changes in industrial productivity, they are unrelated to local exogenous amenity
changes. While local housing supply elasticity characteristics, such as coastal proximity and
mountains, likely are amenities of a city, they do not change over time. The identifying
assumption is that housing supply elasticity characteristics are independent of changes in
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local exogenous amenities.
Identifying workers preferences for endogenous amenities is equivalent to identifying
workerspreferences for a citys college employment ratio. The lefthand side of the estimating
equation is equal to a demographic groups mean utility level for each city, which is identied
o¤ of population di¤erences across cities. A city has a high mean utility if a large share of all
workers nationwide, within a demographic group, choose to live there. The populations of all
demographic groups within a city also determine a citys college employment ratio. While
population is both on the left and right hand side of the estimating equation, variation
in citiescollege employment ratios is not solely driven by any given demographic group.
For example, variation in citieslow skill populations impacts the college employment ratio,
holding the high skill local population xed. Variation in citiescollege employment ratios
driven by Bartik shocks and their interactions to housing supply elasticity is driven by how
these local shocks di¤erentially impact high and low skill workers. Thus, the migration
response of a given demographic group to the set of Bartik productivity shocks and their
interactions with housing supply elasticity depends on how these shocks jointly inuence
local wages, rents, and college employment ratios. Intuitively, workers preferences for a
citys college employment ratio is identied o¤ how other demographic groups respond to
the local Bartik shocks.
This leads to the following moment restrictions:
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Decade xed e¤ects are also included.
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The sample analog for each of these moments is measured by:
mutilz
 
w; r; col

=
1
JT
X
jt
 
zjtZjt

:
The labor demand, housing supply, and labor supply moments are all used together to jointly
estimate all parameters using a 2-step GMM estimator. Standard errors are clustered by
MSA in all estimating equations. Standard errors for the worker preference estimates account
for the fact that the mean utilities are estimated. However, since the rst step is estimated
o¤ such a large dataset, this additional source of error does not have a meaningful e¤ect on
the standard errors of worker preference estimates.
A.3 Dynamic Adjustment & Equilibrium Stability
Since a citys college share endogenously determines a citys productivity and amenity level,
there could be many possible equilibrium outcomes. The equilibrium selected will depend
on initial conditions and the dynamic adjustment mechanism of wages, rents, amenities,
and population. Under the true dynamic adjustment process, the equilibrium selected in
the data is likely to be stable. While I have not modeled or estimated the determinants
of the dynamic adjustment process, I will assume a simple dynamic adjustment process to
assess whether the observed equilibrium outcomes in the data are stable, given the models
parameter estimates.
Consider a dynamic adjustment mechanism where in each year t % of the US population
considers moving to a new city, while (1  )% remain xed in their current location. Let
g
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA be a function that maps the population distribution of migrants across cities
in year t   1,
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA ; to the city choices of the migrate population in year t: Total
population in each city in year t is then the combination of the migrants city choices and
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the population distribution of non-migrants from the previous year, as represented by the
function f :
0B@ Ht
Lt
1CA = f
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA ; (A.6)
f
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA = g
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA+ (1  ) 
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA : (A.7)
Ht = (H1t; H2t; :::HJt) ;
Lt = (L1t; L2t; :::LJt) :
The migrants choose where to live in year t based o¤ of the wages, rents, and amenities
observed in year t 1:Workers do not take into account the impact of their migration or the
expected migration of others on citieswages, rents, and amenities in the following period.
The wages, rents, and amenities in each city in year t 1 are the citys labor demand, housing
supply, and amenity levels given the population in year t   1: Thus, I am assuming labor
demand, housing supply, and amenity supply fully respond to population changes from the
previous period. An alternative approach would be to allow wages, rents, and amenities to
sluggishly adjust to population changes each period. Each migrant moves to the city which
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o¤ers him the highest utility. Formally, g is parameterized as:
g
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H and L are the sets of high and low skill workers nationwide, respectively. The utility each
migrant worker would receive from each city in period t  1 is:
Vijt = uijt + "ijt;
uij
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA = wi weduj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + ri rj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + coli Hjt 1Ljt 1 + ij
+sti stix
st
j + 
div
i divi x
div
j ;
where
 
wi ; 
r
i ; 
col
i ; ij; 
st
i ; 
div
i

are the migrants preferences as determined by his demo-
graphics.
The wages and rents workers expect to receive in each city are dened as:
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wHj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) = c+ (1  ) lnNj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + (  1) lnHjt 1 + H ln

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ln (Hjt 1 + Ljt 1) + "CCj :
These represent labor demands and housing supplies which fully adjust to the population
levels in year t  1:
Migrant workers gain utility in period t  1 based on the city they choose to migrate to.
Worker are myopic under this dynamic because they do not take into account that they will
only have a % chance of being able to migrate again the following period. They migrate
based on the current periods wages, rents, and amenities. However, other workers may
also nd the same city appealing, and the aggregate migration responses of all workers will
impact the wages, rents, and amenities in the following period. I do not argue that this
dynamic adjustment process mimics the actual migration dynamics of workers in reality, but
it is a simple dynamic and useful for considering the stability of equilibria. Blanchard &
Katz (1992) and other work nds that migration only partially responds to utility di¤erences
across states each year. This fact could motivate using this dampened migration dynamic.
Fixed points of this dynamic adjustment mechanism are equilibria of the model:
0B@ Ht
Lt
1CA = f
0B@ Ht
Lt
1CA :
To calculate f; I plug in the models parameter estimates of labor demand, labor supply,
housing supply, and the inferred levels of exogenous productivity, amenities, and construction
costs. By construction, the population distribution of workers observed in the data is in
equilibrium. To test for stability, I hold the population distribution xed at that observed
in the data and test whether the magnitude of all eigenvalues of the Jacobian of f are less
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than 1. When 0    0:07; the equilibrium observed in the data in 1980, 1990, and 2000
are all stable. However, for  > 0:07; the Jacobian of f has eigenvalues below -1 in some
years. While this model can potentially have a large set of possible equilibria, the equilibria
observed in the data are stable under this assumed migration dynamic.
If a large fraction of the population can migrate each period ( > 0:07) and workers do
not take into account the expected migration of others, the dynamic adjustment process can
cycle, where cities oscillate between being high college share, desirable cities, to low college
share, undesirable cities.
To build intuition for why the dynamic can oscillate, I simulate this dynamic adjustment
process for a simple two city case. I simplify the model to a two skill group model, ignoring
preference heterogeneity of immigrants and Blacks. I also ignore workerspreferences to live
their state of birth.
I create two cities with identical housing supply curves and exogenous amenity levels.
I allow city 1 to exogenously be more productive than city 2 for college workers, but both
cities are equally productive for non-college workers. The citiesexogenous productivities
are set to:
"H1 = 1:5
"L2 = 1
"L1 = "
L
2 = :5
Housing supply elasticities are set to the estimated average citys housing supply elasticity:
1 = 2 = 0:16:
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The citieslabor demand and housing supply curves are:
wHj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) = (1  ) lnNj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + (  1) lnHjt 1 + H ln

Hjt 1
Ljt 1

+ "Hj ;
wLj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) = (1  ) lnNj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + (  1) lnLjt 1 + L ln

Hjt 1
Ljt 1

+ "Lj ;
rj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) = j ln (Hjt 1 + Ljt 1) :
(; H ; L) ; are set the estimated values (0:563; 0:555; 0:020) ;as reported in Table 1.3. I
set exogenous amenities equal in both cities, and I normalize them to 0. Workers (non-
random) utility value for each city is then:
uij
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA = wi weduj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + ri rj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + coli Hjt 1Ljt 1 :
Plugging in the model estimated worker preferences from Table 1.3 gives:
uHj
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA = 1:41wHj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1)  :95rj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + 3:38Hjt 1Ljt 1 ;
uLj
0B@ Ht 1
Lt 1
1CA = 4:12wLj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1)  2:80rj (Hjt 1; Ljt 1) + 1:36Hjt 1Ljt 1 :
I set the mass of college workers in the nation equal to one and the mass of non-college
workers equal to 3. This gives a nationwide college share of 0.25, which is the share of
college workers observed in the data from 1990.
I simulate this dynamic starting the population distribution equal across both cities:
H1t=0 = H2t=0 = :5
L1t=0 = L2t=0 = 1:5:
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I simulate the dynamic adjustment varying the share of workers which can migrate period,
as measured by  in equation (A:7) : I plot the dynamic adjustments in Figure A.1. The
gure shows that for  2 f0:05; 0:25; 0:5g ; the dynamic adjustment process converges to an
equilibrium. However, for  = 0:75; the dynamic oscillates between each city being high
wage, high rent, high skill to low wage, low rent, low skill. Intuitively, a city that has a high
college share appears desirable to high and low skill workers. Both groups migrate in to the
desirable city, but the in-migration of the low skill overwhelms the migration of the high skill.
This sharply lowers the college share in the following period, making the city undesirable,
leading to large out-migration. By dampening the migration process, the migration response
each period to desirable cities does not drive down the utility of that city as much in the
following period. This allows the dynamic to converge to an equilibrium.
While I have only evaluated dynamic adjustment and stability under a simple assumed
dynamic, future work could attempt to estimate the dynamics of this system. Under a
known dynamic adjustment process, counterfactual policy experiments, such as place-based
policies, could be run to assess the possible equilibrium outcomes for di¤erent cities.
A.4 Comparison of Productivity Estimates to Outside Research
The large literature studying the nationwide increases in the college wage gap nds that
the advent of computers and the internet has led to increases in high skill productivity and
decreases in low skill productivity.53 Computers substitute for routine tasks often performed
by low skill workers such as the tasks performed by bookkeepers, bank tellers, and secretaries.
Computers complement non-routine abstract tasks often performed by high skill workers
such as computer scientists, engineers, and physicians. Recent work by Autor and Dorn
(2012) shows that the commuting zones (a geographic unit similar to MSAs) that historically
employed workers in routine tasks experienced more wage growth for high skill workers, along
53See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a review of this literature.
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with larger wage declines for low skill workers employed in routine tasks from 1980-2005.54
Additionally, work by Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010) shows how cities most likely to
adopt new computer technology are those with higher skill workforces, since the returns to
the technology adoption in high skill areas are higher. Thus, a validation check of my model
is whether the locations which Autor and Dorn (2012) measure to have a historically high
share of employment in occupations requiring routine tasks and the locations which Beaudry,
Doms, and Lewis (2010) measure to have the highest rates of computer technology adoption
coincide with my models predictions of which cities experienced the largest amounts of skill
biased technological change.
Appendix Table A.5 reports the MSA which had the largest increases in the gap between
high skill productivity and low skill productivity, which measures how skill biased local
productivity change was. While Autor and Dorn (2012) and Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis
(2010) do not directly report a city ranking based on their metrics, from looking at cities
labeled on their graphs, the cities ranking highest on routine tasks share include New York,
NY, Chicago, IL, San Francisco, CA, Detroit, MI, Milwaukee, WI, and Providence, RI.
My model ranks New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Milwaukee in the top ten largest
increases in the skill biased productivity change. Cities ranking lowest for routine task share
include: Fresno, CA, West Palm Beach, FL, New Orleans, LA, Virginia Beach, VA, Orlando,
FL, and Scranton, PA. The model predicts Fresno, CA and New Orleans LA to be in the
top ten cities with the least amount of skill bias productivity change.
The cities ranking highest on computer adoption, as measured by Beaudry, Doms, and
Lewis (2010) are: San Francisco Bay Area, CA, Seattle, WA, Washington DC, Houston,
TX, Boston, MA and Dallas, TX. The model ranks San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA, San
Jose, CA, Seattle-Everett, WA, Houston-Brazoria, TX, Dallas-Fort Worth, TX and Boston,
54Autor and Dorn (2012) also focus on the polarization of the labor market by comparing wage changes of
non-routine, low skill jobs, mainly comprised of local service occupations, with the wages of routine, low-skill
jobs. Modeling local wage changes for di¤erent types of low skill workers within an MSA is beyond the scope
of this paper and a point of future research.
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MA-NH in the top ten largest increases in the local productivity gap.55
The cities with the largest increases in low skill productivity are very di¤erent loca-
tions. The city with the largest increase in low skill productivity, a mere 5.3% increase,
was Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point, NC, followed by Austin, TX, Riverside-San
Bernardino,CA, Fresno, CA, and Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, MA/RI. Greensboro-
Winston Salem-High Point, NC is known for large textile, tobacco, and furniture corpora-
tions. While some manufacturing jobs in these industries have left, the area remains the
national center for textile manufacturing. The area has more recently focused on attracting
technology industries to the area. For example the computer manufacturer Dell Inc opened a
computer assembly plant in the area during the early 2000s. This area is still highly focused
on manufacturing and has fared better than other manufacturing towns during the 80s and
90s. The cities with the largest decreases in low skill productivity represent the areas hit
hardest by the manufacturing decline. The largest low skill productivity declines were in
Pittsburgh, PA, followed by Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA, San Jose, CA, Milwaukee, WI,
and Seattle-Everett, WA.
One reason some manufacturing towns fared better than others during the 80s and 90s
is based on their exposure to Chinese exports. Work by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2012)
analyzes which citieshad large amounts of their labor force employed in industries that
faced the most competition from the increased penetration of Chinese exports. They nd
the cities which were most exposed to Chinese export competition experienced wage and
employment declines, particularly for low skill workers. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2012)
reports the top 10 Commuting Zones of the 40 largest commuting zones which experienced
the largest exposure to Chinese export competition from 1990 to 2007. I compare this to my
list of locations with top 10 largest productivity declines for low skill workers. My ranking
is taken from the sample of the 75 largest MSAs, unlike Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2012)s
sample, which contains only the largest 40 commuting zones. Three cities in my top 10 list
55Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010) does not explicitly report which cities had the least computer adoption,
which prevents doing a comparison.
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are too small to be included in Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2012)s list. Of the remaining seven
cities, four cities appear in both lists: San Jose, CA, Milwaukee, WI, Boston, MA-NH, and
Chicago, IL. This provides further evidence that the model predictions about productivity
di¤erences across space ts well with outside knowledge on which cities are thought to have
higher or lower productivity levels.
A.5 College Share Changes and Housing Supply Elasticity
While local productivity changes appear to be the predominant driver of changes in cities
employment, cities with less elastic housing supplies have also experienced larger increases
in their college shares. Appendix Table A.6 shows that cities with less elastic housing supply
have had larger increases in wages, rents, and college employment ratios. This phenomenon
can be explained by the national increase in population over time. As the nations population
grows larger, the cities with less elastic housing supply will experience relatively higher
increases in housing rents. Since low skill workers have a higher demand elasticity with
respect to rent than higher skill workers, the rent increases in inelastic cities will lead to more
out migration of low skill than high skill workers. This, in turn, leads to larger increases in the
college employment ratios of housing inelastic cities. Increases in a citys college employment
ratio raises all workerswages, as shown by the estimates for citieslabor demand curve, as
well as increase the citys amenities. These e¤ects will mitigate the out-migration driven by
the initial increase in the citys rent, keeping the rent high in these housing inelastic cities.
Thus, nationwide population growth over time should lead to larger increases in wages, rents,
and college employment ratios in housing inelastic cities.
To test whether the observed relationship between college share growth and housing
supply elasticity is consistent with the models predicted equilibrium response to nationwide
population growth, I simulate this counterfactual scenario. I hold xed the exogenous
productivity and amenities levels of cities in 1980, but I allow the nationwide population to
shift from its 1980 level to the level observed in 2000. This population change includes both
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the overall increase in the number of people, as well as the changes in characteristics of the
population, such as the increase in the average education level of the population.
Using the 2000 population but the 1980 exogenous amenity and productivity levels, I
solve for the equilibrium wages, rents, and population distribution. Since this model can
have multiple equilibria, I must select between equilibria. The equilibrium is selected by
assuming a process of how workers adjust to local wages, rents, and amenities. I assume
an adjustment process which is a simplied version of the iterated best response learning
dynamic often used to solve dynamic games in industrial organization. (See Pakes and
McGuire (2001).) To solve for the equilibrium, I take the worker population of 2000 and
assume these workers start out living in the cities based on the population distribution
observed in 1980. I then compute what local wages, rents, and amenities would be based
on this population distribution across cities. I then allow 5% of workers to migrate between
cities based on this new set of wages, rents, and amenities.56 I dont allow 100% of workers
to adjust to cities wages, rents, and amenities instantaneously to allow for a sluggish
adjustment process. There is a large amount of evidence that workers slowly adjust to
wages across space.57 After these 5% of workers have migrated, I recompute new local
wages, rents, and amenities and iterate on this process until it converges. I have tried a
variety of alternative starting population distributions and population adjustments rates.
While the nal equilibrium can di¤er slightly based on these choices, all equilibria which I
have been able to compute exhibit very similar patterns of how workers sort into cities with
di¤erent housing supply elasticities.
Using the counterfactual equilibrium college employment ratios across cities, I measure
the change in each citys college employment ratio from the observed level in 1980 to the
counterfactual level in 2000. Appendix Table A.7 shows regressions of these counterfactual
college employment ratio changes on each citys inverse housing supply elasticity. I nd
56The 1980-2000 census show that 12% of workers move between MSAs within a 5 year period. I have
tried a variety of migration adjustment rates between 1% and 10% and all yield similar results.
57See Blanchard and Katz (1992) for a study on the properties of worker migration dynamics.
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that cities with less elastic housing supplies would have had larger increases their college
employment ratios.
To gauge whether the magnitude of sorting across areas with di¤ering housing supply
elasticities in this counterfactual is similar to that observed in the real data, I run the same
regression using the actual changes in cities college employment ratios on cities inverse
housing supply elasticities. Appendix Table A.7 shows that the coe¢ cient on this regression
is almost identical to the regression using the counterfactual college shares. A test of whether
these coe¢ cients are the same cannot be rejected. As further evidence, I regress the coun-
terfactual college employment ratio changes on the actual college employment ratio changes
across cities. Appendix Table A.7 shows that a coe¢ cient of 1 cannot be rejected, meaning
that the magnitude of sorting across cities with di¤ering housing supplies can be explained
by the nationwide population change from 1980 to 2000. However, the R squared of this re-
gression is only 0.084. The interaction of nationwide population growth with housing supply
elasticity heterogeneity mechanism does not explain very much of the observed changes in
citycollege employment ratios, the overwhelming driver is local productivity change.
A.6 Microfounding Endogenous Amenities
I microfound the endogenous amenities in a city by modeling them as local goods, such as
bars, restaurants, and dry cleaners. While this setup provides a possible mechanism of how
increases in a citys college share could lead to more desirable amenities, I do not intend to
argue that this mechanism is the main driver behind my estimated results. Other important
possible mechanisms include direct preferences for more educated neighbors, peer e¤ects
within the local school system leading to better schools, or changes in crime or air quality.
Since many of my observable amenities involve the amount of local goods per-capita, I focus
on that mechanism here.
I assume that all workers have a taste for variety in the local goods available. By modeling
the rms which produce local goods as monopolistically competitive, increases in a citys total
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income across all residents leads to a larger variety of local goods and services available.
However, for a given number of local goods available in the city, I assume that increases in
population leads to congestion within the city, which lowers workersutility. For a given
number of stores, increases in population will lead to longer lines within each store, as well
as more tra¢ c congestion on city streets. Since college educated workers earn more income
than lower educated workers, an increase in a citys college population will increase the
variety of goods available in the city by a larger amount than an increase in the population
of lower skill workers. However, increases in the population of each education group lead
to the same amount of congestion in the city. If the increase in the variety of local goods
outweighs the congestion costs for high skill workers, but not for low skill workers, then the
overall desirability of the citieslocal goods is increasing is college workers and decreasing in
non-college workers.
A.6.1 Workersdemand for local goods
Let worker a of type edu; earn a wage W edujt in city j. He consumes a national good O,
housing M , and local goods k where the total number of local goods is Kjt:58 The price of
the national good is Pt; the price of housing is Rjt; and the price of each local good is Pkjt:
The worker also consumes the exogenous amenities in city. The consumption value of local
amenities, such as parks and climate, are freely consumed by all city residents He maximizes
his utility function subject to his budget constraint:
max
O;H;q1;::qK
ln
 
O1  

+ ln (M) + ln
 X
k
qk
!

  c(Hjt + Ljt)
Kjt
+ Ajt
s:t: PtO +RjtM +
X
k
Pkjtqk  W edujt :
58I only allow workers to be heterogeneous based in their wage in this setup. Allowing richer preferenence
heterogeneity does not change the results, but complicates exposition.
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Utility from the consumption of local goods is measured by ln (
P
k q

k)

 : Workers have a
love of variety for local goods k; as represented by the CES functional form:The amount of
consumption of good k is represented by qk: Higher levels of qk measures both consumption
of higher qualities of k as well as higher quantities. For example, consider the consumption
of co¤ee at a co¤ee shop. Higher values of q could represent buying a large size instead of
a small, or it could represent buying a higher quality co¤ee such as a latte, instead of drip
co¤ee.
To consume the local goods, the worker must paya congestion cost, c (Hjt+Ljt)
Kjt
; propor-
tional to the number of shoppers per store in the city. For a given number of local goods,
Kjt; increases in the city population creates crowding at local stores, as well as more tra¢ c
congestion in the city streets. If there are a fewer number of stores per-capita, each consumer
must drive further, on average, within the city to get to each store, causing more congestion.
The congestion cost is proportional to the number of consumers, but does not depend on
the amount each consumer spends on each good. For example, driving a given distance to
either Walmart or Whole Foods leads to similar amounts of tra¢ c, even if the Whole Foods
consumer will spend more money on their journey.
Demand for each local product k; as a function of its price pkjt; is equal to the sum of
each individuals demand. Since workers are identical, except that workers with di¤erent
education earn di¤erent wages, the product demand function is:
q (pkjt) =
 (pkjt)
  1
1 
 
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt
P
k p
  
1 
kjt
 :
A.6.2 Firmssupply of local goods
There are a large number of potential entrants into the local goods market in city j: Each
rm has identical production costs equal to:
c (qkjt) = Ft + Rjtqkjt:
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There is a xed cost of operation, Ft. The marginal cost of production depends on the
housing rental rate Rjt and  measures the amount of store space needed to stock amount
qjkt. Local good producers must rent a storefront to sell their products and they must rent
a larger space to sell a larger quantity. Since qjkt measures both quality and quantity, this
can be thought of both the need for space to store larger quantities of goods, as well as
the extra needs for space to store higher quality goods. For example, fresh juice requires a
refrigerator, while juice from concentrate only requires shelf space.
Firms maximize prots by pricing such that marginal cost equals marginal revenue:
max
Pkjt
kjt = max
pkjt
pq (Pkjt)  Ft   Rjtq (Pkjt) :
Each rms pricing equation is:
Pjkt = Pjt =
Rjt

:
Since rmsall have identical marginal costs, and workers have CES preferences, all goods
within the same city have the same price, which I will refer to as Pjt.
The number of local good produced in the city is pinned down from a free entry condition.
Since rms can freely enter, equilibrium prots must equal zero.
kjt =
Rjt

q

Rjt


  Ft   Rjtq

Rjt


= 0:
Since all products have identical prices and workerspreferences are symmetric across prod-
ucts, each rms total revenue is equal to the total amount of expenditure on local goods
within the city, 
 
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt

; divided by the total number of products for sale in
the local goods market, K.

 
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt

K
  Ft   Rjt

 
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt

Rjt

K
= 0:
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Solving for K :
K =
(1  )   WHjtHjt +WLjtLjt
Ft
: (A.8)
The number of local goods for sale within a city is increasing in population and wages.
A.6.3 Comparative Statics
Returning to workersutility functions of each city, I solve for the workers indirect utility
function. Since the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, the workers expenditure share on
housing is equal to ; the total expenditure share on local goods is , which makes the
expenditure share on national goods equal to (1    ) : The indirect utility function is:
Vijt = (1    ) ln
 
(1    )W edujt
Pt
!
+  ln
 
W edujt
Rjt
!
+ ln
 X
k
 
W edujt 
KRjt
!! 1
  c(Hjt + Ljt)
Kjt
+ Ajt:
Since all local products have the same price and worker preferences are symmetric across
products, each worker divides his local goods expenditure equally across all local goods.
Dropping terms which do not vary across cities and grouping like terms gives:
Vijt = ln
 
W edujt
  (+ ) ln (Rjt) +  1  


ln (Kjt)  c(Hjt + Ljt)
Kjt
+ Ajt: (A.9)
Since both housing and local goodsprices reect housing costs, the coe¢ cient on the
housing rental rate reects consumption both on housing and local goods. Equation (A:9)
also explicitly shows the trade o¤ between increases in the number of local good providers,
Kjt; and increases in congestion costs c
(Hjt+Ljt)
Kjt
:
I now plug in the equilibrium number of local good providers in the city, equation (A:8) ;
and drop terms which do not vary across cities. This leads to the indirect utility function
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rewritten as:
Vjt = ln
 
W edujt
  (+ ) ln (Rjt) +  1  


ln
 
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt

 c Ft (Hjt + Ljt)
(1  )   WHjtHjt +WLjtLjt + Ajt:
Taking comparative statics of utility with respect to high skill population gives:
@Vijt
@Hjt
= 

1  


WHjt
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt| {z }
Utility gain from increase in variety
  cFt
(1  ) 
 
WLjt  WHjt

Ljt 
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt
2 > 0| {z }
Utility gain from decreased congestion
: (A.10)
Equation (A:10) show that increases in a citys high skill population leads to a net utility
gain from the expansion of local product variety and changes in the congestion costs. Since
high skill workersincomes allows them to expand the product market more than lower skill
workers, population per local good provider falls. This lowers congestions costs by decreasing
the number of shoppers per store.
Similarly, the utility impact from increases in non-college population is:
@Vijt
@Ljt
= 

1  


WLjt
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt| {z }
Utility gain from increase in variety
  cFt
(1  ) 
 
WHjt  WLjt

Hjt 
WHjtHjt +W
L
jtLjt
2| {z }
Utility loss from increased congestion
:
An increase in low skill workers in the city will expand the local good market. However,
since the low skill population cannot support as many stores per worker as the high skill
population, increases in the low skill population lead to more crowding in each store. The
overall utility impact of low skill population increases is ambiguous, and depends on whether
the utility gain from the love of variety outweighs the utility cost of additional congestion.
If the overall utility impact of low skill population changes is negative, then amenities,as
measured by the desirability of the local goods market, is increasing in high skill population
and decreasing in low skill population.
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Appendix Table 1.8 shows the reduced form causal e¤ect of a citys college employment
ratio on many local amenities. Using high and low skill industrial labor demand shocks as
instruments for citiescollege employment ratios, I nd high college employment ratios leads
to more apparel stores per capita, eating and drinking places per capita, and movie theaters
per capita. The college employment ratio also decreases property crime rates and improves
local air quality. This motivates using the ratio of college to non-college residents of a city
as an index for the desirability of local endogenous amenities.
A.7 Supplementary Tables and Figures
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Largest Increases in College Amenities
Δ
Amenity
Largest Increases in Non-College
Amenities
Δ
Amenity
Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.904 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.439
Las Vegas, NV 0.827 Boston, MA-NH 0.410
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 0.804 Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 0.389
Boston, MA-NH 0.742 Rochester, NY 0.382
Providence-Fall River, MA/RI 0.738 Harrisburg-Lebanon--Carlisle, PA 0.352
Orlando, FL 0.722 Atlanta, GA 0.346
Tacoma, WA 0.682 Syracuse, NY 0.336
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 0.679 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 0.335
Atlanta, GA 0.670 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 0.333
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 0.665 Pittsburgh, PA 0.328
Largest Decreases in College
Amenities
Δ
Amenity
Largest Decreases in Non-College
Amenities
Δ
Amenity
Fresno, CA - Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA -
Baton Rouge, LA 0.006 Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 0.027
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.011 San Diego, CA 0.031
Tulsa, OK 0.038 Fresno, CA 0.040
San Jose, CA 0.052 San Jose, CA 0.057
Oklahoma City, OK 0.054 San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.061
Houston-Brazoria, TX 0.114 Sacramento, CA 0.093
New Orleans, LA 0.127 Honolulu, HI 0.106
Miami-Hialeah, FL 0.140 Miami-Hialeah, FL 0.121
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton, CT 0.158 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, FL 0.122
Best Amenities, College Workers,
1980 Amenity
Best Amenities, Non-College Workers,
1980 Amenity
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 2.889 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 1.213
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 2.530 San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.956
Washington, DC/MD/VA 2.492 San Diego, CA 0.910
Denver-Boulder, CO 2.285 Phoenix, AZ 0.855
New York-Northeastern NJ 2.167 Honolulu, HI 0.829
Seattle-Everett, WA 2.143 Denver-Boulder, CO 0.818
Chicago, IL 2.126 San Jose, CA 0.816
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 2.117 Tampa-St. Pete-Clearwater, FL 0.773
Atlanta, GA 2.039 New York-Northeastern NJ 0.728
Houston-Brazoria, TX 2.021 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, FL 0.728
Table A.3: Largest and Smallest Amenity Changes across 75 Largest Cities
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Worst Amenities, College Workers,
1980 Amenity
Worst Amenities, Non-College
Workers, 1980 Amenity
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA - Syracuse, NY -
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 0.075 Rochester, NY 0.013
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 0.112 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 0.042
Syracuse, NY 0.117 Toledo, OH/MI 0.044
Harrisburg-Lebanon--Carlisle, PA 0.183 Harrisburg-Lebanon--Carlisle, PA 0.045
Toledo, OH/MI 0.210 Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 0.050
Rochester, NY 0.457 Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 0.051
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.464 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.120
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.507 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.126
Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, MA/RI 0.583 Grand Rapids, MI 0.148
Best Amenities, College Workers,
2000 Amenity
Best Amenities, Non-College Workers,
2000 Amenity
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 2.473 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.892
Washington, DC/MD/VA 2.414 Phoenix, AZ 0.820
Boston, MA-NH 2.290 Denver-Boulder, CO 0.737
Atlanta, GA 2.282 Seattle-Everett, WA 0.714
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 2.279 Boston, MA-NH 0.710
Denver-Boulder, CO 2.277 San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.695
Seattle-Everett, WA 2.259 Tampa-St. Pete-Clearwater, FL 0.695
Phoenix, AZ 2.202 Atlanta, GA 0.691
New York-Northeastern NJ 2.102 Las Vegas, NV 0.689
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 2.096 New York-Northeastern NJ 0.658
Worst Amenities, College Workers,
2000 Amenity
Worst Amenities, Non-College
Workers, 2000 Amenity
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA - Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA -
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 0.121 Toledo, OH/MI 0.008
Syracuse, NY 0.200 Syracuse, NY 0.015
Harrisburg-Lebanon--Carlisle, PA 0.221 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.042
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 0.238 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 0.056
Toledo, OH/MI 0.288 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.062
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.431 Rochester, NY 0.073
Akron, OH 0.436 Harrisburg-Lebanon--Carlisle, PA 0.075
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.440 Grand Rapids, MI 0.096
Fresno, CA 0.485 Akron, OH 0.117
Notes: Sample reports top and bottom 10 from the 75 biggest cities by 1980 population. Local amenities are
inferred from model estimates. Local high and low skill amenities are normalized to 0 in city least with the least
desirable amenities in 1980 and 2000. Units measure the log wage value equilvalent to the utility difference
between the amenities in the given city and the city normalized to 0. See text for further details.
Table A.3 (Continued)
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Δ Prod. Δ Prod.
San Jose, CA 0.442 Greensboro-Winston Salem, NC 0.053
Boston, MA-NH 0.423 Austin, TX 0.050
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.402 Riverside-San Bernardino,CA 0.029
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.356 Fresno, CA 0.021
Providence-Fall River, MA/RI 0.344 Providence-Fall Rivert, MA/RI 0.017
Austin, TX 0.341 San Antonio, TX 0.017
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson SC 0.340 Tacoma, WA 0.016
New York-Northeastern NJ 0.337 Memphis, TN/AR/MS 0.012
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 0.334 Las Vegas, NV 0.008
Chicago, IL 0.332 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT -0.002
Δ Prod. Δ Prod.
Rochester, NY 0.089 Pittsburgh, PA -0.176
Baton Rouge, LA 0.125 Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA -0.133
New Orleans, LA 0.138 San Jose, CA -0.131
Fresno, CA 0.160 Milwaukee, WI -0.114
Syracuse, NY 0.173 Seattle-Everett, WA -0.112
Toledo, OH/MI 0.176 Boston, MA-NH -0.111
Oklahoma City, OK 0.187 Chicago, IL -0.106
Knoxville, TN 0.189 Akron, OH -0.104
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.202 Louisville, KY/IN -0.101
Honolulu, HI 0.202 Detroit, MI -0.098
Prod. Prod.
Washington, DC/MD/VA 0.518 Detroit, MI 0.463
San Jose, CA 0.439 Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 0.444
Houston-Brazoria, TX 0.394 Toledo, OH/MI 0.394
New York-Northeastern NJ 0.386 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 0.357
Rochester, NY 0.379 Riverside-San Bernardino,CA 0.354
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton, CT 0.359 Cleveland, OH 0.346
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.345 Milwaukee, WI 0.345
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 0.330 Las Vegas, NV 0.345
Denver-Boulder, CO 0.328 Akron, OH 0.342
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.327 Pittsburgh, PA 0.339
Most Productive, Non-College Workers, 1980
Table A.4: Largest and Smallest Productivity Changes across 75 Largest MSAs
Largest Decreases in Non-College Productivity
Largest Increases in Non-College ProductivityLargest Increases in College Productivity
Largest Decreases in College Productivity
Most Productive, College Workers, 1980
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Prod. Prod.
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 0.000 Austin, TX 0.000
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 0.058 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.048
Las Vegas, NV 0.080 Washington, DC/MD/VA 0.064
Providence-Fall River, MA/RI 0.084 San Antonio, TX 0.121
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.099 Knoxville, TN 0.148
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson SC 0.101 Greensboro-Winston Salem, NC 0.151
Riverside-San Bernardino,CA 0.108 Boston, MA-NH 0.161
Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee, MA 0.108 Miami-Hialeah, FL 0.163
Tacoma, WA 0.124 Atlanta, GA 0.163
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.132 Memphis, TN/AR/MS 0.168
Prod. Prod.
San Jose, CA 0.611 Riverside-San Bernardino,CA 0.361
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.477 Detroit, MI 0.343
New York-Northeastern NJ 0.453 Las Vegas, NV 0.331
Washington, DC/MD/VA 0.451 Tacoma, WA 0.324
Boston, MA-NH 0.448 Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 0.293
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton, CT 0.398 Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 0.290
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 0.395 Toledo, OH/MI 0.288
Chicago, IL 0.375 Grand Rapids, MI 0.273
Houston-Brazoria, TX 0.356 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 0.251
Philadelphia, PA/NJ 0.354 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 0.243
Prod. Prod.
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 0.000 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.000
Las Vegas, NV 0.024 Washington, DC/MD/VA 0.015
Fresno, CA 0.039 Austin, TX 0.028
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 0.056 Boston, MA-NH 0.029
Tacoma, WA 0.058 Knoxville, TN 0.097
Riverside-San Bernardino,CA 0.073 San Jose, CA 0.097
Toledo, OH/MI 0.076 Miami-Hialeah, FL 0.100
Oklahoma City, OK 0.106 Tucson, AZ 0.103
Tucson, AZ 0.118 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 0.111
Baton Rouge, LA 0.119 Birmingham, AL 0.112
Table A.4 (Continued)
Notes: Sample reports top and bottom 10 from the 75 biggest cities by 1980 population. Local productivity is
inferred from model estimates. Local high and low skill productivities are normalized to 0 in city least
productive in 1980 and 2000. Unit measure differnece in log wages between cities directly due to productivity
differences. Some MSA names shortened to fit in table column. See text for further details.
Least Productive, Non-College Workers, 2000Least Productive, College Workers, 2000
Most Productive, College Workers, 2000
Least Productive, College Workers, 1980 Least Productive, Non-College Workers, 1980
Most Productive, Non-College Workers, 2000
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MSA
Δ Log
Prod.
Gap MSA
Δ Log
Prod.
Gap
San Jose, CA 0.320 San Jose, CA 0.580
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.272 Boston, MA-NH 0.520
Boston, MA-NH 0.270 San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.468
Houston-Brazoria, TX 0.246 Chicago, IL 0.437
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.237 Louisville, KY/IN 0.398
Chicago, IL 0.235 Seattle-Everett, WA 0.395
Pittsburgh, PA 0.232 Milwaukee, WI 0.388
Phoenix, AZ 0.225 Pittsburgh, PA 0.387
Seattle-Everett, WA 0.222 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.376
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 0.219 New York-Northeastern NJ 0.366
MSA
Δ Log
Prod.
Gap MSA
Δ Log
Prod.
Gap
Fort Wayne, IN 0.052 Fort Wayne, IN 0.055
Columbia, SC 0.062 Rochester, NY 0.123
Greensboro-Winston Salem, NC 0.063 Greensboro-Winston Salem, NC 0.127
Colorado Springs, CO 0.084 Fresno, CA 0.138
Tacoma, WA 0.088 New Orleans, LA 0.160
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.094 Syracuse, NY 0.171
San Antonio, TX 0.094 Tacoma, WA 0.178
Las Vegas, NV 0.099 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.194
Rochester, NY 0.099 Columbia, SC 0.207
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 0.100 Las Vegas, NV 0.208
Table A.5: Largest and Smallest Productivity Gap Changes across 75 Largest Cities
Notes: Sample reports top and bottom 10 from the 75 biggest cities by 1980 population. Local productivity is
inferred from model estimates. Change in local productivity gap is defined as the difference between the change
in local high skill productivity and low skill productive from 1980 to 2000. Unit measure differneces in the
increase in local college wages gaps between cities directly due to productivity differences. Exogenous
productivity changes are inferred from the residual of labor demand equations, while total productivity changes
include by the exogenous change and the endogenous response due to changes in the local college employment
ratio. See text for further details.
Largest Exogenous Changes in Log College/Non-
College Productivity Gap
Smallest Exogenous Changes in  Log
College/Non-College Productivity Gap
Largest Total Changes in  Log College/Non-
College Productivity Gap
Smallest Total Changes in Log College/Non-
College Productivity Gap
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Figure A.1: Equilibrium convergence across various migration dampening parameters, 
Notes: All gures plot di¤erence in outcome variable between city 1 and city 2. Cities 1 and 2 have identical
exogenous characteristics other than city 1 is more productive for high skill than city 2. See text for details on
dynamic adjust process.
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B Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Income Tax
B.1.1 Government
The local government of city j charges an income tax  j to workers who choose to reside
within the city. The local government also produces government services, which cost sj
for each worker in the city. Nj measure the population of city j: The local rent seeking
government maximizes:
max
j ;sj
 jwjNj   sjNj
B.1.2 Workers
All workers are homogeneous. Workers living in city j inelastically supply one unit of labor,
and earn wage wj: Each worker must rent a house to live in the city at rental rate rj and pay
the local income tax  j:Workers value the local amenities as measure by Aj:The desirability
of government services sj is represented by g (sj) : Thus, workersutility from living in city
j is:
Uj = wj (1   j)  rj + Aj + g (sj) :
Workers maximize their utility by living in the city which they nd the most desirable.
B.1.3 Firms
All rms are homogenous and produce a tradeable output Y:Cities exogenously di¤er in
their productivity as measured by j. Local government services impact rms productivity,
as measured by b(sj): The production function is:
Yj = jNj + b(sj)Nj + F (Nj) ;
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where F 0 (Nj) > 0 and F 00 (Nj) = 0 in labor: I assume a completely elastic labor demand
curve to focus on the role of housing supply elasticity in setting tax rates.
The labor market is perfectly competitive, so wages equal the marginal product of labor:
wj = j + b(sj) + F
0 (Nj) :
B.1.4 Housing
The housing market is identical to the setting described in the main text in Section 2.2.4.
The housing supply curve is:
rj = aj + j log (Nj) ;
j = x
house
j
where xhousej is a vector of city characteristics which impact the elasticity of housing supply.
B.1.5 Equilibrium in Labor and Housing
Since all workers are identical, all cities with positive population must o¤er equal utility to
workers. In equilibrium, all workers must be indi¤erent between all cities. Thus:
Uj = wj (1   j)  rj + Aj + g (sj) = U:
Plugging in labor demand and housing supply gives:
(j + b(sj) + F
0 (Nj)) (1   j)  aj   j logNj + Aj + g (sj) = U: (B.1)
Equation (B:1) determines the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities.
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B.1.6 Government Tax Competition
The government maximizes:
max
sj ;j
 jwjNj   sjNj:
The rst order conditions are:
0 = wj j
@Nj
@sj
+  jNj
@wj
@Nj
@Nj
@sj
 Nj   sj @Nj
@sj
(B.2)
0 =  j

@wj
@Nj
@Nj
@ j
Nj + wj
@Nj
@ j

+ wjNj   sj @Nj
@ j
:
Di¤erentiating equation (B:1) to solve for @Nj
@sj
and @Nj
@j
gives:
@Nj
@sj
= Nj
(1   j) b0 (sj) + g0 (sj)
j
> 0
@Nj
@ j
=  Nj (j + b(sj) + F
0 (Nj))
j
< 0: (B.3)
Population increases with government services and decreases in taxes. Plugging these into
(B:2) and combining the rst order conditions shows that government services are provided
such that the marginal benet
  
1   j

b0 (sj) + g0 (sj)

equals marginal cost (1) :
 
1   j

b0
 
sj

+ g0
 
sj

= 1:
This is the socially optimal level of government service, given the tax rate.
The equilibrium tax revenue per capita is:
wj

j = j + s

j : (B.4)
To analyze the e¤ect of housing supply elasticity on governmentsability to extract rent
from taxes, I di¤erentiate the tax markup with respect to the slope of the inverse housing
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supply curve, j:
@
@j
 
wj

j   sj

= 1 > 0: (B.5)
The government can extract more rent through higher taxes in a city with a less elastic
housing supply with a income tax instrument.
B.2 Property Tax
B.2.1 Government
The local government of city j charges a property tax  j to workers who choose to reside
within the city. The local rent seeking government maximizes:
max
j ;sj
 jrjNj   sjNj
B.2.2 Workers
Workersutility from living in city j facing a property tax  j is:
Uj = wj   rj (1 +  j) + Aj + g (sj) :
B.2.3 Firms
The production function is:
Yj = jNj + b(sj)Nj + F (Nj) ;
where F 0 (Nj) > 0 and F 00 (Nj) = 0 in labor: I assume a completely elastic labor demand
curve to focus on the role of housing supply elasticity in setting tax rates.
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The labor market is perfectly competitive, so wages equal the marginal product of labor:
wj = j + b(sj) + F
0 (Nj) :
B.2.4 Housing
The housing market is identical to the setting described in the main text in Section 2.2.4.
The housing supply curve is:
rj = aj + j log (Nj) ;
j = x
house
j
where xhousej is a vector of city characteristics which impact the elasticity of housing supply.
B.2.5 Equilibrium in Labor and Housing
Since all workers are identical, all cities with positive population must o¤er equal utility to
workers. In equilibrium, all workers must be indi¤erent between all cities. Thus:
Uj = wj   rj (1 +  j) + Aj + g (sj) = U:
Plugging in labor demand and housing supply gives:
(j + b(sj) + F
0 (Nj)) 
 
aj + j logNj

(1 +  j) + Aj + g (sj) = U: (B.6a)
Equation (2:1) determines the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities.
B.2.6 Government Tax Competition
The government maximizes:
max
sj ;j
 jrjNj   sjNj:
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The rst order conditions are:
0 = rj j
@Nj
@sj
+  jNj
@rj
@Nj
@Nj
@sj
 Nj   sj @Nj
@sj
(B.7)
0 =  j

@rj
@Nj
@Nj
@ j
Nj + rj
@Nj
@ j

+ rjNj   sj @Nj
@ j
: (B.8)
Di¤erentiating equation (2:1) to solve for @Nj
@sj
and @Nj
@j
gives:
@Nj
@sj
= Nj
b0 (sj) + g0 (sj)
j (1 +  j)
> 0
@Nj
@ j
=  Nj rj
j (1 +  j)
< 0: (B.9)
Combining the rst order conditions shows that government services are provided such that
the marginal benet (b0 (sj) + g0 (sj)) equals marginal cost (1) ; which is the same nding for
an income tax and head tax:
b0
 
sj

+ g0
 
sj

= 1:
Plugging (B:9) into (B:8) and rearranging shows the equilibrium tax revenue per capita
is:
rj

j = j + s

j : (B.10)
Di¤erentiating the tax markup with respect to the slope of the inverse housing supply curve,
j:
@
@j
 
wj

j   sj

= 1 > 0: (B.11)
The government can extract more rent through higher taxes in a city with a less elastic
housing supply using a property tax instrument. In the case of a property tax, as opposed to
a head tax, there are four mechanisms through which a tax rate change impacts government
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revenue. To break these down, I rewrite the tax rate rst order condition:
0 =  jrj
@Nj
@ j| {z }
Decline in revenue due
to population decrease
+  j
@rj
@Nj
@Nj
@ j
Nj| {z }
Decline in revenue
due to rent decrease
+ rjNj|{z}
Additional tax revenue
from each resident
  sj @Nj
@ j| {z }
Government services
cost savings
(B.12)
First, the amount of out-migration driven by a tax hike is inuenced by the local housing
supply elasticity. This is the rst term of equation (B:12) : Second, the out-migration lowers
rents and directly impacts tax revenues since the tax revenue is a percentage of housing rents.
This is the second term of equation (B:12) : However, the housing supply elasticity will not
impact the size of the rental rate decrease in response to a tax hike. To see this, recall the
equilibrium condition, equation (B:6a) : For workers to derive utility U from this local area,
the utility impact of a tax increase must be perfectly o¤set by a rent decrease.59 Thus, the
equilibrium rental rate response to a given tax increase does not depend on the local housing
supply elasticity. Indeed, the housing supply elasticity determines the migration response
required to change housing rents in order to o¤set the utility impact of the tax increase.
Thus, a more inelastic housing supply decreases the elasticity of government revenue with
respect to the tax rate, giving the government more market power when using a property
tax instrument.
The third and forth terms of equation (B:12) show a tax increase raises government rev-
enues from each household and lowers the cost of government services due to out-migration.
These channels also appear in the case of a head tax instrument.
59Since I have assumed a perfectly elastic labor demand curve, the rental rate response to a tax increase
would be the same in any city. However, if labor demand was not perfectly elastic, then the rental rate
response to a tax increase could di¤er with housing supply elasticity, since housing supply elasticity would
inuence the relative incidence of the tax rate on wages versus rents.
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C Chapter 3 Appendix
For the general model, leaving aside terms that do not involve unknown parameters, the log
likelihood function is
L(jY) =  1
2
ln (det(
(Z; )))  "0 1(Z; )"=2:
The matrix 
(Z; ) is large in our illustrations, with dimension 2,590,190 by 2,590,190.
Direct maximization of the log likelihood function is therefore not feasible. However, because
locations are measured by puma locations, 
(Z; ) has a block structure, and calculations
of the log likelihood simplify and can be written in terms of rst and second moments by
puma. We rst give a couple of preliminary results.
Theorem 11. (Sylvesters Determinant Theorem) Let A and B be arbitrary M N
matrices. Then:
det(IN + A
0B) = det(IM +BA0):
Proof of Theorem 11: Consider a block matrix
 
M1 M2
M3 M4

. Then:
det
 
M1 M2
M3 M4

= det
 
M1 0
M3 I

det

I M 11 M2
0 M4 M3M 11 M2

= detM1 det(M4  M3M 11 M2)
similarly
det
 
M1 M2
M3 M4

= det
 
I M2
0 M4

det

M1 M2M 14 M3 0
M 14 M3 I

= detM4 det(M1  M2M 14 M3)
Letting M1 = IM ;M2 =  B;M3 = A0;M4 = IN yields the result.
Lemma 12. (Determinant of Cluster Covariance Matrix) Suppose C is an NM
matrix of binary cluster indicators, with C0C equal to a M M diagonal matrix,  is an
arbitrary M M matrix, and IN is the N-dimensional identity matrix. Then, for scalar 2",
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and

 = 2IN +CC
0 
C = + 2(C
0C) 1;
we have
det(
) = (2)
N M det(C0C) det(
C):
Proof of Lemma 12: By Sylvesters theorem:
det(
) = (2)
N det(IN +C=
2
C
0) = (2)
N det(IM +C
0C=2)
= (2)
N det(IM +C
0C
C=2   IM) = (2)N det(C0C) det(
C=2)
= (2)
N M
Y
Np

det(
C):
Lemma 13. Suppose Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. Then for any N N matrix 
,
E [W0
W] =
M1  (M1   1)
M  (M   1)  
0
N
N +
M1 M0
M  (M   1)  trace (C
0
C) :
Proof of Lemma 13: We have
E[Wi Wj] =
8><>: M1=M if 8m;Cim = Cjm;(M1  (M1   1))=(M  (M   1)) otherwise:
it follows that
E[WW0] =
M1  (M1   1)
M  (M   1)  N 
0
N +

M1
M
  M1  (M1   1)
M  (M   1)

CC0
=
M1  (M1   1)
M  (M   1)  N 
0
N +
M1 M0
M  (M   1) CC
0:
Thus
E[W0
W] = trace (E[
WW0])
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= trace


 

M1  (M1   1)
M  (M   1)  N 
0
N +
M1 M0
M  (M   1) CC
0

=
M1  (M1   1)
M  (M   1)  
0
N
N +
M1 M0
M  (M   1)  trace (C
0
C) :
Lemma 14. Suppose the N N matrix 
 satises

 = 2"  IN + 2C CC0;
where IN is the N N identity matrix, and C is an N M matrix of zeros and ones, with
CM = N and C0N = (N=M)M , so that,

ij =
8>>>><>>>>:
2" + 
2
C if i = j
2C if i 6= j;8m;Cim = Cjm;
0 otherwise;
(C.1)
Then, (i)
ln (det (
)) = N  ln  2"+M  ln1 + NM  2C2"

;
and, (ii)

 1 =  2"  IN  
2C
2"  (2" + 2C N=M)
CC0
Proof of Lemma 14: First, consider the rst part. Apply Lemma 12 with
 = 2C  IM ; and C0C =
N
M
 IM ; so that 
C =

2C + 
2
" 
M
N

 IM :
Then, by Lemma 12, we have
ln det(
) = (N  M)  ln(2") +M  ln(N=M) + ln det(
C)
= (N  M)  ln(2") +M  ln(N=M) +M  ln

2C + 
2
" 
M
N

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= (N  M)  ln(2") +M  ln

N
M
2C + 
2
"

= N  ln(2") +M  ln

1 +
N
M
 
2
C
2"

:
Next, consider part (ii). We need to show that
 
2"  IN + 2C CC0

 2"  IN  
2C
2"  (2" + 2C N=M)
CC0

= IN ;
which amounts to showing that
  
2
"  2C
2"  (2" + 2C N=M)
CC0 + 2C CC0 2"  CC0 
4C
2"  (2" + 2C N=M)
CC0 = 0:
This follows directly from the fact that C0C = (N=M)  IM and collecting the terms.
Proof of Lemma 5: The unbiasedness result directly follows from the conditional unbi-
asedness established in Lemma 4. Next we establish the second part of the Lemma. By the
Law of Iterated Expectations,
VU(Z) = V

E
h
^ j Y(0);Y(1);Z
i
j Z; N1

+ E
h
V

^
Y(0);Y(1);Z j Z; N1i (C.2)
= E
h
V

^
Y(0);Y(1);Z j Z; N1i
where the second line follows since ^ols is unbiased. By Lemma 4, we have:
E
h
V

^
Y(0);Y(1);Z j Z; N1i = E" N
N0 N1  (N   2)
NX
i=1
("i   ")2 j Z; N1
#
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Observe that we can write:
NX
i=1
("i   ")2 = ("  N 0N"=N)0("  N 0N"=N)
= "0"  2"0N 0N"=N + "0N N N 0N"=N2
= "0"  "0N 0N"=N:
Hence:
VU(Z) =
N
N0 N1  (N   2)E ["
0"  "0N 0N"=N jZ; N0; N1]
=
N
N0 N1  (N   2) trace (E [""
0   0N""0N=N jZ; N0; N1])
=
N
N0 N1  (N   2) (trace (
(Z))  
0
N
(Z)N=N)
which establishes (3.11). Finally, we prove the third part of the Lemma. By Lemma 2, ^ols
is unbiased conditional on Z;W, so that by argument like in Equation (C.2) above, we can
also write:
VU(Z) = V

E
h
^ j Z;W
i
j Z; N1

+ E
h
V

^
Z;W j Z; N1i
= E
h
V

^
Y(0);Y(1);Z j Z; N1i
which equals E [VR (Y(0);Y(1);Z) j Z; N1] by (C.2).
Suppose Assumptions 1 holds with 
(Z) satisfying trace(
(Z))=N ! c for some 0 < c <
1, and 0N
(Z)N=N2 ! 0, and Assumption 3 holds with N1=N ! p for some 0 < p < 1.
Then
N  (VINC   VU(Z)) p ! 0; and N  VINC p ! c
p  (1  p) :
Proof of Lemma 6: We will rst show that the second claim in the Lemma holds,
N  VINC p ! c
p  (1  p) ; (C.3)
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and then show that
N  VU p ! c
p  (1  p) ; (C.4)
which together prove the rst claim in the Lemma.
Consider (C.3). By the conditions in the Lemma, ^ and ^ are consistent for  and ,
and therefore the probability limit of ^2 is the probability limit of
PN
i=1
PN
i=1 "
2
i =N which is
the probability limit of trace(
(Z)=N). Then
plim (N  VINC) = plim
 
1
N
NX
i=1
"2i 
N2
N0 N   1
!
= plim

trace(
(Z))
N
 N
2
N0 N1

=
c
p  (1  p) :
Now consider (C.4). By the conditions in the Lemma,
N  VU =

1
N   2 trace(
(Z)) 
1
N  (N   2)
0
N
(Z)N

 N
2
N0 N1
=
N
N   2 
1
N
trace(
(Z))  N
2
N0 N1  
N
N   2 
1
N2
0N
(Z)N 
N2
N0 N1
p! c
p  (1  p) :
Proof of Lemma 9: To show the rst part of the Lemma, observe that under constant
cluster size,
^ols =
PM
m=1(
~Ym   ~Y )2( ~Wm   ~W )P
m(
~Wm   ~W )2
where ~Ym = (N=M) 1
P
i : Cim=1
Yi, and
~Y =M 1
P
m
~Ym = Y , and
~W = W . Therefore, we
can apply Lemma 4, treating cluster averages ( ~Ym; ~Wm;~m) as a unit of observation, which
yields the result.
To show the second part, again by Lemma 4, ^ols is unbiased, so that by the Law of
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Iterated Expectations, and the rst part of the Lemma,
VU(Z) = V

E
h
^ j Y(0);Y(1);Z
i
j Z;M1

+ E
h
V

^
Y(0);Y(1);Z j Z;M1i
= E
h
V

^
Y(0);Y(1);Z j Z;M1i
= E
"
M
(M   2) M0 M1
MX
m=1
 
~"m   ~"
2 j Z;M1#
Hence, it su¢ ces to show that
E
"
MX
s=1
 
~"s   ~"
2Z;M1
#
=

M2
N2
 trace (C0
(Z)C)  M
N2
0
(Z)

:
Note that in general CM = N ; and under Assumption 8, it follows that C0C = (N=M)  IM :
We can write
~"m = (C
0C) 1C0" =
M
N
C0"; and ~" =
1
M
0M (C
0C) 1C0" =
1
N
0N";
so that
MX
m=1
 
~"m   ~"
2
=

M
N
C0"  1
M
M 
0
N"
0
M
N
C0"  1
M
M 
0
N"

=

M
N
C0   1
N
M 
0
N

"
0
M
N
C0   1
N
M 
0
N

"

:
= "0

M
N
C  1
N
N 
0
M
0
M
N
C0   1
N
M 
0
N

":
Thus
E
"
MX
m=1
 
~"s   ~"
2Z;M1
#
= E

"0

M
N
C  1
N
N 
0
M
0
M
N
C0   1
N
M 
0
N

"
Z;M1
= trace

E

M
N
C  1
N
N 
0
M
0
M
N
C0   1
N
M 
0
N

""0
Z;M1
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= trace

M
N
C  1
N
N 
0
M
0
M
N
C0   1
N
M 
0
N


(Z)

= trace

M
N
C0   1
N
M 
0
N


(Z)

M
N
C  1
N
N 
0
M
0
=
M2
N2
 trace (C0
(Z)C)  M
N2
 0N
(Z)N :
Proof of Theorem 10: We show
N  VU p ! c
N2m  p  (1  p)
;
and
N  VINC;CR p ! c
N2m  p  (1  p)
;
which together imply the two claims in the Theorem. First consider the rst claim. The
normalized variance is
N  VU(Z) = M
2 N
M0 M1  (M   2) N2  (M  trace (C
0
(Z)C)  0
(Z))
=
M2 N
M0 M1  (M   2) 

M
N
 trace (C
0
(Z)C)
N
  
0
(Z)
N2

:
By the conditions in the Theorem the probability limit of this expression is
plim

M2 N
M0 M1  (M   2) 

M
N
 trace (C
0
(Z)C)
N
  
0
(Z)
N2

= plim

M2 N
M0 M1  (M   2)



plim

M
N
 trace (C
0
(Z)C)
N

  plim

0
(Z)
N2

=
c
N2m  p  (1  p)
:
Next, consider the second claim. Now the probability limit of the model-based variance is
plim (N  VINC;CR(Z)) =
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plim

M2 N
M0 M1  (M   2) N2 
 
M  trace  C0
(Z; ~"; ~2S)C  0
(Z; ~"; ~2S)
= plim
 
M2 N
M0 M1  (M   2) 
 
M
N
 trace
 
C0
(Z; ~"; ~2S)C

N
  
0
(Z; ~"; ~2S)
N2
!!
=
1
Nm  p  (1  p) 
 
plim
 
M
N
 trace
 
C0
(Z; ~"; ~2S)C

N
!
  plim

0
(Z; ~"; ~2S)
N2
!
=
1
N2m  p  (1  p)
 plim
 
trace
 
C0
(Z; ~"; ~2S)C

N
!
Hence, in order to prove the second claim it su¢ ces to show that trace(C0
(Z)C) =
trace(C0
(Z; (~"; ~2S))C). The log likelihood function based on the specication (C.1) is
L(2"; 
2
SjY;Z) =  
1
2
 ln  
  Z; 2"; 2S  12 Y0
(2"; 2S) 1Y:
The expected value of the log likelihood function is
E

L(2"; 
2
SjY;Z)
Z =  1
2
ln
 


 
Z; 2"; 
2
S
  1
2
 E Y0
(Z; 2"; 2C) 1Y
=  1
2
 ln  
  Z; 2"; 2S  12  traceE h
  Z; 2"; 2S 1YY0i
=  1
2
 ln  
  Z; 2"; 2S  12  trace
  Z; 2"; 2S 1
(Z) :
Using Lemma 14, this is equal to
E

L(2"; 
2
SjY;Z)
Z =  N
2
 ln(2") 
M
2
 ln  1 +N=M  2S=2"
  1
2  2"
 trace(
(Z)) + 
2
S
2  2"  (2" + 2S N=M)
 trace (C0
(Z)C) :
The rst derivative of the expected log likelihood function with respect to 2S is
@
@2S
E

L(2"; 
2
SjY;Z)
Z =   N
2  (2" +N=M  2S)
+
trace (C0
(Z)C)
(2" + 
2
S  (N=M))2
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Hence the rst order condition for ~2S implies that
trace (C0
(Z)C) = N  (~2" + ~2S  (N=M)):
For the misspecied error-covariance matrix 
(Z; ~) we have
trace (C0
(Z; ~)C) =
MX
m=1
 
N2m  ~2S +Nm  ~2"

:
By equality of the cluster sizes this simplies to
trace (C0
(Z; ~)C) = N   ~2" + ~2S  (N=M) = trace (C0
(Z)C) :
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